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PREFACE 
In the wake of the Royal Commission Part Two Report and run up to the 
1993 State election, I penned a letter to the Editor of The West Australian 
newspaper about prospects for the reform of government arising from the 
imbroglio of 'WA Inc'. Unabashedly pessimistic in sentiment, the letter 
drew substantially upon that great work of political allegory- George 
Orwell's Animal Farm. The idea of a Conference which examined the 
legacy of the Part Two Report and might accomplish something more 
positive, namely, provide a stimulus to the reform process, had its genesis 
around this time. I wrote to Associate Professor Harry Phillips in the 
Department of Social Sciences explaining the idea. 
In co-operation with Harry and Professor Geoffery Bolton, the Conference 
developed over the ensuing year with formalisation of the programme in 
June, 1994. The Conference Committee agreed that in as much as possible, 
the holding of the Conference should await formal appointment of the 
Commission on Government. Allowing for appointment of the 
Commission, the Committee decided that the second anniversary of the 
Part Two Report, due in November 1994, afforded the best opportunity for 
a Conference of this kind. Perhaps fortuitously, rather than by intent, the 
appointment of the Commissioners coincided with the Conference proper, 
providing for a highly successful Conference and the first opportunity for 
West Australians to gain an insight into how the Commission on 
Government ('the child of the Part Two Report' ) would go about its job. 
Given the difficulties in putting together a programme of this kind, 
involving key thinkers and participants, the enthusiasm of others for the 
project was vital to its success. In this respect, the enthusiasm of Associate 
Professor Harry Phillips ( co-editor for these proceedings) and Professor 
Geoffrey Bolton from Edith Cowan University's Department of Social 
Sciences was outstanding. In the Department of Library and Information 
Science (LISC), valuable encouragement was similarly offered by Karen 
Anderson, Vicky Wilson and Department Chairperson, Marie Wilson. A 
special thanks is also due to the staff of SASTEC (Roger Vella Bonavita, Kay 
Noble, Yvette Drager and Stephanie Moir) for their work on Conference 
organisation. During the various stages of Conference planning, it had not 
been intended to produce formal proceedings for the Conference. The 
emergence of these papers (as presented with only minor editorial 
corrections) reflects the tremendous public interest generated by the 
Conference. In no small measure can this be attributed to the quality of 
presentations made at the Conference and it is to our speakers that I extend 
on behalf of Harry, Geoff and myself, a final vote of thanks. 
Mark Brogan 
USC 
Edith Cowan University 
25 November, 1994 
AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY TO THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY 
REFLECTION OF THE SECOND REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION INTO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT 
AND OTHER MATTERS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
Dr Harry Phillips, 
Associate Professor of Politics, 
Edith Cowan University. 
The Establishment of the Royal Commission 
The Royal Commission into the Commercial Activities of Government and Other 
Matters, popularly referred to as the W.A Inc. Royal Commission, unfolded into one 
of the most dramatic events in the State's political history. It provided the citizens of 
Western Australian with two most comprehensive public reports on the operations 
of government and a suggested reform framework. In addition a confidential 
report was provided for referral to the Independent Public Prosecutor. In the wake 
of constant agitation, particularly from the Opposition, members of a high profile 
group 'The People for Fair and Open Government' and a reference from the Deputy 
Ombudsman, Premier Carmen Lawrence had foreshadowed the inquiry on 19 
November 1991. 
The Governor, Sir Francis Burt, formally issued a Commission on 8 January 1992 to 
Justice Geoffrey Kennedy, of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Sir Ronald 
Wilson, formerly of the High Court of Australia, and Mr Peter Brinsden, retired 
Judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. They were to inquire and report on 
whether there had been corruption, illegal conduct, or improper conduct by any 
person or corporation in the affairs, investment decision and business dealings of 
the Government of Western Australia or its agencies, instrumentalities and 
corporations in respect of twelve matters listed in an accompanying schedule and 
dating as far back as 1977 in the case of financial assistance by government to 
Bunbury Foods Proprietary Limited (see Appendix One). 
The original reporting date for the Commission, allocated a six million dollar 
budget, was to be January 1992. However, the Commissioners were required to seek 
extensions of time as after nine months they had completed hearings in only three 
areas namely; the Fremantle Gas and Coke sale, the Northern Mining Diamond Deal 
and the Burswood Casino Licence. In the second half of 1991 the huge Rothwell's 
inquiry and its companion aspects, the K winana petrochemical project, the Bell 
share deal and the St. George's Terrace land sales had dominated the inquiry. Still 
to be considered were the sales agreements for the purchase of natural gas from the 
North West Shelf Joint Venturers, and the Teachers Credit Society and Swan 
Building Society rescues as well as allegations of bribery concerning planning 
decisions of the Stirling City Council for Observation city and the adequacy of the 
subsequent police investigation. The Commissioners had to abandon their original 
plan of hearing most evidence together. They commenced dual hearings in mid-
November 1992 and moved into three simultaneous hearings in December. 
On each of the terms of reference the Commissioners were to report whether 'cny 
matter should be referred to an appropriate authority with a view to the institution 
of criminal proceedings' or whether 'changes in the law of the State, or in 
administrative or decision-making procedures (were) necessary or desirable in the 
public interest'. With regard to the latter the first official indication of some of the 
matters being considered for inclusion in the final set of recommendations were 
published in a discussion paper in late November 1992. The paper identified open 
government, accountability, integrity, ethical supervision of the public sector and 
government involvement in commerce as issues central to the structure and 
operation of government. Within this framework, in the context of intense media 
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and community interest in the deliberations of the Commission, the public were 
invited to make submissions. 
In all there were some 525 separate witnesses including four former Premiers, 17 
other Ministers of departments and many others who had served on government 
instrumentalities, boards and commissions. Frequently the evidence created 
headlines and sometimes observers heard theories of modem government. In 
conclusion, the Royal Commissioners, after making a critical reference to former 
Deputy Premier David Parker's assertion that modem government's seek 'to live by 
concealment', contended (Part One, Vol. 6, 27.2.13): 
If public confidence in our institutions of government is to be restored and maintained, if 
government is to warrant the public's confidence and not its suspicion, a systematic 
reappraisal of our institutions, laws and practices is called for. 
Report of the Royal Commission Part One 
The six volume 2000 page Part One of the Report was delivered to the Governor on 
19 October 1992 and tabled in Parliament on the following day. In one paragraph 
(Part One, Vol. 6, 27.2 ), which typified the forthright language of the Report, the 
Royal Commissioners stated; 
The government system of this state exists to serve the interests of the people of Western 
Australia. Our .findings and observations provide compelling evidence that this 
fundamental purpose has not always been uppermost in the minds of our elected and 
appointed public officials, in some instances far from it. They equally demonstrate that 
the present institutional arrangements for the conduct of government cannot be relied 
upon either to ensure that government will be conducted for the public's benefit or to 
provide reassurance to the public that it is being so conducted. 
One immediate shock was Premier Lawrence's announcement that Environment 
Minister, Bob Pearce, would stand down from the Ministry and vacate his 
parliamentary seat after the forthcoming election: the Commissioners had 
concluded that Pearce along with Premier Brian Burke had acted improperly in 
making public confidential information concerning funds deposited with the 
Teacher's Credit Society by Keith Wilson, the incumbent Liberal Party President. 
The Royal Commissioners (Part One, Vol.9, 9.49-50)) did concede the words 
improper conduct 'are chameleon like their meaning varying with circumstances'. 
Nevertheless a consensus emerged 'a least in the context of the Public Service that 
improper conduct would be established where there was a gross departure from 
those standards of public administration the public are entitled to expect and which 
is otherwise inexplicable' (see also Part One, Vol.1, 1.6.57-58). Findings of improper 
conduct in these terms were made against former Premiers Brian Burke and Peter 
Dowding, as well as other senior ministers including, in addition to Pearce, David 
Parker and Julian Grill. The latter, for his part, strongly attacked the conduct of the 
Commission. 
In their 'General evaluation', the Royal Commissioners observed ~ ~ that; 
(Part One, Vol 6, 27.2,1-13); 
• ministers have elevated personal and party advantages over their constitutional 
obligation to act in the community's interests; 
• the personal associations (of some ministers) and the manner in which electoral 
contributions were obtained only create the public perception that favour could be 
bought, that favour would be done; 
• members of statutory authorities with very significant funds subject to their control 
seemed to be unaware of, or else indifferent to, their legal and public duties; 
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• in many instances the capacity of statutory instrumentalities to act in the discharge 
of their statutory obligations was severely constrained by the presence on their 
boards of public servants who represented government; 
• the processes of decision making, but more importantly the very reasons for decision 
in many matters inquired into, were often shrouded in mystery. 
• the absence of effective public record keeping has dogged this comm1sszon in its 
inquiries. Records provide the indispensable chronicle of a government's 
stewardship. They are the first defence against concealment and deception. 
• the practice of government, especially in its business relationships, changed 
markedly during the Burke years .... Effective accountability was a casualty of its 
entrepreneurial zeal. Influence in the conduct of this State's public affairs was 
captured by a small group of self-interested businessmen. 
• impropriety of considerable proportions occurred in the period into which we have 
inquired. 
By far the longest section of the Report related to the original Rothwell's rescue at the 
end of 1987 and the subsequent abortive attempt to establish a petrochemical 
complex at Kwinana. In the closing section on this term of reference the 
Commissioner's (Part One, Vol. 5, 21.1.153) remarked; 
Ultimately, however, Mr Burke and Mr Dowding must accept the responsibility for 
distressing episode in the history of Government in this State.... Unfortunately, when 
leadership was called for, none was shown. vVhen the public demanded openness, the 
truth was concealed from it'. 
Report of the Royal Commission : Part Two 
Delivered on 12 November 1992, Part Two of the Royal Commission Report 
provided the framework for certain reforms in the system of government and 
various administrative decision making procedures. The Commissioners 
concluded (Part Two, 1.1.31) they had identified: 
fundamental weaknesses in the present capacity of our institutions of government, 
including the Parliament, to exact that degree of openness, accountability and integrity 
necessary to ensure that the executive fulfils its basic responsibility to serve the public 
interest. 
The forty recommendations (see Appendix Two) to help overcome 'the deficiencies' 
of government embraced: 
• a review of the role, powers and electoral law for both houses of Parliament; 
• new codes of conduct for government ministers, public officials, ministerial 
advisers and press secretaries; 
• the establishment of a Commission for the Investigation of Corrupt and Improper 
Conduct and the creation of a Commissioner for Public Sector Standards; 
• the provision of protection for public servants who 'blow the whistle' on corrupt 
practices; 
• an overhaul of secrecy and criminal laws and the Public Service Act together with 
the Freedom of Information Act which satisfied exacting criteria; 
• new laws to govern political donations and enforce disclosure of MP's financial 
interests; 
• amendments to the Financial Administration and Audit Act and better reporting 
procedures to the Auditor General; 
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Parliament to be given overriding authority in the scrutiny of government activities, 
with the Legislative Council acting as a House of Review, and distanced from the 
Executive by debarring its members from holding ministerial office. 
The Commission on Government 
To oversee the recommendations the Commissioners recommended the 
establishment 'by legislation and without delay' of an umbrella body, a 
Commission on Government (Cc:x;), modelled in large measure on the 
Administrative Review Commission of Queensland. However, the Lawrence 
Government's attempt to pursue this course of action was forestalled when the 
enabling bill was referred by the Legislative Council to its Standing Committee on 
Legislation. When Parliament was prorogued on 16 December 1992, the 
Government announced that it would move instead to establish the Commission by 
Executive action. Expressions of interest, to be directed to the Premier, were sought 
in nationwide advertisements for membership of the Commission, only for Cabinet 
to decide, in the absence of cooperation from the Coalition, not to proceed further 
until Parliamentary approval could be obtained. 
Notwithstanding the Commissioner's recommendation that the cc:x; should be set 
up as a matter of urgency it was not until 8 July 1993 that Premier Court introduced 
the second reading into the Legislative Assembly and it was not debated again until 
December. After the summer recess the bill reached the Legislative Council in March 
1994 with attention focussed on the provisions of Clause 5a specifying that the cc:x; 
was to inquire into the matters listed in the schedule (and including the electoral 
system for each of the two houses) 'in the manner and to the extent that the 
Commission believes is warranted having regard to the prevention of corruption, 
illegality or impropriety by or involving public officials'. Although the bill was 
referred to the Legislative Council's Legislation Committee, which recommended a 
broadening of the scope of Clause 5a, the legislation was passed in its original form. 
As recommended in Part Two of the Royai Commission Report a Joint Select 
Committee was established by the Parliament to monitor and review the work of the 
Commission. The Legislative Council members from the governing Coalition were 
Barry House, Murray Montgomery and Murray Nixon with John Cowdell and 
Mark Nevill from the Labor Opposition. In the Legislative Assembly there was a 
surprise when Speaker Jim Clarko was chosen as Chairman, together with Ian 
Osborne and Max Trenordan from the Coalition. The Labor members were Dr 
Geoff Gallop and Larry Graham. The Legislative Council members had been 
appointed on 16 August 1994 while members from the Legislative Assembly were 
elected one day later. 
Premier Court in a surprise response to a question without notice on 13 September 
1994 from Dr Geoff Gallop, Opposition Accountability Spokesperson, nominated 
the members of the cc:x; without the mode of consultation with the Leader of the 
Opposition which had been implied in the Royal Commissioner's Report and the 
cc:x; Act. This announcement had been preceded by a newspaper advertisement 
seeking expressions of interest for full or part-time membership of the Commission. 
Significantly Jack Gregor, named as the full time Chairperson of the five member 
Commission, did not have the qualifications in constitutional and administrative 
law as had been recommended by the Royal Commission. Other members of the 
Commission, who like Gregor, had their appointments duly ratified by the Joint 
Select Committee, were Murdoch University lecturer ·or Frank Harman, University 
of Western Australia Associate Professor of Politics Campbell Sharman, former 
Perth City Town Clerk Reg Dawson and well known media personality Ann Conti. 
As Jack Gregor had not had a high profile his preparedness to make his first public 
address concerning his role as the full time Chairperson of the COG at the Edith 
Cowan Conference on 4 November 1994, marking the Second Anniversary of Part 
Two of the Royal Commission Report, was an important event It was learnt that 
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Gregor had been awarded a Perth Technical College Diploma in Public 
Administration and an Associateship in Public Administration from Curtin 
University. He had also undertaken studies at the International Institute of Labour 
Studies in Geneva. Later on assignment to Kuwait with the United Nations he 
worked on a new national plan for that country. Gregor, from 1960, had a long 
period of employment with the public service before joining the Western Australian 
Employers' Federation, first as an Industrial Officer and later as a member of its 
Executive Management. During this period he undertook military service and was 
commissioned as an infantry officer. In 1985 Gregor was appointed as a 
Commissioner of the Western Australian Industrial Commission and in 1990, he 
was the first Commissioner to receive a dual appointment to the Commonwealth 
Industrial Relations Commission. 
In his address to the conference Gregor indicated that he was keen to witness the 
formulation of reforms which would 'stand up to the twenty first century'. Despite 
the reservations expressed in Parliament, and the media, The Commissioner did not 
see the terms of reference as restrictive. Gregor even placed a positive construction 
on the much criticised delay of the creation of the COG. In his judgement there had 
been time for reflection which would enable the avoidance of problems such as those 
which had emerged in New South Wales with the newly established Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAq, with Ian Temby Q.C. as the inaugural 
Commissioner. Gregor, too, recognised the challenges ahead but confirmed his 
independence and a preparedness to seek submissions from the public to help ensure 
the success of his mission. At hand would be the Edith Cowan University 
Conference papers delivered by an eminent body of thinkers on the floor of the Perth 
International Hotel. The resultant discussions and media comment have provided 
Gregor and his Commissioners with a library for the COG deliberations. 
The Papers Program. 
The Conference was opened by Professor Roy Lourens, the Vice Chancellor of Edith 
Cowan University. Given his earlier career in auditing he was able to identify one 
of the main themes for the day's deliberations. As Lourens warned 'one of the 
lessons of auditing is that a deterioration of information and ethical behaviour sets 
in over time when executive actions are not exposed to independent scrutiny and 
accountability'. One of the tasks of the Conference, as Lourens recognised, was to 
'test how we can sensibly go about improving the accountability of our public life'. 
In posing the question why the excesses of WA Inc. were not exposed at an earlier 
juncture Professor Lourens suggested that renowned historian Professor Bolton 'is 
right in saying wherever the real blame lies, academics must accept some of the 
blame too. Few of us can walk away from this episode feeling that we had done all 
that could, and should, have been done. In one sense, this Conference is to revisit 
issues which we failed to properly visit in the first place'. 
As a record of this revisit the papers delivered at the Conference have been collated 
for this publication. Readers will choose to study in more detail the content of each 
address. Members of the press gallery, who attended the Conference in force, have 
already been responsible for providing wide publicity to many of the highlights. 
Their response indicated that political reform in Western Australia was a matter of 
keen public concern. Was the Court government, as The Western Australian 
newspaper editorial (7 /11/1994) asserted, 'lying doggo on reform'? 
To deliver the keynote address, with the advantage of being able to call on his 
Western Australian heritage, Ian Temby Q.C. was able to offer circumspect advice as 
he had, for five years from 1988 to 1994, been the ICAC Commissioner in New South 
Wales. In his judgement the ICAC had achieved a great deal including increased 
confidence in the public sector, more integrity in public life and substantial systemic 
change. Unfortunately, as he conceded, the achievements had been clouded in 
controversy. Nevertheless Temby proposed a similar permanent independent body 
in Western Australia to replace royal commissions of inquiry. This body wotild be 
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more effective and cheaper than royal commissions, which took time 'and had a 
chilling effect on the government process'. 
Another need recognised by Temby was for a code of conduct to be instigated for 
MPs in Australia. It was a reminder that the Report of the Parliamentary Standards 
Committee, which was tabled in 1989, urged that the Western Australian 
Parliament 'give consideration to adopting the Code of Conduct' which had been 
formulated. Temby suggested an independent body to investigate people's 
suitability to hold public office and report to Parliament, which would decide on 
appointments. Reference in his speech were also made for an induction program for 
new Members, 'to help ensure that they understand their role and do the right thing'. 
In addition it was suggested 'that the oath of allegiance have added to it an oath of 
office, analogous to that taken by new judges, by which Members of Parliament 
promise to do the right thing by all manner of people without fear of favour, 
affection or ill-will'. 
According to Temby, 'corruption, viewed simply, is the abuse of public power for 
private ends'. He paraphrased Lord Acton and said 'the greater the power, the 
greater the capacity for abuse'. 'It is therefore not surprising', said Temby, 'that the 
ICAC should have directed its attention to those who hold high political office. As 
successful politicians are not famed for their meekness, it is equally surprising that 
they should have resented and resisted those attentions, and turned their wrath 
upon the ICAC'. But as Temby also observed 'one should not be too despondent 
about the reaction of those holding elected office to the ICAC. Reactions in other 
places have been broadly similar. In Western Australia, the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission into the Commercial Activities of Government were received 
with a marked lack of enthusiasm, implementation has been slow and partial, and 
the desire of Government to make itself and its 'successors more accountable has 
been less than wildly enthusiastic'. 
Mr Michael Barker, who was one of the Counsel engaged by the Royal Commission 
to assist in the preparation of the Royal Commission Report, was dismissive of 
earlier 'ridiculous' claims by the National Party Leader and Deputy Premier, Hendy 
Cowan, that the Commissioners did not write Part Two of the Report and 
furthermore only had a few days to consider it before it was published. Barker was 
critical of the manner in which Premier Court had 'intentionally desired to limit the 
likely effectiveness of COG in the performance of its functions'. Recognising that the 
COG was based on similar lines to Queensland's Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission, Barker was forced to lament that the COG 'is certainly not, at 
birth, the child the Royal Commission had thought it conceived'. 
Barker explained that for Part Two of the Report the 'democratic principle' and 
'trust principle' had been central in formulating the reordering of political power to 
enhance the Parliament and check the Cabinet. In this respect Barker was 'withering' 
in his criticism of those who had argued that 'fair' electoral laws were not integral 
to this exercise. Barker, too, expressed 'astonishment' that new political finance 
laws for elections had not yet been enacted. Another matter given focus by Barker 
was the Court government's action in shelving the Royal Commission 
recommendation for the creation of a Commission for the Investigation of Corrupt 
and Improper Conduct (CICiq. In its place more powers had been given to the 
existing Official Corruption Commission but this was described as 'merely a pale 
imitation' of CICIC. 
Several of the Royal Commissioner's suggestions by which Parliament attempts to 
hold the Executive to account were also recalled by Barker. The mechanisms said to 
require overhaul were question time, the committee system and debate on legislative 
measures. A more fundamental change, highlighted by Barker, was the 'politics of 
review' rather than the 'politics of government' function which the Royal 
Commissioner's proposed for the Legislative Council. The upper house elected by 
proportional representation, should develop a strong committee system and !1C' 
responsible for the r;;ystematic oversight and review of the public sector. Moreover. 
i' 
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members of the Council should, in principle be prevented from holding ministerial 
office and the Council should not have the power to block supply. 
'Parliament', said Barker, 'must be made to work. The question is how. The Royal 
Commission's suggestions are plain enough, hardly utopian, but (as we have seen) 
susceptible to crude attacks from those in established political parties who strive 
only for one thing-power.' This led Barker to support the Commission's view (Part 
Two, 5.2.1) that 'the causes of decline in the effectiveness and reputation of the 
legislature in Westminster systems are well understood. They lie chiefly in the 
dominance of party machines in the work of elected representatives'. 
Professor Peter Boyce, who also assisted the preparation of the Royal Commission 
Report, also directed attention in his paper 'Accountability and the Reform Agenda' 
to why Westminster derived political systems are failing to uphold the principle of 
accountability. In fact Boyce found himself in some agreement with the submission 
to the Commission by the Royal Australian Institute of Administration 'that the 
Westminster system is not the solution to WA's problems; it is apart of the problem'. 
He also remarked 'the unpleasant fact is that no government feels very comfortable 
with the full requirements of accountability and no government wants a 
parliamentary system in which the executive does not control the numbers'. 
Although Boyce shared the Royal Commissioner's enthusiasm 'for the ideal of a 
strong system of bipartisan investigative and monitoring committees' he had grave 
doubts about this being achieved in small Westminster-style parliaments. One 
critical aspect of the Report, namely the proposal to convert the Legislative Council 
to a genuine house of review was most significant. Unfortunately Boyce could 'see 
little prospect of the present government allowing such change to occur', although he 
hoped the COG would pursue this reform. This task may have been made easier if 
the Royal Commission 'had been a little more sensitive to the likely reactions of the 
major political parties to one of their key recommendations, a reform of the electoral 
system ... .' 
Conscious of the broad terms of reference, the extraordinarily 'tight time frame', the 
mounting costs and the increasing impatience of the government heading for an 
election, Boyce was nevertheless disappointed that the Royal Commissioners were 
reluctant to tread the reform path of a revision of the Western Australian 
Constitution. Unfortunately the document 'is an unintelligible, untidy assortment of 
colonial documents' which remain 'silent on several key aspects of the operation of 
responsible government'. Given that the public knows so little of the essential 
features of the Westminster system 'they are unlikely to know how the processes of 
accountability should be played out'. 
One contentious item, sometimes contemplated but rarely articulated in public, was 
the preparedness of Boyce to address the different sorts of expertise required for the 
two parts of the Royal Commission report. It was asserted that the first inquiry 
belonged exclusively to legal counsel and members of the judiciary but the second 
'required an admixture of constitutional legal expertise and an understanding of 
political processes, especially the conventions of responsible government'. In Boyce's 
view 'neither the legal consultants nor the Royal Commissioners seemed entirely 
comfortable in confronting issues of political process, especially those relating to 
ambiguous or contested conventions of ministerial responsibility. The sphere of 
statutes, regulations, codes and tribunals, where authority is specific and 
enforceable, seemed more to their liking'. Not surprisingly this sparked a response 
from Michael Barker who later returned to the podium to state, 'I publicly reject 
unequivocally what Professor Boyce said. I reject the idea that there was some 
peculiar legal takeover and mind set'. 
Barry McKinnon, as a trained accountant, was neither a lawyer nor a political 
scientist, but was the Leader or Deputy leader of the Opposition throughout much of 
the WA Inc. period. As a campaigner for the Royal Commission he placed much of 
the blame for the abuses of WA Inc. on the key actors in government. The ends 
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justified the means by those 'motivated by power'. It was conceded by McKinnon 
that divisions within the Liberal Party and an absence of a Coalition with the 
National Party Opposition had weakened Parliament's capacity to bring the Burke 
and Dowding Government's to brook. He called for a reduction of ministers in the 
Legislative Council to help strengthen the upper house role as a watchdog on 
government. 
McKinnon, after noting the breadth of attention devoted in Part Two of the Report to 
extending the powers of the Auditor General, was critical of the lack action 
concerning this office. Similar views were expressed on the scope of the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction. He was also critical of the continued absence of 
disclosure legislation for party election funding. In a confession that he had 
changed his views as a product of his experiences in Parliament he foresaw the need 
to introduce public funding for elections as had taken place for New South Wales 
and Commonwealth Parliament elections. Nevertheless he did not believe that vote 
weighting, a characteristic of the Western Australian electoral landscape, had 
contributed to corruption. McKinnon expressed his support for the weighting 
principle and in a direct challenge to Michael Barker (and later Dr Geoff Gallop and 
Jim McGinty) contended electoral reform is not as important as some people say as 
'a break or accelerator' on the nature of the body politic. 
One of most learned critics of the historic vote weighting in Western Australia has 
been the Labor Party Deputy Leader Dr Geoff Gallop. He delivered a Conference 
Paper titled 'The High Court and Electoral Reform in Western Australia'. Gallop 
recalled that even in 1900 when the Commonwealth Constitution Bill was debated 
in the House of Commons an Irish MP had argued that a condition of entry of 
Western Australia into the federation should be 'full and fair representation' in the 
local Parliament. 
Given the recognition that their had been a change in judicial thinking since the 
Labor Party had unsuccessfully sought to reform the electoral system by judicial 
review in 1982 a decision was made to try again in the High Court rather than the 
State Supreme Court. Gallop referred to 'the constitutional entrenchment of the 
doctrine of representative government and the implied rights which follow from it, 
the spreading of the net of implications to State as well as Commonwealth laws, and 
the growing importance of international conventions and standards in 
constitutional interpretation'. In each instance Gallop provided authoritative 
evidence. However, the question remains as to how the High Court will respond. An 
affirmative decision for Labor would bring changes in representation similar in 
scale to that which the House of Representatives experienced in the USA in the 1960s 
after the Supreme Court determined that 'equal representation of equal numbers of 
people' was a 'fundamental goal'. 
Electoral matters were also central to Dr Ian Alexander's paper 'Independent 
Voices: The Two Party System, WA Inc. and Electoral Reform'. Alexander who was 
the State Member for Perth from 1987 to 1993, resigned from the ALP in 1991 after 
becoming disillusioned with the performance of his party during the WA Inc. years 
'when by-passing Parliament was something of an art form'. Now, thought 
Alexander, 'it is time to put the Royal Commission agenda back in the urgent 
basket'. A remedy suggested by Alexander was a change to the Constitution so that 
major financial decisions including all major capital items under the budget and by 
statutory and semi-government authorities be made subject to Parliamentary debate 
and approval. Parliamentary reform was necessary to avoid the situation where the 
Cabinet and Executive of the day can either dominate·both Houses of Parliament or 
even bypass a potentially hostile Parliament. Importantly, too, Alexander argued in 
a similar vein to the Royal Commission by urging the adoption of proportional 
representation and multi-member electorates for not only the Legislative Assembly 
but also the Legislative Council 'as this would lead fo a Parliament more 
representative of the plurality of views in the community .... ' 
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Parliamentary accountability in a federal system, a responsive public service, public 
sector ethics together with ministers and their advisers, rather than electoral 
systems, were the focus of Alan Peachment's analysis his paper 'WA Inc: Failure of 
the System or Crime of the Employer? Although critical of the Court government for 
its reticence in implementing key recommendations of the Royal Commission 
Peachment cautioned about the consequences of carrying the reform agenda so far as 
to shackle government or threaten individual freedoms. 
Research evidence which Peachment presented to the forum was widely reported in 
the press. In a 1991 survey when Dr Carmen Lawrence was Premier public servants 
had indicated that the infusion of ministerial advisers that had occurred from the 
beginning of the Burke regime did major political damage as it was believed that 
the new breed were poorly inducted and trained and lacking in standards of 
probity. Significantly a recent finding revealed that public servants believed ethical 
standards have deteriorated since the Court Government came to office. In addition 
it was found that 75 per cent of those surveyed believed there was a low awareness 
of the existing code of conduct 
Dr Michael Wood, during his term as the Public Service Commissioner, had issued 
guidelines for behaviour of public servants in 1988. Though they applied only to 
staff employed under the Public Service Act the Commissioner had hoped they 
would be taken into account across the public sector. In presenting an excellent 
summary of the Royal Commission's guidelines for public sector reform Wood 
recognised that the prospects of ministerial responsibility matching the Westminster 
model ideals were made more difficult by complex legal-financial arrangements of 
the federal system. Moreover Cabinet's role as the link (or 'efficient secret' as 
Bagehot suggested) between the executive and legislative branches of government is 
being altered by the increasing prominence of the office of the Premier, the agencies 
supporting that office and the electioneering methods followed by political parties. 
Moreover the 'interdependence between government agencies and functions also 
makes it very difficult for individual Ministerial responsibility to have any 
meaning and the practice of delegating authority, a necessary step, tempts 
politicians to push down to others blame for errors'. 
After canvassing public sector reforms in several Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries, and other Australian States, 
Wood contended, that Western Australia would have benefited by a major public 
service review to enable changing circumstances, particularly those pertinent to 
accountability, to be addressed. The former Public Service Board in 1985 and 1986 
had initiated changes and senior officials from the Public Service Commission, 
Treasury and Department of Cabinet had proposed reforms in publications issued 
in 1992. The Public Service Commissioner had also made proposals for a new 
legislative framework in 1991 and 1992. 
One matter addressed by Wood was the importance of record keeping to 
accountability. The Royal Commission Report in Part Two had recommended that 
the Auditor General be given access as of right to cabinet records for functions of his 
office and that the proposed state archives authority monitor compliance with 
standards set for record creation, maintenance and retention (Part Two, 4.2.11) 
The nexus between executive accountability and public recordkeeping was further 
explored in a concurrent workshop presentation by Mark Brogan. He described 
how the reform agenda in information policy in the 1980's effectively by passed the 
important area of the life cycle management of public records, an omission which 
proviqed the essential context for the 'improper' practices in public recordkeeping 
identified by the Royal Commission. In the Royal Commission's view (Part Two, 
4.3.1) 
Such practices strike at the roots of responsible government. Whether intended or not, 
the result is a false or incomplete account of the steward ship of the Government. Proper 
record keeping and effecrttJ~ record security are essentiaJ to good public administration. 
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Developing his notion of the 'electronic white board' as a metaphor for changes in 
public recordkeeping taking place as a consequence of the increasing use of digital 
technologies, Brogah predicted a further decline in public sector accountability 
arising from the use of new technologies, an outcome attributable to the fact that 
computer based information systems are seldom designed to ensure evidence. 
The extent to which Western Australian Government agencies are sensitive to issues 
in accountability arising from the use of new technologies in recordkeeping is the 
subject of a research project currently being undertaken by the Public Sector 
Electronic Recordkeeping Research Group at Edith Cowan University. Project 
Leader, and co-presenter Vicky Wilson, concluded the public recordkeeping 
presentation with a description of the research methodology of the Group and 
progress of the study to date. 
The role of the Freedom of Information Act in facilitating openness in the process of 
decision-making and allowing scrutiny of decisions and actions by government 
was discussed by Karen Anderson. The Annual Report of the Office of the Freedom 
of Information Commissioner reveals that some 75% of requests received during the 
Act's first year of operation, concerned access to personal information. The less 
common "public interest" application of the Act, has been extensively investigated by 
the West Australian. With the aid of case studies based on the West's experience, 
Anderson explained issues in the public interest application of the Act, concluding 
that many problems encountered in gaining access to information through FOI arise 
not from obfuscation or avoidance, but rather from the often poor quality of records 
management in many public agencies, suggesting the need to raise the general 
standard of public sector records management. 
Although the Westminster model of government is distinctive with it recognition of 
the Office of Leader of the Opposition, parliamentary procedure rarely provides 
such an incumbent with an opportunity to deliver policy statements. So it was not 
surprising that Jim McGinty, who had only been elected as Opposition Leader on 9 
October 1994, chose the Conference to make his first major public address. 
McGinty, after reminding listeners of some of Labor's achievements during the WA 
Inc. period, gave an 'assurance that the Labor Party in Western Australia embraced, 
without exception or qualification, all the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission in its new accountability package'. It was argued the Second Report 
was an agenda for action not a topic for discussion which should be applauded as a 
blueprint for government of the future. 'Accountability', said McGinty, 'is now a 
mainstream political issue'. 
The Legislative Council was to be given a central role in reviewing and scrutinising 
the management and operations of the public sector. To this end McGinty said the 
Council 'must gain the authority and legitimacy that can only come from electoral 
reform and proper realisation of the principle of proportional representation'. 
However, electoral reform was not enough as it was important that Parliament's 
accountability roles be enhanced by way of parliamentary committees, question 
time and executive scrutiny generally. More specifically McGinty indicated that 
Deputy Leader Geoff Gallop had prepared a package of measures for adoption 
which included equal numbers of Government and non-Government members on 
key Legislative Assembly committees, the establishment of the right of reply to brief 
Ministerial statements, the restoration of Private Member's time to at least four and 
a half hours per week, the extension of question time to 45 minutes, televising 
Parliament and more Parliamentary sitting days and iess night sittings. 
In contrast to normal parliamentary order Premier Richard Court was originally 
scheduled to follow the Leader of the Opposition to the podium. However, the 
Government's perspective was forcefully presented by the Hon. Peter Foss, MLC, the 
Minister for Health and Fair Trading. Foss asserted that 'what happened to our 
government in the 1980s stemmed simply from an inability or unwillingness on the 
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part of key individuals to judge right from wrong'. In his view nothing was wrong 
with the system and only 'some bad Labor apples spoiled the barrel'. 
The criticism of the response to this approach probably surprised the Court 
government which, in the light of very good economic indices and successful debt 
reduction strategies, was achieving record approval poll ratings. The West 
Australian (7 /11/1994) warned that the Premier and some members of his Cabinet 
'are constructing a dangerous fantasy over what happened in the WA Inc. years and 
what should be done now to protect the State's system of government and its 
reputation'. Two days later The West Australian carried a front page headline 
'Court Attacked by WA Inc. Critic'. Associate Professor Patrick O'Brien, given credit 
by Professor Lourens in his opening address to the Conference for blowing the 
whistle on WA Inc., was reported as stating: 
Mr Foss's argument that the corruptions of WA Inc. were solely the result of individual 
immorality is not only self serving it is reminiscent of Maximilien Robespierre's claim 
on behalf of the Jacobins (of the 18th century French Revolution) that, because they were 
incorruptible, they could be trusted with absolute powers'. 
Professor O'Brien then interpreted Minister Foss's pronouncements as suggestive of; 
a high degree of political authoritarianism and end[ing] hopes that the Court 
Government might have acted as the party of genuine reform in WA. Rather, it is now 
the principal party of reaction. 
Of course the Commission on Government is yet to table any of its reports and the 
Court-Cowan Coalition government has time to consider its legislative response to 
whatever recommendations may be forthcoming. The jury is still out on whether the 
Court Government has politically erred with its response to the Second Report. 
What role WA Inc. will play in the scheduled 1997 election will be fascinating for 
psephologists. In the opinion of some commentators, the Court Government's 
tardiness in its approach to the reform recommendations has already meant it may 
have lost the 'high moral ground' which the Royal Commission had inadvertently 
delivered to their side of politics. 
The WA Inc. Royal Commission did bring politics to the people with an 
unprecedented air of drama. Alan Carpenter, the well known ABC television 
compere who reported daily on the Royal Commission sittings, told the conference 
that sections of the public were angry, bewildered and confused with the 
revelations. He said that 'it was mind boggling' that despite what had been 
documented about political donations in party politics, no legislation had yet been 
given assent by the Western Australian Parliament. Whether the coverage of the 
drama accorded too closely to Chomsky's notion of 'manufactured consent' was 
queried by Carpenter. Significantly, too, although Carpenter was the final (and most 
entertaining) speaker at the Conference, he was the first to raise questions about the 
fairness of the proceedings and the extent to which David Parker may have been 
damaged by hearsay evidence. As the anchor person for the local ABC 7:30 Report, 
Alan Carpenter will shoulder significant responsibility for conveying to the public 
the deliberations of COG. 
The conference proceedings have provided an opportunity for a more complete and 
proper understanding of what the Royal Commission envisaged. Perhaps in two 
years it may be necessary to conduct a reflection of what the COG has delivered. 
Sections of the media and some members of the academic community have been 
criticised fqr failing to raise the 'alarm bells' over many of the W.A. Inc matters. 
'Past as Prologue' has gone some way to re-establish academic involvement in 
public debate about arrangements for government in Western Australia, an 
involvement which its organiser's hope will grow as COG gets dctwn to its 
formidable task. 
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WELCOME SPEECH 
Professor Roy Lourens 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Edith Cowan University 
Welcome to this timely Conference on the Royal Commission into Commercial 
Activities of Government and Other Matters. 
It is now almost exactly two years since Part II of the Report of the Commission was 
presented to the Governor of Western Australia. The three Royal Commissioners 
concerned, Sir Ronald Wilson, Peter Brinsden and Chairman Geoffrey Kennedy, 
worked long and hard on their enquiries and conclusions. 
The Commissioners covered a wide range of topics. In Part II of their Report, they 
made some 40 recommendations, after concluding that there were "fundamental 
weaknesses in the present capacity of our institutions of government, including the 
Parliament, to exact that degree of openness, accountability and integrity necessary to 
ensure that the executive fulfils its basic responsibility to serve the public interest". 
It is a salutary reminder that the heady days of W.A. Boom were followed by the 
retribution of W .A. Inc. losses in excess of $1 billion, and the emotional responses of 
the time. 
Now, two years on, perhaps sadder and wiser, is a good time to reflect on these 
matters, and to place them into a wider perspective. Western Australia was not the 
only state to experience these problems. Lessons have been learned elsewhere too. 
Conclusions and recommendations made at an earlier time, can now be tested in 
this wider context, perhaps with a greater level of detachment and clarity. 
We should also examine the progress that has been made towards implementing the 
recommendations, or at least moving towards a situation in which such excesses 
identified by the Royal Commissioners have a greater prospect of being nipped in 
the bud before too much damage is again done. 
My earlier career was in auditing. One of the lessons of auditing is that a 
deterioration of information and ethical behaviour sets in over time when executive 
actions are not exposed to independent scrutiny and accountability. The onset of 
such negative behaviour is insidious. Initially, honest people do their best to act 
honestly in the best interests of their organisation. Gradually, if not exposed to 
accountability, little things go wrong, and comers are cut Later, truth tends to be 
bent somewhat to suit one's convenience. Later still, wholesale deceptions are 
resorted t9 in the interests of some "greater interest", whatever that may be, or for 
personal gain. 
The lesson of history is to insert a degree of accountability into this process. Indeed, 
it can be said that the integrity of a system is only as good as its independent 
verifiability. 
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Now, what has auditing got to do with the Royal Commission? One answer, is that 
when auditing is not present, or the function fails, things start to go wrong. In some 
cases, they go very wrong; even unbelievably wrong. 
Many celebrated company collapses and frauds look so simple in retrospect. The 
errors seem obvious. At the time, however, this simplicity was usually hidden in a 
confusing maze of detail and seeming irrelevancies. 
Does this mean that we should strengthen the level of auditing in both public and 
private life? One answer is yes, simply to keep up with the increasing demands and 
sophistication found in modem corporations and government. Yet at another level, 
the answer is no. One cannot become so bound up in auditing, checking, policing, 
accountability and reporting, to the extent that useful and productive actions don't 
get done. 
It may well be that our current society is tending that way at present All the checks 
and laws and regulations and accountability in the world will not, in itself, 
eliminate improper practices. Nor will whistle blowing on trivial matters do so, 
other than become another bureaucratic nuisance and a means of harassing others. 
Some sense of proportion is needed to balance initiatives with investigations, 
achievements with accountability, and reward with restraint. 
At this stage I should divert for a moment and assure you that those words about a 
sense of proportion were written prior to reading the headlines in this morning's 
newspaper, which is a good illustration of the difficulties involved. 
Universities are public bodies, and we must always be ready to open ourselves to 
public scrutiny. Indeed, this happens all the time. In accounting to the 
Commonwealth government, the State government, the Department of Employment, 
Education and Training, our Senates and Councils, numerous agencies dealing with 
social and industrial legislation, our staff, students, employers, the media and the 
public, I sometimes feel that universities currently suffer from an excess of 
accountability, to the detriment of teaching and research. 
The Auditor General has added his bit, and found universities to be wanting in 
some respects regarding the administration of consulting by academics. Well, we 
must be prepared to stop and listen when he speaks, or we would be hypocrites in 
espousing accountability and integrity for others, but not for ourselves. 
I did hear the Auditor General say that our administrative procedures needed to be 
better administered. In fact some months ago we agreed to do precisely that in the 
audit exit interview. 
But I did not hear the Auditor General say, as headlined somewhat enthusiastically 
in The West Australian today that the "Auditor General attacks Academic Cheats". 
There is absolutely no evidence to that effect. 
In any case, our total consulting income is less than 1 % of our revenues. Most 
academics are far too busy on academic matters to find the time for additional 
work as consultants. Moreover, given the pressures that universities are under to 
reduce their dependence upon public funds, some consultancy is a useful way of 
generating some top-up private income to supplement relatively low academic 
salaries closer to those in industry. 
It is therefore a sensible policy to encourage academics to share their expertise with 
the community. Consultancy is beneficial both to staff, the organisation receiving it, 
and to studew:s in keeping the;;n in touch with the practice of the real world. This 
close interaction between universities and downtown, is one of the strengths of 
German universities, for example. That of course is provided the first priorities on 
teaching, research and administration are met. 
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Most universities have processes in place to see that this is done. Some, from time to 
time, need to be reminded to review their administrative processes, and that is what 
is already being done through our Audit Committees and Administrations in 
responding positively to the recommendations of the Auditor General. 
This Conference on accountability, as it happens, was organised through SASTEC, 
the consultancy arm of the Faculty of Science, Technology and Engineering at Edith 
Cowan University. I can assure you that this Conference is properly accounted for! 
Last century, in the Western World, it was found that the new corporation required 
more capital and a greater level of risk than that which could be handled by 
individuals or partners. The result was the limited liability company in which the 
personal liability of individual investors was limited, generally to their paid up 
share capital, in return for a public disclosure of what was happening in the 
business. 
Business organisations are far from perfect. Too many collapse, like Rothwells, in 
inglorious circumstances. But on the whole, the public disclosure requirement, aided 
by the media and informed comment, works quite well, without detracting too 
much from an ability to run the business. 
Public organisations and governments still have some way to go in this regard. For 
myself, I believe accountability is best enhanced by independent scrutiny, as well as 
a series of other safeguards, including in many cases public disclosure. 
It is the task of this Conference to examine these issues and processes further, and in 
particular, to test how we can sensibly go about improving the accountability of our 
public life. 
One area in which we failed as a society, was in our silence, or absence of critical 
facilities, at the time many of the worst excesses of the W .A. Inc. era were occurring. 
There were excuses. We were busy, the facts were not apparent, we did not wish to 
offend, and it was somebody else's business. 
Professor Ed Shann was one who foresaw the great depression of the 1930's. I have 
never quite worked out whether he did so by good luck, or by superior analysis and 
observation. On this occasion, Associate Professor Patrick O'Brien was one of the 
few who called out loudly what he saw. It is a credit to him that he did so, and some 
reflection on the rest of us that we were silent at a time which, in retrospect, called 
for us to query what we saw; even what we did not fully understand. 
Professor Geoffrey Bolton is right in saying that wherever the real blame lies, 
academics must accept some of the blame too. Few of us can walk away from this 
episode feeling that we had done all that could, and should, have been done. In one 
sense, this Conference is to revisit issues which we failed to properly visit in the first 
place. 
How then can another W.A. Inc. be avoided, or at least the risk of a repeat be 
minimised? What is the right balance between freedom and accountability? What 
level of public disclosure is needed? What more should be done arising out of the 
deliberations of the Royal Commissioners? 
That, essentially, is what the proceedings are about. On behalf of Edith Cowan 
University, I have much pleasure in welcoming you here today, and inviting your 
participation in what promises to be a timely and worthwhile contribution to the 
future we deserve. 
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MAKING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE: 
THE NEW SOUTH WALES EXPERIENCE 
Mr Ian Temby QC 
Barrister and former Commissioner 
(Independent Commission Against Corruption 1989-1994) 
There is a clear world-wide trend towards people power, the imperative that those 
who govern be made to account to those they govern for how they wield power. 
In Japan, the ruling party was thrown out of power precisely because it was seen as 
corrupt. Those who followed, largely unaccustomed to holding the reins of power, 
had difficulty adjusting, and nobody would claim that the position is yet perfect. 
But the people sought change, and change was the result. So it was in Italy. In Brazil 
and Bangladesh, grand corruption has led to the downfall of Presidents. Closer to 
home, who can forget the people of the Philippines, defying the army to shoot as they 
marched through the streets of Manila to bring down President Marcos. Many other 
examples could be given. 
In Australia, efforts to make Government more accountable have varied greatly 
from State to State, which not surprising as the steps taken have been politically 
driven. It is equally unsurprising that the first domino to fall was in Queensland, 
which suffered under a Government of spectacular arrogance and a police force 
which had become an instrument of political power. A Commission of Inquiry was 
held, chaired by Fitzgerald Q.C. who had been and is now again a Judge. Over two 
years of vigorous investigation beginning in June 1987 led to a change of Premier, a 
scathing report, a change of Government, and the setting up of various reform 
institutions, the most ambitious being the Criminal Justice Commission. 
Unfortunately that body had an unwieldy structure, and for that and other reasons 
it has remained both highly visible and distinctly unpopular with the politicians. 
In each of Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, Royal Commissions 
were held over the next few years. In each of those States, revelations of financial 
irregularities and losses caused Premiers to lose office, and in due course of time, 
Governments to be changed. All of this reflects democracy in action, and is to be 
welcomed. Closer analysis is called for before we can judge the extent to which the 
noble cause of increased Government accountability has been furthered by these 
events. 
New South Wales has had more than its share of scandals over the period since 
white settlement However, the course of recent history has been generally less 
eventful than in the other States just mentioned. In my adopted State, a change of 
Government was followed by the establishment of a new statutory body charged 
with the respohsibillty' of reducing corruption, improving public sectar integrity, 
and making Government more accountable. The rest of what l have to say will deal 
with that institution, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (1'the ICAC") 
although at the end I will compare the current position in New South Wales with 
that in both Queensland and Western Australia. Dispassionate analysis leads to 
conclusions that are less than sanguine. 
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Having said that, it must be stressed that we Australians are well ahead of most 
other countries from the viewpoint of people power. We can and do vote to change 
Governments. The media are relatively free, as is the flow of information. We are not 
inclined to knuckle down to those in authority, basic services can be provided in a 
timely and cost effective fashion and without that widespread corruption is 
inevitable - and political malfeasance is less widespread than in the USA or any of 
the countries in the Asia Pacific region, with the probable exception of Singapore. 
It must also be acknowledged that in New South Wales and elsewhere there have 
been other and important systemic changes over the past two decades or so. They 
include freedom of information legislation, a trend towards greater Parliamentary 
Committee examination of public accounts, an increasing tendency for Auditors-
General to deal with program efficiency and effectiveness as well as how public 
monies have been spent, and increasing emphasis within the public sector generally 
upon outcomes. To the extent this last matter reduces the importance attached to 
process, it is a mixed blessing. 
The ICAC came into existence on 13 March 1989. It was set up by legislation, which 
had a contentious passage through the Parliament. Concerns were expressed by the 
newly created Opposition which feared that the ICAC would become a vehicle for 
bashing the ALP, the Judges who resented the prospect of being brought within the 
purview of the new body, and civil liberties groups. A wary attitude continued for 
some time after the Commission came into existence, although within a year or so 
the reservations held had been largely dispelled, at least so far as the first and last 
of these groups were concerned. 
From the beginning the Commission set out to be as open and accountable as 
possible. An answer obviously had to be provided to the old question as to who 
would guard the guardians. Performance of the ICAC was monitored by a 
Parliamentary Committee, which had power in all respects save operational 
matters, and a statutory Operations Review Committee existed to ensure that 
decisions whether to commence and continue investigations were made correctly. 
Perhaps more importantly than these mandatory requirements, the Commission was 
forthcoming in its approach, largely held public hearings - as indeed the legislation 
required - and sought to solicit information and support from the public. For the 
first year or so most effort went into the investigative side of the Commission's 
work, but thereafter strong and increasing emphasis was placed upon the other two 
activities required by statute, namely, public education and corruption prevention 
work. 
The Commission was given all powers enjoyed by the Courts, although of course it 
was an administrative body charged with the responsibility of reporting to 
Parliament and could not bring down judgments or change the status or rights of 
citizens. As well as having power to subpoena witnesses and documents, and to 
administer oaths for the purpose of hearings, the Commission had power to obtain 
search warrants for the purposes of its investigations, whether or not a criminal 
offence was suspected, and the Commissioner could authorise ICAC officers to enter 
upon any public premises without warrant and seize documents. Further, witnesses 
could be required to answer questions even if in so doing they might incriminate 
themselves. The legislation gave them the right to object to answer questions, and in 
that event the answers given could not be used against them otherwise than in 
proceedings for false swearing. 
It seemed appropriate to carefully control the circumstances in which these 
extraordinary powers could be used. Accordingly the ICAC adopted, from the 
outset, the practice that the special powers would be used only in the course of 
formal inv~stigatwns, which would be commenced only with the authority of the 
Commissioner, and only after close consideration, almost always preceded by 
substantial examination of material and preparation of internal submissions. A 
very selective approach was adopted. The Commission reserved itself for the most 
difficult work, which others could not or would not do, and extensively used the 
power to refer lesser matters to other organisations, in particular the Ombudsman. 
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On average during the first five years only ten investigations a year were 
commenced. 
In the hearing and report process, much emphasis was placed upon systemic 
improvement, and every opportunity was taken to spell out general truths that could 
be applied by bodies other than that under investigation. A lot of work was done in 
relation to each of local government, tendering, land development and policing. As 
will be related shortly, the ICAC also delved into the political process from time to 
time. 
The ICAC has been described by some as a standing Royal Commission into public 
sector corruption, and that description has aspects of truth, but is in some respects 
inapposite. 
When a Royal Commission completes its report it becomes functus officio - there is 
nothing left for it to do, no power for it to exercise. What Government does with the 
report which it has commissioned is entirely a matter for it. History shows the 
typical response is an undertaking to study and implement where practicable, 
followed by cunctation and insignificant action. There are exceptions - Fitzgerald's 
excellent report was wholly acted upon, pursuant to extravagant and competitive 
promises made by all politicians before it was handed down that complete and 
enthusiastic implementation would be effected. But the general rule remains. A 
standing body, having responsibility for minimising corruption and enhancing 
public sector integrity, can follow up on recommendations made and thus increase 
the likelihood of action. The ICAC followed that course, with considerable success. 
Not every recommendation was implemented, but the success rate was high. 
Sometimes there was frustrating delay, but except in the Parliamentary area, no 
reports lacked all effective response. 
A critical difference between the ICAC and any ad hoc Commission of Inquiry is that 
the former sets its own agenda, decides for itself what to investigate, and works to 
Parliament. Any Royal Commission is appointed by Government, with terms of 
reference set by Government, and reports to Government. On occasions, reports 
provided have remained secret for long periods. That could never happen with the 
ICAC. Of course a standing body must be able to decide for itself what to 
investigate, because otherwise it cannot be seen as independent from Government. 
Without that independence, public confidence cannot exist, and at least in the 
medium to long term, failure is assured. 
Corruption, viewed simply, is the abuse of public power for private ends. The 
greater the power, the greater the capacity for abuse. A ticket collector acts corruptly 
in putting fares into his own pocket, but that is not of great moment, and the criminal 
law can be used to handle the situation. A mayor who secures for his brother-in-law 
a contract to mow all parks within the municipal area has done something more 
significant and insidious, because he has more power. And of course Cabinet 
Ministers and judicial officers hold more important public trusts, enjoy greater 
power again, and have a greater ability to abuse it. It should be remembered that 
important events leading to the creation of the ICAC included the sale of early 
releases from prison by the then Prisons Minister (Rex Jackson) and actions in 
perversion of the course of justice by the then Chief Magistrate (Murray Farquahar). 
Each was investigated by an ad hoc body appointed by Government. Both men were 
imprisoned. Their actions caused the gravest possible public disquiet, and the steps 
taken against them were important in demonstrating that even those in positions of 
significant power were not beyond the law. 
As has been said, the greater the power, the greater the capacity for abuse. It is 
therdore not surpri&ing thl\t the ICAC should have turned its attention to the conduct 
of those who held high political office. As successful politicians are not famed for 
their meekness, it is equally unsurprising that they should have resented and 
resisted those attentions, and turned their wrath upon the ICAC. 
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The first Commission investigation that saw Cabinet Ministers and other politicians 
in the witness box was conducted by Assistant Commissioner Roden, a retired 
Supreme Court Judge. It was into land development in the north coast region of New 
South Wales. No findings of corruption or recommendations were criminal action 
were made against elected officials, but some were held in terms of the statute to 
have behaved in a manner conducive to corrupt conduct. That, and indeed the mere 
indignity of being in the witness box and made to answer for their actions, led to 
extraordinary outburst of anger, culminating in the Deputy Premier (one of the 
reluctant witnesses) likening the ICAC to the Spanish Inquisition. Other analogies 
used by politicians in relation to the ICAC were to Stalinist show trials, and to the 
Star Chamber. Of course politicians tend to talk iu slogans for the purpose of 
creating headlines, but the contended for analogies demonstrated a deplorable 
ignorance of history. The very essence of the Star Chamber was its secret hearings, 
whereas in truth the great difficulty the powerful had with the ICAC was its open 
approach and public hearings. As to totalitarian show trials, the point of course was 
that the outcome was known before the nominal hearing commenced, which was 
manifestly untrue of the ICAC, a body which on occasions brought down reports 
declaring that allegations made were without substance. 
After the North Coast report and the attendant fuss and bother, the Commission 
continued to conduct investigations small and large. The latter included one which 
disclosed a widespread and illicit trade in supposedly confidential Government 
information, another which lifted the lid on organised corruption in relation to the 
issue of drivers' licenses, a third into the use of prisons informers, and a fourth into 
the relationship between police and criminals. Unfortunately overshadowing these 
large and difficult matters, each of which has led or is leading to large systemic 
change, there was the so-called Metherell matter. 
Before coming to that matter, mention should be made of an ICAC report - relating 
to a former member of Parliament named Mochalski and one of his constituents -
which contained suggestions for Parliamentary reform, namely that -
• an induction program be introduced for new Members, to help ensure that they 
understand their role and do the right thing; 
• Parliament develop a code of conduct for its members and perhaps also their staff 
- this followed a useful submission to the ICAC from the Speaker; and 
•the oath of allegiance have added to it an oath of office, analogous to that taken by 
new Judges, by which Members of the Parliament promise to do right by all manner 
of people without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. 
A statutory officer who works to the Parliament.must of course show due deference. 
The report contained this passage: 
The Parliament is the repository and chief organ of our democracy. Its Members are 
elected, as no public servant or ICAC Commissioner is. Those chosen by the people are 
properly in a position of great power as well as responsibility. The Parliament has 
always guarded its privileges most strongly, and that is as it should be. The head of a 
statutory body created by the Parliament cannot properly tell the Parliament what to do. 
Accordingly I think it inappropriate to draft a code of conduct, as was done for local 
government, unless asked by the Parliament to do that, or otherwise assist. The 
Committee on the ICAC can make an important contribution if so inclined. The Bowen 
report (on the Federal Parliament, prepared in 1979) provides a fair starting point. 
Any decisions concerning induction programs or codes of conduct must be for the 
Parliament to make. This chapter is written to round off a Report which documents how a 
former Member of Parliament got himself into an impossible situation with a constituent. 
Doubtless Members will say that they would not behave in a like manner, but that is not 
quite the point. Unless all our elected representatives can say that they receive at the 
moment an appropriate level of training and guidance, then it surely behoves them to 
pursue the issues which have been raised. 
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Making Government Accountable: The New South Wales JJxperience 
The key ICAC recommendation related to the proposed code of conduct. There was a 
little action. A Parliamentary committee sought submissions, and began the process 
of preparing a code which was to be imposed on all. They became mired in the 
question of enforceability. This was the wrong way of going about the job, and it 
contemplated the wrong end product. Codes should be prepared from the ground 
up, and are designed to provide guidance, not be a tool for punishment In 
consequence the Parliament still lacks a code of conduct, although they are universal 
features of modem public service life in New South Wales. 
Part of this unsatisfactory reaction flowed from the fact the Metherell hearing 
commenced not long after the Mochalski report was presented to Parliament. 
Metherell was a former Cabinet minister who had resigned after conviction of a tax 
offence, later left the ruling party to sit as an Independent in a finely balanced 
Parliament, and was then after covert manouverings appointed to a senior Public 
Service position. That happened in circumstances which made a mockery of 
competitive selection procedures which have characterised the public sector in this 
country for many decades. The appointment led to public clamour including 
allegations of corruption. After some time the Commission decided it must conduct 
an investigation, and its report made findings of corrupt conduct against the then 
Premier and a Cabinet Minister. Both men challenged the report in the Supreme 
Court. Before the hearing they were forced to resign. A majority decision of the Court 
of Appeal striking down the ICAC finding naturally led to suggestions that their 
conduct had been completely vindicated, although that is hardly a realistic 
description of the outcome. 
The new Premier was distinctly less supportive of the ICAC than had been his 
predecessor, many members of Parliament have become very distrustful of the 
institution, and protestations of support for it while customary have sometimes rung 
somewhat hollow. The hope was that when I left as the first Commissioner after five 
years in March 1994, most of the political opprobrium would follow me, and the 
Commission would flourish. However, there has been bungling and delay in the 
appointment of the new Commissioner, and patient rebuilding of the institution and 
its relations with politicians and others will now be necessary. 
Those who decry the ICAC fail to recognise the great benefits that it has brought. 
These are not restricted to increased confidence in the public sector, increased 
integrity in public life, and substantial systemic change. The simple fact that the 
Commission exists has given Government somewhere to send scandals as soon as 
they arise. The ICAC enjoys public confidence, is seen as impartial, and its decisions 
not to investigate are accorded general acceptance. In the bad old days a real 
scandal was met by mud slinging, denials, and the ultimate appointment of a Royal 
Commission or similar body. Typically this was followed by a cessation of most 
Government activity while the inquiry was conducted, generally quite slowly. All 
this is best avoided. If anybody doubts what is said, they can look at any or all of 
Brisbane, Perth, Melbourne and Adelaide in recent years. Surely the chilling effect 
which a major Commission of Inquiry has upon Government processes is best 
avoided. 
The Metherell matter was painful, and the outcome must be seen as unsatisfactory, 
but it was certainly carried through in an independent and impartial fashion, and it 
was certainly expeditious. Had the ICAC not done the job, then inevitably another 
body would have; at worst a Parliamentary Committee, which is an horrific 
thought The matters the ICAC investigated simply had to be examined, in an 
impartial manner. Further, nobody suggests that the ICAC got the facts wrong. It is a 
great aid to orderly public administration to have a standing body to which 
matters can be referred. This is a point which I know is fully appreciated by both the 
present Premier and the Leader of the Opposition. 
One should not be too despondent about the reaction of those holding elected office 
to the ICAC. Reactions in other places have been broadly similar. In Western 
Australia, the recommendations of the Royal Commission Into Commercial 
Activities of Government were received with a marked lack of enthusiasm, 
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implementation has been slow and partial, and the desire of Government to make 
itself and its successors more accountable has been less than wildly enthusiastic. In 
Queensland, as mentioned earlier, relations between the Criminal Justice 
Commission and Members of Parliament have been strained for a long time. I have 
never understood how the CJC could have considered bringing down a report which 
found widespread rorting of the travel allowance scheme by Parliamentarians, gave 
the number of those who had misbehaved, but would not name them. The job should 
surely have been done fully, or not at all. That matter has left many scars. The CJC 
accepts that it cannot investigate elected officials except where criminal misconduct 
is suspected. Presumably, by extension, that includes holders of Ministerial office. 
No statutory change is being sought by the CJC. 
This cannot be good enough. Government must be made accountable, and there must 
be no room for the view that Ministers are either above the law or beyond proper 
scrutiny. 
The best solution is not difficult to find. It was recommended by the ICAC in the 
immediate aftermath of the Metherell affair, but has not been acted upon. Justified 
criticism of the ICAC legislation by the Court of Appeal well over two years ago 
should have led to early statutory changes. They are still under consideration. This 
is deplorable. 
The answer applies to all constitutional office holders, that is to say those who hold 
any public office at the will of Parliament. That includes Judges, Ministers, and 
Members of Parliament, because Parliament can decide for itself who sits and who 
does not. In relation to each of these groups, and there are doubtless others such as 
the Auditor General and indeed the ICAC Commissioner, the decision whether office 
continues to be held ought be made by the Parliament. However, to make that 
decision Parliament should act upon facts as found, not conclusions reached 
following an intemperate Parliamentary debate or by a Parliamentary Committee 
which must comprise the politically partisan, but by an independent body. That 
independent body should be of a standing nature, so as to be immediately available; 
the ICAC or the CJC. It should not be required to make findmgs of corrupt conduct, 
but simply report facts and leave the matter for Parliamentary decision. This is the 
course that was followed in Queensland under the Parliamentary Oudges) 
Commission of Inquiry Act, 1988 when the conduct of Mr. Justice Vasta of the 
Supreme Court became a matter of concern. The only difference is that the inquiry 
was conducted by an ad hoc group of three retired Judges, rather than by a standing 
body, because no such body then existed in that State. The process envisaged could 
begin either pursuant to a Parliamentary reference, or at the volition of the ICAC or 
equivalent body. 
Government has left the ICAC to languish, first by long delays in introducing 
necessary statutory change, and secondly, by holding up the process of appointing a 
new Commissioner until the incumbent - myself - was well and truly gone. Of recent 
times there has been progress on both fronts. Legislation has been passed which will 
allow the new Commissioner-designate, a Judge of the Supreme Court, to return to 
judicial office when he has served a term at the ICAC. He made that a condition of 
accepting appointment. Secondly, Parliament is debating proposed changes to the 
ICAC Act which would predicate jurisdiction upon possible breach of conduct 
codes. Anyone with a cynical streak would reckon that a code of conduct for 
Members of Parliament is unlikely to either be in place quickly, or be rigorous in its 
contents. 
Permit me to conclude on a personal note. I take considerable pride in the work 
which the ICAC did during the five years that I had ultimate responsibility for it. Of 
course many contributed, most notably Commission staff, the great majority of 
whom were fine and keen individuals. We achieved a very great deal. It is 
unfortunate that at the end of the day those achievements remain clouded by 
political controversy, but mature reflection tells me that this was always likely if the 
job was to be done without fear or favour. My hope is that the Commission, under 
the new Commissioner, will quickly resume active and effective work. 
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THE WORK OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO W.A. INC. 
Michael L. Barker LLB(Hons); LLM; Barrister; 
(one of the Counsel who assisted the Royal Commission 1991-1992) 
The Royal Commission in to W.A. Inc.1 was borne of a period of turbulence and 
predatory conduct not altogether unique to the circumstances of this State; a period 
in which the much-talked about and much-written about "baby boomers" began their 
ascendant march in politics and business, though not a period in which those in 
politics and business with predatory habits were limited to those whose first youth 
was enjoyed in the 1950's. 
As we reflect in late 1994 on the work of the Royal Commission into W.A. Inc. 
completed two years ago, we would do well to recall also the circumstances which 
gave rise to the establishment of the Fitzgerald Commission in Queensland in 19872, 
the setting up of the ICAC3 by legislation in New South Wales in 1988, the State 
Bank inquiry in South Australia during 1991-19924, the Intercontinental merchant 
bank inquiry in Victoria which reported in 1993 and the Rouse Affair in Tasmania 
of about the same time. In other countries similar waves of turbulence were also 
observable during the same periods.s 
The evidence from these various inquiries shows that something fundamental, 
something important went missing in the practice of government and the conduct of 
commerce throughout Australia during the periods in question. Our institutions of 
government were found to be lacking. Public officials, both elected and appointed, 
abused the trust invested in them by the public: they carried on government in secret, 
without giving a proper account of their actions and, sometimes, dishonestly. These 
public officials, as a group, were devoid of integrity and helped in no small way to 
confirm the reputation of public officials in Australia, certainly politicians, as a 
class, as a "barely necessary evil."6 
The conviction and imprisonment of a former premier and deputy premier of the 
State in recent times, added to the revelations of the W.A. Inc. inquiry, have only 
served to exaggerate the view of many Australians living elsewhere than in this 
State, that Western Australians are mavericks; certainly that our local politicians 
and businessmen are, unlike those elsewhere in the country. Such a view is 
necessarily a generalisation and so cannot and does not apply to all Western 
Australians or local politicians and businessmen. It is also a view which depends 
completely on a thorough going and very public dissection of Western Australian 
political and commercial life between 1983 and 1990, as well as some matters 
predating this period, which was carried out at the investigation of a State 
Government of the same political persuasion as those predominantly the subject of 
investigation, albeit and necessarily by reason of considerable public pressure. As a 
result, all Australians perhaps know a lot more about the practise of government 
and the behaviour of businessmen in Western Australia in those years than they do 
in their own States. Western Australian citizens were prepared to tolerate such a 
process regardless of the tarnishing effect it would necessarily have on their and the 
State's reputation. It is arguable that no other State, not even Queensland, has 
subjected itself to such a vertical and horizontal examination. 
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Today we ask, somewhat rhetorically, whether it has all been worth it. l would 
answer, simply and without rhetoric, that it will have been if we learn from the past 
and not repeat the mistakes our recent history of government has taught us. In this 
sense, the past truly is the prologue to the State's constitutional future. 
Some of the more endearing qualities of Western Australians, borne of physical 
isolation, are their sense of self-worth, their willingness to make do and their 
preparedness to fight against the odds. These help. to explain the sometimes 
seemingly contradictory conduct of our citizens: an adventurousness in national 
business and politics, a secessionist mentality, a fierce national pride. They also lead 
to a belief, perhaps, that Western Australians are the "true Australians", those who 
collectively enjoy "a fortunate life". 7 
Sometimes, however, we Western Australians may profit from a considered and 
broader view of social, economic and political developments elsewhere in Australia 
and, indeed, over the seas. In the case of the W.A. Inc. era we should be prepared to 
accept that the events which gave rise to the phenomena reviewed by the Royal 
Commission were unique to the State only in the sense that the individual 
participants were "sons" of the State, and that in all other respects the debilitating 
effect of the conduct of these individuals was not endemic to Western Australia, not 
simply an "aberration" in the life of the government of the State, but a symptom of a 
more widespread malaise in government in Australia and, indeed, world wide. 
The first part of the Report of the Royal Commission, by chapter and verse, 
identified the malaise in government. There is much to be said for the view that for 
all intents and purposes, we the citizens had found ourselves living in a classical 
"one party State". Within a State constitutional structure in which the judiciary is not 
an entrenched institution of government and the State legislature is considered (by 
some) to reign supreme, the executive government of the day was run by a relatively 
small group of senior ministers who exercised control or influence over their party 
machine, the entire public sector of the State, much of the media and the Parliament. 
Having also aligned major business interests with their interests, these ministers 
were, or at least appear to have considered themselves, relatively immune from the 
vagaries of the ballot box. Hubris, that "overweening pride towards the gods, 
leading to nemesis"S can usually be relied upon to re-order human ambitions and 
did so in this State when the Royal Commission, having pored over the remains of 
the Burke and Dowding periods of government, found9 
• that some ministers had elevated personal or party advantages over their 
constitutional obligation to act in the public interest; 
• that the personal associations of some ministers with certain businessmen and 
the manner in which electoral contributions were obtained from those 
businessmen could only create the public perception that favour could be 
bought, that favour would be done; 
• that members of statutory authorities with very significant funds subject to their 
control seemed to be unaware of, or else indifferent to, their legal and public 
duties; 
• that persons appointed to statutory authorities had not always been possessed 
of appropriate experience and qualifications; 
• that, in many instances, the capacity of statutory instrumentalities to act in the 
discharge of their statutory obligations was severely constrained by the 
presence on their boards of public servants who represented government; 
• that processes of decision making were often shrouded in secrecy by virtue of 
the lack of a public record; 
• that the proper role and function of cabinet was either poorly understood or 
deliberately abused on certain occasions by the Premier and certain senior 
ministers; 
• that there had occurred, especially during the Burke years, a marked change in 
the approach of government to business, it was entrepreneurial and risk-taking 
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Past as prologue: A second anniversary rejledion 
The Royal Commission had little hesitation in concludinglO that these findings 
revealed 
" ... serious weaknesses and deficiencies in our system of government. 
Together, they disclose fundamental weaknesses in the present capacity 
of our institutions of government, including the Parliament, to exact that 
degree of openness, accountability and integrity necessary to ensure that 
the executive fulfils its basic responsibility to serve the public interest." 
In its tone and broad thrust this conclusion was similar to that arrived at by the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. It also mirrored other contemporary Australian criticisms of 
the system of government inherited from Britain which some improbably continue 
to insist on calling "the Westminster system". 
In short, the near-universal complaint in Australia is that our constitutional system, 
with all its supposed "checks and balances", is prone to executive take-over or 
control. The W.A. Inc. inquiry and report is but a well-defined illustration of the fact, 
for fact it is. The question is, how, if at all, our constitutional system can be 
improved. This is, of course, the Big Question, the question students of government, 
politics, public administration, law, life, and many other disciplines besides, spend 
most of their lives contending with, writing about in academic journals, debating in 
common rooms and at dinner parties; and musing over in more or less serious 
forms of media. 
The Royal Commission had the responsibility to engage in this god-like task, aware 
no doubt from the outset that they could and would not please everyone, nor 
respond to every blueprint for reform. They requested advice from the public and 
they received it.11 On the one hand, there were those who claimed all the system 
needed was a "good dose of salts" to restore the health of the State and that all 
would be well upon removal of the incumbent government That may have been a 
necessary step, but only a palliative, not a cure. On the other hand, there were those 
who claimed there was no life left in the existing system and that only a major 
transplant, of a heart, could save it, that is, wholesale constitutional reform to 
remove for all time the prospect of executive dominance of the system. Emotionally 
there is much to commend this view. In between, as one would expect, many other 
prescriptions were offered for improving the health of the State. 
The Commission ultimately responded to the Big Question by attempting to identify 
the conceptual and practical bases upon which it believed consensus existed as to 
how government in Australia is practised in the late 20th Century. It sought to 
establish, if you like, the "organising principles" by reference to which government 
operates. It eschewed an alternative approach to the question which might have seen 
the Commission attempt to identify the "major complaints" or problems exposed by 
W.A. Inc. (whether by reference to volume of evidence of some subjective assessment 
of their seriousness) and proffer suggestions or solutions as to how they might 
individually be responded to, although specific reforms in certain areas were 
recommended as part of the approach adopted by the Commission. 
The Commission plainly enough believed that if you can agree what government is 
all about then the reforms required to respond to the identified weaknesses in the 
system either would suggest themselves or would be found to be unavailable within 
the current system of government and so require invention. 
Consequently, at the outset of Part II of its Report, the Royal Commission contended12 
that two principles underlie, or should underlie, our system of government I doubt 
that anyone would quarrel with either. The first was described as "the democratic 
principle": that it is for the people of the State to determine by whom they are to be 
represented and governed. The second, "the trust principle": that the institutions of 
government and the officials and agencies of government exist for the public, to 
serve the interests of the public. 
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The Commission explained that each principle carries with it certain consequences. 
As to the democratic principle, the Commission said this:13 
"The first institution of representative government, the Parliament, must 
be constituted in a way which fairly represents the interests and 
aspirations of the community itself. The electoral process must be fair. 
Public partidpation in, and support for, candidates, parties and 
programmes is to be encouraged. However, electoral laws should aim to 
prevent sectional interests from purchasing political favour, and to 
prevent those seeking election from attracting support by improper 
means." 
As to the trust principle the Commission noted that it provided the "architectural 
principle" of our institutions of government and "a measure of judgment of their 
practices and procedures".14 
The Commission sought to translate these two fundamental principles of 
constitutional organisation into three practical goals which, if observed, it 
. considered were necessary to safeguard the credibility of our democracy and an 
acceptable foundation for public trust and confidence in our system of government. 
The three goals are: 
• government must be conducted openly; 
• public officials and agencies must be made accountable for their actions; 
• there must be integrity both in the processes of government and in the conduct 
expected of public officials.IS 
In the light of these two fundamental principles and three practical goals, the 
Commission set about a broad review of the structure and practise of government in 
Western Australia. Ultimately, it made specific recommendations for change where 
it could form a clear and concluded view as to what precisely was required to deal 
with a particular problem. In a number of areas, however, the Commission 
recognised concerns, suggested the means or approach by which a problem might be 
addressed, and expressed the view that the issue was one which should be 
considered by a Commission on Government specially appointed to do so in a 
report to Parliament following extensive public consultation. The Commission 
expressly observed that issues falling into this category "are not solely for 
parliamentarians and the Government to solve".16 Nonetheless, the Commission 
invariably expressed its views as to the values or principles which should inform 
consideration of these issues. 
In a number of respects, the recommendations and principled views of the Royal 
Commission have not met with bipartisan political support in the two years which 
have passed since Part II of the Report of the Commission was handed down. The 
reason for this is clear enough: there are those who fear that implementation of the 
Commission's recommendations will lead to a re-ordering of political power away 
from the familiar power bases upon which they rely and so they tend blindly to 
oppose change. Indeed, in order to attempt to weaken the influence of the Report of 
the Royal Commission, these same persons are prone to make scurrilous allegations 
concerning the authorship of the report and the process by which it was produced. 
One such allegation, which those who were also closely associated with the Report 
of the Royal Commission might consider humorous if it weren't so serious and if it 
weren't made by some of the State's most senior politicians, is the allegation that the 
Commissioners "only had one day in which to consider it [Part II of the Report]" 
before subscribing their names to it.17 The Hon. Peter Brinsden Q.C., a former Justice 
of the Supreme Court and one of the Royal Commissioners, has recently responded 
to this utterly absurd proposition by labelling it "ridiculous"IB, a truly understated 
comment if ever there were one! One would hope no further comment is required, 
although I Suspect those who don't like the Commissioners' message will continµe to 
contrive opportunities for shooting at the messenger! 
i. 
I 
! ! 
Past as prologue: A second anniversary reflection 
It is now to the message that I shall return. It should be plain enough by now that the 
Commission considered the W.A. Inc. phenomena were able to occur because our 
governmental system is not structured to prevent it. Parliament, which we have 
always held to be the centrepiece of our democratic system - our Parliamentary 
democracy - failed to prevent W.A. Inc. Independent watchdog agencies largely 
failed to prevent W.A. Inc. The public service was no obstacle to its occurrence. The 
media was noteworthy for its failure to expose W.A. Inc; rather the local media, 
particularly "The West Australian", may well have been responsible for assuring the 
return of the Dowding government at the 1989 general election. The common factor, 
as noted earlier, was that the executive arm of government got away with 
proverbial "blue murder": it suborned the i.nstitutions of government, and media and 
private business interests (the latter no doubt knowingly and willingly), to its own 
interests. 
Central to the Royal Commission's response to this political reality was a desire not 
to radically alter the system, but to strongly reinforce the tenets of "responsible 
government and representative democracy" by ensuring that the means exist 
whereby executive government can in fact, and not just in theory, be made open, 
accountable to the public it serves, and imbued with integrity. Accordingly the 
Royal Commission report starts with the people and their forum, the Parliament, 
and ends with the people as the mechanism for making our existing system of 
government work. I cannot emphasise too strongly this theme in the report of the 
Commission; for it is an overtly democratic document. 
The practical goals of openness, public accountability and integrity expressed by the 
Commission, unlike virtue, can be provided for; at least, structures, processes and 
checks can be put in place which enable the political processes to work so that these 
goals have a realistic chance of being realised. It has long been asserted that our 
inherited British system of government enjoys the benefits of a "separation of 
powers" doctrine, that is to say, that by keeping the executive, legislative and judicial 
arms of government separate each from the other we are best able to curb the abuse 
of public power. The theory is a good one. However, our system currently fails to 
achieve the appropriate degree of separation and I believe that, in large measure the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission were, and are, intended to remedy this 
failing or deficiency in our system of government. Put another way, they are 
intended to ensure that each arm of government is practically able to do what it is 
intended to do in constitutional theory. By and large, the judiciary is independent 
although its true independence must always be jealously guarded. Under the federal 
constitution the independence of the judiciary is effectively guaranteed. In Victoria, 
a statutory guarantee of independence exists, although the extent of its protection 
may be debated. In Western Australia, as in most States and Territories, the 
position is different and the judiciary has no guaranteed independence. 
As an aside, perhaps the time has arrived when this issue needs ventilation and 
further consideration. However, the W.A. Inc. phenomena did not disclose any 
particular threats to the independence of the judiciary. But, as we have seen, it did 
disclose a threat to the capacity of the legislature, the Parliament, to act as it should, 
as a reviewer of executive power, as well as a law maker; in short, as an 
accountability agency. 
In much of the recent public attacks on the recommendations in Part II of the Report 
of the Royal Commission there is evident a common concern, namely that the 
Commission went so far as to concern itself with the composition of the Parliament. 
How did the electoral system cause corruption or improper conduct, some naively 
ask. How did the Parliament act improperly? In every case the rhetorical questioner 
simply has failed to understand a basic tenet of our constitutional system which is 
that the Parliament is the mainstay of our democratic processes. It must be so 
structured and so empowered to ensure it can act as the ultimate accountability 
agency, for there can be no mistaking that is what it is. If the Parliament is incapable 
ultimately of protecting the public interest, and if we now wish to acknowledge 
some inherent inability of Parliament to act in this way, then more radical 
constitutional measures may be called for and, at least, a Bill of Citizen's Rights 
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should perhaps be enacted urgently to empower the judiciary to do what the 
Parliament is incapable of doing. 
The Royal Commission, however, was unwilling to reject our constitutional 
inheritance, rather it wished to make it work. Its recommendations demand 
executive government first and foremost to be open; to adopt "openness" as a habit, "a 
cast of mind". They also demand public officials to act with integrity, and propose 
additional means such as the creation of a Public Sector Standards Commission and 
a Commission for the Investigation of Corrupt and Improper Conduct (CICIC), 
whereby Parliament has improved means of monitoring and enforcing standards of 
proper official conduct. Some steps have been taken by the present government, along 
with others designed to secure public sector management reform, to pursue the 
former recommendation, but little has been done in respect of the latter. The existing 
Official Corruption Commission (OCC), even with its recently acquired additional 
powers, is but a pale imitation of the body proposed by the Royal Commission to 
oversee complaints of corrupt and improper official conduct in this State. The 
proposed bodies, together with the existing accountability agencies of the Auditor 
General and the Ombudsman (and to an extent the DPP) have, or should have, the 
power and the responsibility to report to Parliament in a timely and informative 
manner so that Parliament may function, to the fullest extent possible, as the ultimate 
accountability agent. However, it must be said that a Parliament which is not 
perceived to be structured on democratic grounds and in which the public can have 
little confidence that issues of public importance brought to its attention will be 
dealt with other than on partisan political grounds, will have little chance of 
fulfilling its constitutional accountability function. Parliament must be made to 
work. The question is how. The Royal Commission's suggestions are plain enough, 
hardly utopian, but (as we have seen) susceptible to crude attacks from those in 
established political parties who strive only for one thing- power. 
The Commission observed, in my view rightly, that 
"The causes of a decline in the effectiveness and reputation of the 
legislature in Westminster systems are well understood. The lie chiefly 
in the dominance of the party machines in the work of elected 
representatives. vVhen a Government commands a majority in both 
Houses of a bicameral legislature, neither chamber is likely to provide a 
stringent check on the executive's activities. vVhen an Opposition 
controls the Upper House, there will be a tendency for review to 
degenerate into mere obstruction. "19 
The means by which Parliament holds the executive to account are traditionally 
listed as question time, the committee system (especially standing and select 
committees) and debate on legislative measures. For the reason advanced by the 
Commission these may count for nought if review and public accountability are not 
real political possibilities. There is little doubt that the traditional Parliamentary 
accountability mechanisms require overhaul. In particular, in this State the 
committee system requires considerable development. It is beginning to occur, but 
there is much to be done. The origins of the public accounts committee as a 
parliamentary device to induce better systems of public management are well 
documented.20 It demonstrates the potential and provides the prototype of a 
committee designed to achieve accountability outcomes. The committee system in 
the Commonwealth Parliament is considerably advanced on any comparison to this 
State's. Odgers says of the committee system in the Senate that it "is a major 
development in the strengthening of the Australian Parliamentary system of 
government. In particular, the committee system furthers the effectiveness of the 
Senate's role as a House of review".21 Fitzgerald commented to similar effect in 
assessing the weaknesses of the Queensland system of government.22 The Royal 
Commission adopted the same view essentially of this State's system of government. 
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The functions of a committee, especially one located within a House whose primary 
responsibility it is to overview the management and operation of the State's public 
sector, may be considered of great constitutional importance. In recent times, this 
comment has been amply demonstrated by various Senate committees in relation to 
specific heads of inquiry. However, committees may go further than this and be 
responsible for the early review and assessment of draft legislation and rules 
proposed by the executive or administrative bodies.23 
However, the capacity of an upper house such as the Legislative Council in this State 
to discharge such a review function, as a matter of practical politics, is dependent on 
the extent to which its electoral system is bound to reproduce the major political 
party struggle which dominates lower house (Legislative Assembly) proceedings. 
The more it is, the more likely the observation of the Commission quoted above will 
be perennially proven true. The Commission therefore sought to make observations 
and recommendations which would enable this cycle to be reconsidered and, in all 
probability, broken. 
First, it recognised that the Legislative Assembly in our system of "responsible 
government and representative democracy"24 is the House of Government. Secondly, 
it confirmed that the Legislative Council should be considered the House of Review, 
thereby identifying the strengths of a bicameral Parliament. 
In order to highlight and advance the constitutional responsibilities of the 
Legislative Council, the commission had little doubt that a review should be 
conducted of the electoral representation system for the Council with a view to 
members being elected on the basis of proportional representation. The purpose and 
intent of this proposal is plain: significant minority interest should have the capacity 
to secure representation in the Legislative Council. Such a system it not bound to 
weaken the hold of the major parties in the Council, but is considerably more likely 
to do so than is the current system. 
To emphasise the importance of the constitutional function of the Legislative Council 
as a House of Review, and not a mere extension of the Assembly or the government 
of the day, the Commission logically further proposed that: 
• the Council should serve as the House primarily responsible for the systematic 
oversight and review of the public sector as a whole; 
• members of the Council should, in principle, be prevented from holding 
ministerial office; 
• the Council is the House with the greater capacity to exploit the committee 
system and, accordingly, should be the House in which most committees should 
be concentrated; 
• the Council should not have the power to block supply. 
Curiously enough, a Parliament structured in this way would have many of the 
features of the Commonwealth Senate and the British House of Lords. It would have 
an electoral system and constitutional function not unlike the Senate. It would be 
more democratically elected than the Lords, but would have in common with the 
Lords the inability to block supply. 
The power to block supply is an issue capable of bringing out in many all the heated 
debates which usually accompany discussion of the Whitlam dismissal in 1975. To 
some, this suggestion by the Commission was seen as a plot devised by 
Machiavellian Labor Party fellow-travellers who had infiltrated the ranks of the 
Commission. In fact, it was a much-debated proposal which was ultimately 
considered but the logical extension of the Commission's desire to remove what 
might be called the "politics of government" from the realms of the Council and to 
supplant it with the "politics of review". 
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Understood in this way, there can be no real doubt that electoral reform of the 
Legislative Council is a precondition to devising a Parliamentary structure truly 
capable of holding executive government accountable to the public it is 
constitutionally obliged to serve. Those who oppose such reform, as I noted earlier, 
are concerned only with their possible loss of political power to a new constituency 
better able to realise the constitutional function of the House of Review. Whether or 
not they realise it, those in opposition to these reforms or their prospect are, or are in 
danger of becoming, the Trojan horses of the enemies of public accountability. 
As observed, the recommendations of the Royal Commission going to electoral 
reform have been poorly understood by some. In other respects, however, the 
Commission's work has been more generally acknowledged as recommending 
necessary changes to the governmental system or raising issues which genuinely 
require considered public debate. However, despite this, many important, quite 
specific recommendations have not been implemented. 
For example, and astonishingly in light of the rudimentary fact that its phenomenon 
gave rise to the Commission in the first place, Western Australia still does not have 
its own political finance law requiring disclosure of political donations to, and 
expenditure by, parties and candidates and political organisations. The 
Commission gave explicit advice on what needed to be done in this regard, but 
instead reform has been put off by referring the issue to the Commission on 
Government. If there was one issue which, in the public mind, required urgent 
legislative attention, I would suggest it was the matter of political finance. The 
failure of the Government to act on this matter is regrettable. It leaves the 
Government open to the serious charge that, despite its support for much of the 
Commission's report, it is deliberately "dragging the chain" on this issue. 
The same comment may be made in respect of the apparent unwillingness of the 
Government (and perhaps the Opposition too) to accept the need for the 
establishment of CICIC. The role of such investigative bodies continues to be 
debated in Australia. The ICAC in New South Wales and the qc in Queensland 
have attracted their fair share of public and political acrimony and judicial review. 
No doubt, there is an important civil liberty issue at stake in their operations. But 
the fact remains that much of the conduct of public officials found by the Royal 
Commission to be "improper" was not "illegal" and not easily amenable to 
investigation, inquiry and report by existing agencies. In combination with such 
other accountability agencies as the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and the 
proposed Public Sector Standards Commission, the Parliament could be assisted in 
discharging its accountability functions by the creation of a body which has the 
discrete function of dealing not only with "corruption" as a criminal offence but also 
"improper" behaviour by public officials. 
The offices of the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman are not designed for this 
type of audit function or experienced in performing it. The Commission accepted 
that a special purpose body was required to perform the task. At the very least, 
however, the powers of the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman must be widened 
to ensure they are not restricted in their capacity to monitor all official conduct 
within the public sector. Moreover, if the Ombudsman is to be relied upon as the 
principal accountability agency in this area, in the absence of a CICIC, the office must 
necessarily be better resourced and funded to meet such public expectations than it 
currently is. 
In some areas of needed reform identified or confirmed by the Commission, reform 
has either occurred or is in train. For example, the State now has freedom of 
legislation legislation which has already made its mark. Further, a review of the 
State's administrative appeals structure is close to completion following the recent 
publication of a discussion paper by the reviewers, even though proposals for such 
reform have been about in this State for a decade and more following the 
publication of WA Law Reform Commission proposals on the topic. Public sector 
management reform is also a live issue. 
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Additionally, the agenda set by the Royal Commission for detailed public 
consideration of important issues of public policy upon the establishment of a 
Commission on Government is soon to commence, and not before time. The Royal 
Commission saw the issues it placed on this agenda as important ones upon which a 
wide range of views needed to be expressed before recommendations were made to 
Parliament itself. As I noted earlier, the Commission on Government is intended to 
be "the people's inquiry", not a body susceptible to executive control or influence, 
with the responsibility to entertain a number of broad-ranging constitutional and 
administrative issues which had been identified through the Royal Commission's 
inquiries as bearing directly on the capacity of the Parliament to exact open and 
accountable government from the executive, and the expectation of the public that 
government will be carried out openly, accountably and with integrity. The 
Government has added, and continues to add other issues to the Royal 
Commission's list. 
I am bound to say that the apparent reluctance of the Government to establish the 
Commission on Government, despite its early political undertaking to do so, by 
drawing out its creation for so long, does not auger well for the future of COG. 
COG, one might say, was a child conceived with considerable enthusiasm by the 
Royal Commission. Its gestation, longer than expected, was committed to the care of 
Government and Parliament, the latter under the continued influence of the former. 
The child now born has been given a tentative pat on the bottom and sent out into the 
world to find its own way. Its immediate adop~ve parent is the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee responsible for its oversight. COG was intended by the 
Royal Commission to have the benefit of the guiding hand and expert appreciation 
of a person experienced in constitutional and administrative law. The Royal 
Commission, I know, considered such guidance, in the form of a full-time Chairman 
of COG so qualified, to be of the ubnost importance to the success of COG, especially 
in meeting the two year deadline on its work. The unpreparedness of the 
Government to act on this considered advice is an indicator, of the "red spot special" 
variety, that the Government does not wish COG to disprove the aphorism "life was 
not meant to be easy". 
The Premier's statement when he was interviewed on ABC radio soon after COG's 
membership was prematurely announced by him in Parliament, prior to 
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition as required by the Royal 
Commission and the COG Act, to the effect that "you don't need to be a lawyer to 
chair a meeting", on the one hand completely fails to appreciate the point of the 
recommendation concerning the Chairman, yet, on the other hand, is probably ample 
proof, should it be required, that the Premier well-understood the recommendation 
and intentionally desired to limit the likely effectiveness of COG in the performance 
of its functions. The assignment of additional issues to COG also suggests that COG 
is being used as the classical "inter-deparbnental committee" (IDq which is created 
to make Government appear earnest about an issue full-well knowing that it will get 
buried in the committee process and, in all likelihood, forgotten! 
From such an inauspicious start, COG will need all the help it can get as it struggles 
through its relatively short life. It will have to face a steep learning curve, especially 
without the type of full-time leadership recommended by the Royal Commission. I 
would venture to suggest that COG is certainly not, at birth, the child the Royal 
Commission had thought it conceived: not "Rosemary's Baby" perhaps, but maybe 
"Richard's Baby"! Nonetheless, many children blessedly surprise their parents and 
relatives as they mature, and my earnest hope is that COG will also do so by 
engaging in its deliberations with a full and proper understanding of what the 
Royal Commission envisaged its task to be. Unless it does, not only will the work of 
the Royal Commission be undone but the citizens of this State will have been short-
changed. 
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ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT 
Mr Jack Gregor 
Chairman 
Commission On Government 
First, let me congratulate the organisers of this conference. It is very timely and very 
apt. They must have been gifted with second sight to predict so accurately when the 
Commission on Government would be established. 
I also want to thank them for the opportunity of speaking to you at such an 
important conference just before the Commission on Government opens for business. 
It gives me an opportunity to tell you about how we plan to conduct the 
Commission's inquiries and the results we hope to achieve. 
Before doing so, I should introduce one important caveat. The commission has only 
been appointed since Wednesday and we have only had one meeting, and that one 
brief. We have had no opportunity yet to get into any detailed discussions about 
how we are going to conduct our inquiries. 
Therefore the following comments should be taken as indicative only and reflecting 
mainly my own initial thoughts. They are not cast in bronze and are likely to change 
in the light of opinions from other Commissioners and factors which emerge during 
the public consultations. 
My job today is to address you about the role and function of the Commission on 
Government. Our function is easy to define. It is set out in the act. We are to inquire 
into the matters listed in the schedule to the act, add any others we think appropriate 
and report on them to the joint Parliamentary Committee and the Premier. 
In doing so we are expected to consult widely and act openly. We have access to the 
Royal Commission records if we need them but the same confidentiality provisions 
attached to the Royal Commission also attach to us. 
We need to bear in mind that the Commission is not a law on to itself. We are subject 
to supervision by the Parliamentary Committee, the media, the supreme court and 
ultimately the public at large. We will be taking appropriate care to make sure we 
conduct our affairs properly. The subject matter of the Commission's inquiries is 
quite capable of generating controversy, but we don't want the Commission itself, 
and its methods of approach, to become controversial. 
I am the only full time Commissioner. My four colleagues are part time appointees. 
feel sure the definitions of "full-time" and "part time" will be stretched to the limit at 
several points during the 21 rrronths ahead. I look rorward very much to working 
with them. They have my total admiration and respect. I think they will serve the 
Commission and State very well indeed. 
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While I will contribute to the investigative side of our inquiries, I see my primary 
role as simply getting the job done. We have a formidable task. We have more topics 
to consider and less time to do it in, compared with the most recent similar exercise, 
the electoral and administrative review Commission in Queensland set up 
following the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
EARC, as it has become known, covered part of the ground we will have to address. 
Some of this will be useful because we do not want to waste time revisiting areas 
already well explored, bearing in mind the differences between the two states. 
Queensland, you will remember, has a unicameral parliament. 
There has been some public controversy about the time taken to establish the 
Commission in this state. From my viewpoint, that may fortuitously help our task, 
EARC was set up very soon after the Fitzgerald Inquiry, when the emotional, 
political and news media aspects were still running hot. That Commission seems to 
have done a first class job but I can't help thinking that its task was perhaps coloured 
and made more intense by the general atmosphere which then prevailed. 
I see the purpose and role of our Commission as being chiefly relevant to the longer 
term. It is not necessarily a bad thing for the Commission that there has been a time 
gap since the Royal Commission submitted its reports. The pressurised environment 
of that time has relaxed to some extent and there is now more scope for a sober, 
contemplative and reasoned approach to the Commission on Government's 
assignment. 
There has been time to reflect on what happened during the 1980s, assess what was 
good and what was bad and begin to form some ideas about how to do better in 
future. This can only benefit the processes and outcomes of the Commission's 
inquiries. 
This conference also gives me the opportunity to give my understanding about what 
the Commission is and is not 
The 1980s' undoubtedly saw departures from standards the public expects to see in 
public officials. These departures can be attributed to both personal failures on the 
part of individuals and, as the Royal Commissioners argued, to possible 
inadequacies in our system of government. 
The personal failings have been the subject of considerable political debate both 
inside and outside parliament, and they have been dramatically depicted in the 
news media. 
I do not see the Commission's role as being involved in any way with these personal, 
or individual failings. Instead, we will be concentrating on the institutional 
arrangements in our public sector and the system of government in Western 
Australia. 
Our primary role is not investigatory in the sense that the Royal Commission's was. 
Raking over the coals of material produced by the Royal Commission may be 
required to some extent but this is not our main mission and will certainly not be 
done for any political purposes. 
It will be done to assess how these personal failings relate to the institutional and 
administrative environment in which they occurred. Such looking backward is 
unavoidable but it will be selective, instructive and brief. 
I see the Commission focussed firmly on the future. My fellow Commissioners and I 
want to see positive outcomes emerge from our work. The Royal Commission cost 
taxpayers a lot of money and the Commission on Government will add to this, 
albeit much more modestly. It is important that we add value and generate 
worthwhile reforms which will stand up to 21st century conditions. We will not 
achieve this by dwelling too long on the past. 
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There has also been considerable controversy about section 5 of the act and whether 
or not it restricts the ambit of the Commission's inquiries. You will remember that 
section 5 says that the Commission is to inquire into the specified matters if and to 
the extent it considers those matters relevant to preventing corrupt, illegal or 
improper conduct. 
From my viewpoint, I do not feel constrained by the wording of section 5. The 
words "corrupt, illegal and improper" serve to draw everyone's attention to the 
underlying reasons for the Royal Commission in the first place and, ultimately, the 
establishment of the Commission on Government. But there is no need, on my first 
reading, to interpret them narrowly as limiting the Commission's ambit. 
I am mindful, too, of the Government's assurances in Parliament that the 
Commission was to be independent and free to conduct its business as it saw fit. 
This does not sound like a restriction to me. 
As I said a moment ago, our job is to concentrate on how our systems of government 
can be improved to make it more difficult for public officials, entrusted with power 
by the people, to behave corruptly, illegally or improperly in the future. 
In addressing the operation of section 5, the Commission will be mindful of its 
responsibility to act openly and consult widely. Before taking any decision on the 
relevance or otherwise of a particular specified matter, we will ensure that all 
interested parties, and the public generally, have had a full opportunity to put their 
views to us. 
Section 5 also allows the Commission to consider other matters in addition to those 
specified in the schedule to the act. At this early stage, the Commission has not made 
any attempt to think about whether it may wish to widen its ambit to consider other 
matters. 
I think we will be guided by the comments and submissions we receive from the 
public. If interested people put forward new ideas which we think are important 
and have relevance, we will consider them on their merits at the time. 
We are also conscious that the Commission is part of a broader public sector reform 
agenda. The Government and Parliament are continually looking for ways to 
improve our public sector and systems of Government. I noted only last Saturday in 
the "West Australian" that there is a general review of the state's appeal tribunals 
and processes. There are approximately 46 tribunals which have been identified to 
date. 
An administrative appeals tribunal is one our specified matters .. The Commission 
will want to talk with those conducting the review to make sure we support each 
other and avoid duplicating effort. It is especially important that we don't annoy 
people by asking the same questions and collecting the same information. 
The new Public Sector Management act and the strengthened Official Corruption 
Commission are examples of legislative change that have their genesis in the Royal 
Commission's recommendations. We will have to take the adequacy of these into 
account in our deliberations on those matters. 
Our assessment of the electoral issues may be influenced by the real world outcomes 
from the current high court challenge on the one vote-one value issue. That case 
could be running at the same time as our inquiries. 
The Commission will have to tread to path between avoiding needless repetition on 
the one hand and focussing our inquiries inappropriately on the other. 
This brings me to the issue of section 6 of the act. Under this section, the Commission 
can decide that a specified matter has been adequately addressed by legislative or 
administrative action, or is of insufficient significance to merit further inquiry. If so, 
22 
Gregor 
the Commission can make a determination to that effect and cease work on that 
matter. 
I see this section as a sensible provision aimed at preventing needless repetition of 
work already done and actions already taken. It would be damaging to morale and 
counterproductive if the Commission were forced to go over ground which in its 
own mind it knows has been adequately dealt with. 
But the reverse case is equally pertinent If the Commission feels that legislative or 
administrative action by the Government, taken in response to Royal Commission 
recommendations, could be improved still further, we are at liberty to make such a 
recommendation. The Public Sector Management act and the Official Corruption 
Commission may well fall in this category. 
The Premier has indicated that the Government will take whatever action it 
considers appropriate immediately to improve our systems of government, without 
waiting for the Commission on Government Reports. This is entirely appropriate. It 
is both the prerogative and responsibility of government to do so. 
However, the government has also indicated it will consider any subsequent 
recommendations by the Commission for further improvement on their merits. In 
this way, there is scope for the Commission to add value to Government actions 
already taken. This too is entirely appropriate. 
In conducting its inquiries it will be useful to consider the fundamental principles 
stated by the Royal Commission. You may remember the discussion paper issued by 
the Royal Commission during the first phase of its work. The paper was intended to 
stimulate public debate and generate submissions for the Commissioners to 
consider in preparing its part ii report. 
The Royal Commissioners spoke about three key needs which our systems of 
government must meet, namely: 
* 
* 
* 
there must be public confidence in the integrity of our government 
systems; 
the executive government must be accountable to the parliament 
and people; and 
the government must be able to operate effectively in the public 
interest. 
The discussion paper then went on to build on these principles by listing five general 
issues for discussion. These were: 
1. Open government; 
2. Accountable government; 
3. Integrity in government; 
4. Ethical supervision of the public sector; and 
5. Government in commerce. 
It seems to me that these issues remain highly relevant today. Obviously they will be 
in the forefront as we proceed through our inquiries. 
I will divert for a moment to discuss the fifth item I mentioned - namely 
"Government in Commerce". It seems to me that this is especially significant since it 
was the key issue in the so-called "WA Inc" episodes. The government of the da\· 
argued that taxpayers would gain some relief and the government could providl' 
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more and better services if public sector revenues could be augmented by dividends 
from profits made through commercial ventures. Now I know there are many 
counter arguments to this proposition but I do not have time to cover them all here. 
I raise the matter simply to introduce another aspect of the Commission's role which 
hitherto has received little attention. I speak of the question: "What is the core 
business of government"? It seems to me that questions relating to systems of 
government cannot be divorced from consideration of what government is supposed 
to be doing. 
Ultimately, this question cannot be answered in a cold, rational way by a 
Commission such as ours. What government should be doing is what the people 
want is to do, as determined through the political process and in the light of what 
public services cost. 
However, the Commission will have to address itself to this question as one of many 
important considerations in shaping the direction of its inquiries. Here again I am 
conscious that the government is already taking action on public sector reform. Its 
reforms are aimed at making government more efficient and effective and, again 
these steps should not be held up pending the commission's reports. But I hope we 
can contribute positively to the public sector reform process as an essential part of 
our total brief to improve our systems of government. 
The Royal Commission received one hundred and thirty submissions following 
release of its discussion paper. We hope to review these submissions as part of our 
inquiry. They will obviously be an essential starting point. 
For that matter, the whole of the Royal Commission's part ii report will be a key 
document in shaping our approach to both the public consultations and our analysis 
of the submissions we receive. 
The term "Systems of Government" could be taken to include Commonwealth, State 
and Local Government. While we will be looking at the modes and types of 
interactions between the Western Australian and Commonwealth Governments, our 
inquiries will not be directly involved with Commonwealth Government 
administration. This is outside our ambit. Our focus is only on the state government 
level. 
But I am assuming this includes local government, for which the state is ultimately 
responsible. Local government did not feature very prominently in the Royal 
Commission's inquiry but there is little doubt it should be included in our brief. This 
follows because of the clear legal relationship between the state government and 
local authorities through the local government act. There has been evidence of 
corrupt, illegal and improper conduct at the local government level and in such 
cases there can be a responsibility on the part of the minister for local government to 
intervene. 
Fortunately, as you all know, we have as one of our commissioners a man very well 
versed in local government affairs. We will be drawing on his experience and 
counsel for this aspect of our work. 
I want to look now at what might be termed the key success factors for the 
commission. I will group these broadly into three categories: process, outputs and 
outcomes. 
I emphasise here that we have yet to decide finally our modus operandi. That will 
occur over the next month or so. 
On the process side, I see the key success factors as follows: 
The first is just to do justice to the 24 specified items in the schedule 1 of the act. 
Some of the 24 topics lend themselves to grouping into logical sets of issues which 
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we may be able to consider as a block. We will also have to think carefully about 
the order in which we tackle the agenda because some matters clearly will take 
longer to work through and merit more attention than others. 
I don't want to get into too much detail today but I will take just a moment to 
discuss staff and resources. The government has allocated $1.5 million to cover the 
Commission's costs this financial year. Because the financial year is nearly half over, 
nearly all of this money will be spent in the first half of 1995. Our level of effort has 
to build up very rapidly in the new year and' we will be conducting preliminary 
operations during the remainder of 1994. 
One essential part of this is to assemble the human resources needed to perform our 
assignment. These people, along with the help and support of the whole community, 
are the keys to our success. 
Under section 14 of the act we can hire contract staff and put work out to contract. 
We will be doing both, but we will have a firm eye on the budget and the need to get 
real value from any contract we make. All of these contracts will be subject to 
supervision by the Parliamentary Committee. Wherever possible we will call for 
competitive bids for all major contract assignments. The time available to conduct 
the tendering process will be short and this will place extra burdens on bidders and 
Commission staff alike. But given the short time scale and full schedule, I ask 
everyone to bear with us. We will try to give as much notice as possible. 
While we will try to maintain a strong focus on simplicity and common sense in our 
approach, we inevitably will have to deal with complex legal questions and analyse 
existing and proposed statutes. We will be contacting the Crown Solicitor 
frequently, I'm sure, but he is unlikely to have the resources available to meet all of 
our needs, given the many other demands placed on him. This means we will have 
to consider appointing a counsel assisting. I have not discussed this with my 
colleagues as yet but if they agree, we again will call for bids from qualified legal 
firms and individual lawyers to supply this service. 
Under section 15 we can second staff from public sector departments and agencies. 
This we will do also. The Commission needs senior public servants who are 
familiar with our present systems of government, can tap into the resources of 
government as a whole but have the flexibility of mind to see where things can be 
done better. 
Again, we will call for expressions of interest through the public sector notices and 
we will be selecting staff on the basis of merit. I am conscious that chief executive 
officers of departments and agencies will not thank us for taking some of their better 
people and we will have to negotiate mutually. satisfactory arrangements in most 
cases. Our objective will be to gain the capability and experience the commission 
needs without causing too much disruption to the public sector and without 
harming in any way the career progression of the officers concerned. 
The second factor under this heading is the need to satisfy all interested parties that 
they have been heard and their views properly considered. In doing so we must act 
openly and consult widely, as I said earlier. We will, of course, advertise our 
hearings and call for submissions. We plan to produce discussion papers in advance 
and to hold seminars. Some of these will be in regional centres. In this way we hope 
to build public awareness and to stimulate the widest possible debate about the 
important issues before the Commission. 
We plan to use imaging technology so that all material submitted to us and 
produced by the commission will be available to everyone promptly - the same day, 
I hope. 
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Role and function of the Commission on Government 
Our reports, however, will remain confidential while they. are being pre~ar~d. l 
think it is only fair that the Commissioners have the opporturuty to form their views 
on each reference in private before submitting them to the Parliamentary Committee 
and the Premier, who are the first recipients intended under the act. 
The Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee is required to table reports he 
receives from us on the next sitting day. The act also provides for the defacto 
tabling, and hence public release, promptly if Parliament is not sitting. There will be 
no delay therefore in making our reports public. 
The third process factor will be developing a constructive working relationship 
with the joint Parliamentary Committee. The Committee will effectively be our link 
with Parliament as a whole and will receive our reports. 
I see the need for a genuine partnership between the Commission and the joint 
Parliamentary Committee. The Committee will monitor and review our 
performance. While the Commission is independent, we are really answerable to the 
Parliament, through this special standing committee. It is our conduit to Parliament 
and therefore merits our wholehearted cooperation and support. 
The joint Parliamentary Committee will also be examining our reports and debating 
them. This means the ultimate outcomes from the Commission's work will be 
strongly influenced by this examination and the reports the Committee makes in 
turn to Parliament. For this reason, l see the Committee as an integral part of the 
total exercise. It has a positive role to play in contributing to the Commission's 
inquiries and in achieving the beneficial outcomes we are all seeking. The 
Committee will have a major responsibility, as will the Commission, for the final 
results. 
The fourth matter is the need to tap into all of the relevant information resources 
available, not only in Western Australia but also interstate and overseas. We hope 
opinion leaders in learned institutions, universities and the private sector will take 
the trouble to make submissions. 
The final success factor I will mention concerns the need for the Commission itself to 
reach for and maintain the highest possible standards of integrity and fairness. We 
can gather information from far and wide, be guided by the best brains and 
experience available and receive cogent submissions from august bodies and 
individuals, but in the end we should and will be judged on what we produce 
ourselves. We are very conscious of this. It is sobering, I can assure you. 
Having discussed the process questions, I tum now to mention possible outputs from 
our work. 
These, of course, are mainly reports - paper, in other words. These we deliver, as l 
have said, to the Parliamentary Committee and Premier respectively. 
Although we have not decided finally, our preliminary thought is that we will 
report as soon as we have finished work on a particular reference. As I said earlier, 
we may decide to group some of the references and combine them in one report for 
that group. 
l suppose another output is the body of information we collect from those who make 
submissions and the documents we produce ourselves during the various inquiries. 
People can read all of this if they want to and take copies. 
There is also the complete record of all submissions, material produced and files 
which the commission will hand over to the premier at the end of our assignment. I 
presume these materials will become part of the state archives. 
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The delivery of our reports will end the matter as far as the Commission is 
concerned. We will, of course, be happy to answer any questions about our findings 
and recommendations. 
But how, or if they are to be implemented will be questions for others. Once we 
submit our reports, we will move on immediately to the next item. At the end, when 
all reports have been presented, that will be the end of the matter for us. We think it 
would be ill-advised and probably counter-productive for us to make any attempt 
to influence or guide the course of events which follow the issuing of our reports. 
Their implementation will not be our affair. 
However, based on my experience of 8 years on the bench of the Industrial Relations 
Commission, I can, with comparative safety, make some general observations about 
outcomes. Firstly, some people will tend to view the Commission from their own 
perspective. They will hope to see their particular arguments or initiatives emerge as 
recommendations in our reports. The very advent of the Commission and its open 
processes will tend to create expectations, some of them unrealistic. I fear many of 
these will be dashed or realised only in part. We cannot be all things to all people 
and won't try. We ask people to bear this in mind. 
As to final outcomes, the experience of EARC is instructive. Some of the legislation 
recommended by EARC was introduced into the Queensland Parliament late last 
month. More will be introduced this month, some four years after the exercise began. 
The Government of Queensland has been forming its own view of the EARC 
recommendations through normal departmental processes, but decided to await a 
full debate in its Parliamentary Committee, which in Queensland consists of seven 
members, before taking a public stance on the issues. There has been much soul 
searching and behind the scenes discussion, but I understand what has emerged 
bears at least some resemblance to EARC's original recommendations. 
So I just want to make this simple point don't expect the world to change overnight 
immediately after our reports are submitted. I expect our reports will merely mark 
the beginning of another extensive and complex political and social process. 
But in the end, the overall gainers will be the public at large. I am confident there 
will be significant changes emerging from the Commission's work. These changes 
may not be exactly what we recommend but they will represent real progress 
nonetheless. My four colleagues and I want to look back with some pride, able to 
point to reforms which we had a hand in starting. We want to be able to say that 
Western Australia is a better place as a result of the Commission on Government. 
Those participating in our inquiries will, I'm sure, have similar feelings. 
One important outcome will be an increase in public awareness about our systems of 
government and the important topics the commission will address. I hope our 
consultation processes will lift the general consciousness about the importance of 
public scrutiny and the sovereignty of parliament. 
A more aware and better informed public is perhaps the greatest safeguard of all 
against a repetition of the 1980s excesses, as well as being a positive stimulus for 
better public sector performance in the future. 
I end by appealing for help. The Commission by itself is nothing. Its success will 
depend on the help and advice it gets from you, the public. The Commission is a 
conduit, a facilitator for the whole community to take part in its inquiries. The more 
help, understanding and support we get, the better the outcomes will be. I hope 
everyone here will take part and encourage others to do so. 
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE REFORM AGENDA 
Professor P J Boyce 
As the Second Report of the Royal Commission asserts, 'The accountability of 
government ...... is at the heart of the matter.' Indeed, I would suggest that the notion 
of accountability lies at the core of all liberal democratic theory, sharing pride of 
place with the notion of 'consent'. My presentation this morning will first attempt to 
explain briefly how the Westminster derived political systems are failing to uphold 
the principle of accountability and why. Then I offer some thoughts on the reforms 
recommended by the Royal Commissioners and the task confronting the recently 
established Commission on Government. 
Constant reference to the 'Westminster system' by parliamentarians and media 
commentators might imply that there exists a blue-print of correct practice from 
which any deviation would constitute a serious delinquency, but in fact there is no 
fixed model or prototype, for the system at Westminster has been evolving steadily 
since the text-book theorists started to celebrate it in the latter decades of the 19th 
century, and its four major overseas transplants - in Ottawa, Dublin, Canberra and 
Wellington - are modifications of the model to suit local circumstance. All serious 
practitioners, interpreters and proponents of something called 'the Westminster 
system' would nevertheless concur, I think, that its core indispensable element is the 
smooth straight line of accountability which runs from cabinet to parliament and 
from parliament to the electorate. In this respect it is markedly different from , but 
not automatically superior to, the congressional-presidential model of liberal 
democracy favoured by our North American cousins. 
For that line of accountability to carry any traffic, certain conventions or unwritten 
rules of political behaviour must be understood and upheld - rules relating to the 
making and unmaking of governments, the role of the governor, and, perhaps most 
significantly in the context of our WA Inc. experience, to that elusive concept called 
'ministerial responsibility'. 
Criticism of the Westminster system is now very widespread in those countries 
where it is practised, not least in Britain itself. The principal focus of concern for 
almost all critics is the increasing dominance of the political executive over 
parliament and, correspondingly, parliament's failure to call the executive to full 
account. 
This point is highly pertinent to the circumstances which gave rise to WA Inc. and 
the very considerable difficulties encountered in uncovering the scandal. Parliament 
failed miserably in this instance to call the executive to account. There were other 
failures of course; the unprobing print media for example, a somewhat timid public 
service, and a largely apathetic, unsophisticated general public, aroused into a fury 
of indignation only after it became crystal clear that many hundreds of millions of 
dollars of public moneys and private earnings had been lost for ever. But the 
institution which, according to the pure theory of our system of government must 
hold the executive to account, is the parliament. 
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In the heyday of the Westminster system's elevated status as an 'ideal type' of liberal 
democratic government, the executive was not as powerful or complex as it has since 
become; political party discipline within the Parliament was not so strong; and 
within the House of Commons a back-bench member could carve out a reputation for 
himself and fulfil a quite satisfying career outside the Ministry or Cabinet. 
But what do we confront today, not merely in Australia at both national and state 
levels, but in many other parliaments of the 'old Commonwealth'? The general 
pattern has been for cabinets to operate more and more independently of the 
parliaments from which they are drawn and to which they are supposed to report. 
And because of the tightness of party discipline and the ministerial aspirations of 
most backbenchers, parliaments exert less and less restraint on government. In the 
smaller Australian state parliaments with small backbenches, and no doubt in some 
Canadian provincial legislatures as well, the political executive is even less likely to 
be called to strict account. 
The reform agenda of the Commission on Government contains several proposals 
which address the decline of parliament, but a few of them are of relatively minor 
significance and some potentially significant reforms have been left off the agenda. I 
shall refer again to these shortly. Other major recommendations are uncontroversial 
and straightforward but nevertheless important. (For example: the already 
accomplished reorganization of public sector management, the need to extend the 
scope of the Auditor-General's responsibilities, and the need to strengthen 
parliamentary control over state trading concerns.) One's enthusiasm for a reform 
agenda will depend partly on what assumes the causes of WA Inc. to have been, and 
partly on how certain proposed reforms would impact on one's own political party 
fortunes. 
The current Premier and some of his colleagues have stated their opinion from time 
to time that the cause of WA Inc. scandals was the accidental and isolated 
occurrence of there having been a bad barrel of apples installed in government from 
1983. The basic institutions of government had not been found wanting, and the 
government elected in early 1993 was comprised of honest and honourable men and 
women who understood the ground rules of responsible government and would 
respect them to the letter. 
I believe this interpretation of events to be simplistic and flawed. That the 
accountability processes were abused or circumvented more brazenly during the 
Burke and Dowding premierships than at any other time in this state's political 
history I would not dispute. Nor would I query the sincerity of initial commitment 
from the present leadership to honour the requirements of accountability, as they 
understood them. 
But there is surely too much emphasis in this comfortable and self-serving 
interpretation of events on ranking the moral qualities of one party team in 
government as vastly superior to those of its predecessor, with little or no account 
taken of the peculiar circumstances of the period, the weakness of institutional 
constraints, or the inherent moral weakness of human beings of all political 
persuasion in the face of compelling political temptations. Certainly in the last 
resort, personal moral choice is the cause of political corruption, but it is political 
institutions which create the discipline and culture which help inform that moral 
choice. I therefore find myself in some agreement with the submission of the Royal 
Australian Institute of Administration (to the Commission) that the Westminster 
system is not the solution to WA's problems; it is itself part of the problem. 
The unpleasant fact is that no government feels very comfortable with the full 
requirements of accountability and no government wants a parliamentary system in 
which the executive does not control the numbers. Indeed, because an opposition 
looks forward to the day when it will control the reins of government, we probably 
should not look to parliament itself to initiate radical improvements in the processes 
of accountability. These must originate with the general public, through opinion 
leaders. 
29 
Accountability and the refonn agenda 
Before discussing the potential influence of the Commission on Goven:iment and the 
more contentious issues awaiting its attention, I should express a view about the 
credibility of the Report which gave birth to it. With a certain bravado I suggested to 
another audience exactly one year ago1 that although the Second Report deserved to 
be taken very seriously (especially in the light of findings in the First Report), the 
Royal Commissioners had been given an impossible assignment-impossible because 
of the terms of reference presented to them, because of the limitation of time for 
serious consideration of necessary reforms, and because of the inevitable difficulty 
presented to legal practitioners in handling slippery matters of political process 
which do not easily lend themselves to legal discourse. Let me spell out these three 
concerns. I do so because of the unkind assessment some parliamentarians have 
made of the Second Report. 
The Commissioners' terms of reference required them not merely to inquire whether 
corruption, illegal conduct or improper conduct had occurred, and whether any 
matter should be referred to an appropriate authority with a view to the institution 
of criminal proceedings, but also whether 'changes in the law of the State, or in 
administrative or decision making procedures,' were 'necessary or desirable in the 
public interest. 
It would be difficult to imagine more open ended terms of reference than this. 
Although it might be possible to identify defective procedures of accountability in a 
political system, the scope for remedial practice is almost unlimited. Certainly there 
was no unanimity within the group of Commission consultants as to how far into 
the political system one needed to probe to do full justice to the government's brief, 
and we faced a strong temptation, not always resisted, to canvass any reform that 
held promise for the betterment of the machinery or processes of government in W .A. 
The second major difficulty facing the Commissioners was the extraordinarily tight 
time frame within which they had to undertak~ their examination of the political 
system between late completion of the first Report and the deadline for submission 
of the Second Report. Because the investigations of more than a dozen episodes of 
government business dealings required more time than had been originally 
allocated, the Commissioners sought two extensions of deadline. By the date of 
presentation of the first Report (August 1992), barely two months remained for the 
Commissioners' focussed consideration of the issues of political and administrative 
reform. Admittedly a first draft of the second Report had been in preparation for 
several months, being principally the handiwork of resident legal counsel, Michael 
Barker, and a legal consultant from the Australian National University, Professor 
Paul Finn, but involvement of the Commissioners themselves at that stage was of 
necessity perfunctory and spasmodic. 
The Commissioners faced an awkward dilemma, because they were well aware of 
the mounting costs of the Commission and the increasing impatience of government 
which was heading towards a critical election. They knew that to recommend a 
transfer of responsibility for further investigations to a yet-to-be established 
Commission on Government would generate public cynicism and a corresponding 
decline of community interest in reforms of any kind. They therefore decided to 
review the draft placed before them and proceeded to work through it at breakneck 
speed. They made considerable refinements to the document, but it was by now too 
late to re-arrange its structure and basic thrust. 
The Commissioners' difficulties were compounded by the fact that two very 
different sorts of expertise were required for the two Reports. The first inquiry 
belonged exclusively to legal counsel and members of the judiciary; the second 
required an admixture of constitutional legal expertise and an understanding of 
political processes, especially the conventions of responsible government. As 
indicated elsewhere in this paper, neither the legal consultants nor the Royal 
Commissioners seemed entirely comfortable in confronting issues of political 
process, especially those relating to ambiguous or contested conventions of 
ministerial responsibility. The sphere of statutes, regulations, codes and tribunals, 
where authority is specific and enforceable, seeined more to their liking. 
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What then, can the Commission on Government hope to achieve? Should it confine its 
attentions to what it thinks the Government might accept and remain in consultative 
mode with government before it releases recommendations? Or should it set its 
agenda priorities without any regard to how the political executive, the parliament 
or the wider community might receive its recommendations? 
As you might expect, my hope is that the process will fall somewhere between these 
two modes and also that the Commission might ask searching questions about the 
entire fabric of our political culture, in addition to institutional reform. The 
Commissioners should investigate fearlessly and without constraint but tailor their 
recommendations in part to what they think their major target audiences might be 
persuaded to accept, but all the while indicating in their reports, without apology, 
the course of action which they would in the best circumstances prefer. Had the 
Royal Commissioners, or more particularly their advisers, been a little more 
sensitive to the likely reactions of the major political parties to one of their key 
recommendations, a reform of the electoral system, the then Opposition might not 
have been afforded such an easy excuse to rubbish the whole Report. I have to say 
that despite many hours of reflection on this matter I still cannot discern a direct 
link between our malaportioned electoral system and the causes of WA Inc., though I 
can appreciate that if parliament is to be strengthened as an institution of 
accountability, it will be highly desirable that all major political parties feel 
comfortable with the electoral system. Unfortunately the National Party seems to 
have interpreted the Report as being totally hostile to regional weighting's and to 
have closed its mind to any revision of the electoral system as a legitimate part of 
the reform agenda. I wish fervently that the Report had worded discussion of this 
issue differently, so as to avoid the apparent alienation of the National Party. 
The Second Report proposed that the Commission on Government consider changes 
to the basis of electoral representation in the Legislative Council and any other 
mechanism necessary to make that chamber 'the primary review agency of the 
public sector'. The proposal that our Legislative Council be converted to a genuine 
house of review is as critical as any in the Report, and although I see little prospect of 
the present government allowing such a profound change to occur, I sincerely hope 
that the Commission will not be deferred from considering it. 
A genuine house of review would not reflect party alignments in the lower house 
and preferably, though not necessarily, would be free of any endorsed political 
party members. Because no ministers would be drawn from the upper house and 
because the government would not command an automatic majority in that 
chamber, debate and inquiries could be pursued disinterestedly and without fear or 
favour. On the other hand there would not be any expectation that the upper house 
could usurp the role of government. The Royal Commission Report suggested that it 
would be inappropriate for a house of review. to exercise the power of rejecting 
supply, but I know there are some serious analysts who would wish a reformed 
Council to retain this right. I can see arguments for and against, though my 
preference would be for a Council which could exercise real influence through a 
delaying power and the sheer weight of non-partisan talent in its ranks without 
needing the power to reject supply. Paradoxically the House of Lords, archaic and 
anachronistic body though it is, exercises a role broadly in keeping with what I have 
in mind. 
One avenue of reform down which the Royal Commissioners were reluctant to tread 
was revision of the Western Australian constitution. I regretted this at the time and 
regret it even more in retrospect. It is not easy to · demonstrate that a new or 
streamlined constitution would directly reduce the risk of corrupt or improper 
behaviour by government, but there is little doubt that the constitution needs 
revision - if only to make it intelligible and to give the community a sense of 
ownership or proprietorship of its political system, a point which has been forcefully 
argued in public by my former colleague, Patrick O'Brien. I do not get the 
impression that either parliamentarians or many members of the legal profession 
would really welcome a streamlined constitution which is intelligible to the 
layperson and which emphasizes popular sovereignty. This is probably not the 
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occasion on which to initiate detailed discussion of what a new constitution might 
contain (whether for example it should enshrine a bill of rights), but I would see 
benefit in the constitution containing a simple description of responsible government 
and the principal conventions which underpin it. 
We are very wary of looking to American models from the vantage point of our 
somewhat smug and unduly Anglo-oriented political culture, but North American 
experience reminds us that constitutions are not simply a body of rules but an 
expression of the moral consensus -which underlies those rules. The constitution of 
Western Australia is an unintelligible, untidy assortment of colonial documents, 
some of them amended, which (as Campbell Sharman has written) remain 'silent on 
several key aspects of the operation of responsible parliamentary government'. It 
contains no explanatory preamble, and there is no mention in it of the office of 
Premier, no direct reference to Cabinet, nor any reference to the procedures through 
which the formal executive powers of the Crown are to be made responsible to the 
wishes of elected officials. One might be forgiven for suspecting that the designers of 
our constitution, and their contemporary accomplices in our parliament and the 
legal profession, were or are intending to deter the citizenry from acquiring 
knowledge of or interest in the state's constitution. 
This all relates to the political education and sophistication of the community to 
which government is supposed to be accountable through parliament. The odds are 
currently stacked against any sustained push for public enlightenment Yet the 
overwhelming majority of Western Australians would almost certainly be 
incapable of recognizing or defining the essential features of the Westminster 
system, which· is so regularly extolled in hollow or misleading rhetoric. And for 
that reason they are unlikely to know how the processes of accountability should be 
played out. 
The Second Report lays considerable emphasis on the need to develop a strong 
committee system in the Parliament. While I share the Royal Commissioners' 
enthusiasm for the ideal of a strong system of bipartisan investigative and 
monitoring committees, I have grave doubts that this ideal can be realized within 
small Westminster-style parliaments, where government backbenchers, relatively 
few in number, will be understandably hesitant to embarrass the ruling party, and 
where opposition-led probings will be greeted by a sceptical public as routine 
partisan attacks. 
One serious issue which was addressed by the Com.missioners only perfunctorily 
and about which they ventured no recommendation in their long list of possible 
reforms was ministerial responsibility. Chapter 4 contains some sensible 
observations on the twin conventions of ministerial responsibility and correctly 
underlines the distinction between a breach of these conventiol)S and 'improper 
conduct', as understood by lawyers, but Commissioners demurred at the idea of 
prescribing a precise role for Cabinet in our system of government and offered as an 
excuse for avoiding advice on ministerial responsibility the wide divergence of 
views evident in parliamentary practice and scholarly interpretation. The limit of 
their prescription in this area, apart from asserting the need for Cabinet records to 
be kept, was the establishment of a code of conduct for Ministers. 
Perhaps the Commission on Government could prepare a discussion paper on the 
slippery but central concept of ministerial responsibility. There is not quite as much 
variety of interpretation, at least among political scientists, as the Royal 
Commissioners imply, and if it is to be left indefinitely in the too-hard basket, the 
case for abandoning Westminster principles gathers strength. "Ministerial 
responsibility has ceased to be a sword in the hand of parliament and has become a 
shield in the arm of the executive," as the Institute of Public Administration paper 
submitted to the Commission complained. 
A final personal plea is that the Com.mission on Government will not recommend 
the establishment of yet more watchdog agencies. There are probably too many 
already in this state, and several of these are currently seeking wider powers. 
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Moreover, I share the view expressed in one of the submissions to the Royal 
Commission in 1992: that there shouldn't be too many new controls on the work of 
government agencies. 'Progress needs to occur through an appropriate balance of 
micro-control provisions, such as codes of conduct and whistleblower legislation, 
and macro-level initiatives, designed to develop a culture of integrity and 
performance in the public sector generally'. 
I wish the Commission on Government well as it embarks on its two-year 
assignment. Even if some of its final recommendations are not well received by 
Government, it may succeed through discussion papers or seminars in raising the 
level of community interest in the health and welfare of our body politic. 
More than community interest is required of course. We need some profound 
changes to our political culture as well, changes which must be informed by moral 
and ethical perspectives as much as by new institutional arrangements. 
ENDNOTES 
t Much of the following comment on preparation of the Second Report is reproduced 
from my paper to the 1993 conference of the Samuel Griffith Society, published in 
Upholding the Constitution, Vol 3, Melb.1994, pp68-70. 
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PARLIAMENT,THE EXECUTIVE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THEORY 
AND REALITY IN CONFLICT 
Barry MacKinnon 
Liberal Leader and Leader of the Opposition from 1986-1992 
(Edited Transcript) 
Thanks very much Harry. I didn't know that history lesson about Charles Latham 
but I don't envy him, six years in opposition and Leader of the Opposition is enough, 
nine and a half years would have been terrible I would have thought And the 
Dockers, well I'm Chairman of the Company that holds the licence and fnl going to 
be a Docker and all of those of you who are interested in football- and many of you 
would be-you'll be pleased to know that we are double the budget in terms of where 
we expected to be at this moment in time with membership and money. We have got 
some excellent players and we' re looking forward next year to beating the Eagles. I 
think it is going to be a great thing for Perth and the competition. 
To get to the matter at hand, the topic I was asked to address is Parliament and the 
Executive: Accountability Theory and Reality in Conflict. I take that to be a request to 
address a point that in fact the Commissioners made in their second report where 
they said words to this effect:-
'The proper accountability of the executive to the Parliament is a lynch pin in our 
system of responsible government, but the means and measure of that accountability are 
the matters of real importance.' 
To address that question I think you need to look at three central questions:-
• Did the proper accountability of the Executive to the Parliament work? 
• Secondly, was the Parliament informed during that time or uninformed? 
• Finally, was the Parliament effective or ineffective? 
The answer I think you could say right at the outcome is that there is no definitive 
answer to any of those questions. To each of those questions posed you could say 
yes, it did work in part or no, it didn't. In fact some of course would say- in fact a 
journalist asked me before I came here today- wasn't it a fact that the system failed 
totally, it let us down? In fact I would rebut that proposition by saying that if there 
had been a total failure of the system, there would have been no Royal Commission, 
the ALP would still be in government and, in fact, the leading lights that have been 
involved in the Royal Commission inquiry would not be in gaol. 
If it did work in part, but failed in other areas though, what then did go wrong? 
Was it the people, or the system at fault? If it was the people, which people and 
why? If it was the system, what parts of the system and finally where should we 
look in light of this experience to improve and I quote from the Royal 
Commissioners again:-
'The proper accountability of the Executive to the Parliament'. 
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Clearly in my view it was largely the people at fault and not the system, although the 
system as I come to explain to you in a moment, was at fault in part. The Royal 
Commission documented that very, very clearly. In fact the quote on the front of the 
pamphlet that we are looking at today really spelt it out and just let me read that to 
you. 
'The government system of this State exists to serve the interests of the people of 
Western Australia. Our findings and observations provide compelling evidence that 
this fundamental purpose has not always been upper most in the minds of our elected and 
appointed public officials in some instances far from it.' 
From my observations through these times- and I have always felt that this was the 
case- the leaders in government were motivated by power, political power and its 
retention, nothing more and nothing less. They weren't there to look after the 
interests of the people, the power had been won, the power was seen to be effective in 
pursuing the political goal of retaining political power and hence, the ends justified 
the means. There was to that extent, therefore, in my opinion no morality in politics 
to those people- that in my opinion was their fundamental failing- and the system of 
course was to be ignored, if it got in the way of the overriding objective, power and 
the retention of power. 
There are plenty of examples if you look to the Royal Commission of what I mean 
and I just want to quote some of them to you. In the first report they were talking 
about leadership when they said:-
'Mr Burke and Mr Parker not only kept from Cabinet the enormity of the problems and 
the extent to which public funds had been used in futile attempts to solve them but on 
some occasions actively misled their Cabinet colleagues.' 
The full extent of their deviousness may never be known. We call to mind Mr David 
Parker's statement in evidence before this Commission that 'Government 
worldwide is built on the basis of concealment'. Those were David Parker's words. 
This reveals a profound misconception in the proper role of government, it is a 
misconception which unfortunately seems to have been commonplace amongst some 
of his government colleagues and in particular the Premier, Mr Dowding. Those 
words must be ringing, or should be ringing in people's ears today and I am going 
to be critical in a moment of The West Australian. Let me commend them today on 
their Graeme Richardson editorial, I think it is timely that people are reminded that 
people who in politics are lauded by some for their political cleverness to mislead 
and deceive, were the same sort of people that the Royal Commission talks about 
and I think they were right to editorialise as they did today. 
So clearly the principle that deceit is a fundamental and central principle of 
government in my view permeated the process of government throughout those 
years. If you look at question time, just the simple basis of question time in the 
Parliament, which is one of the fundamental areas of the Executive's accountability 
to the Parliament- this is what one of the journalists whose job it was to draft 
answers to Parliamentary questions said in the Royal Commission:-
'There was some degree of anticipation that applied to answering parliamentary 
questions, that anticipation would extend to, if you like, issues that weren't addressed 
into the question themselves. In short, those answers or particular questions were 
answered in a way that was more of an art form than an exact science.' 
Question from the Commissioner:-
'Does that mean that you accept that the answer was inaccurate as drafted by you?' 
Answer:-
'Yes, I accept that.' 
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Answers to questions were of course total deceit and if you thought that the 
Parliament was being misled or ignored, it was highlighted I think by the fact too 
that so too was the Executive (evident from my earlier quote). Not only were the 
public to be kept in the dark about these arrangements, but Cabinet also was not 
given the full picture on 28 July, 1988. It was about the PICL deal. Mr Dowding did 
not explain to his colleagues the connection between the purchase price and the size 
of the problems at Rothwells. He did not explain that the Government was 
deliberately building up the value of PICL by a support mechanism. If Cabinet had 
been aware that the government was effectively paying twice by undertaking a 
contingent liability to increase the value and then claim the increased value, Cabinet 
may well have had a different view of the proposal. So clearly if you look at the 
question of were the people to blame, the Leaders at that time were clearly a central 
part of the problem. We in Opposition often knew the answer, we knew the facts, we 
might not have had the proof, but the answer that was given was wrong or it was 
avoided. 
Just to give you an example, through the whole of the Teachers Credit Society crisis, 
we were getting information on a regular basis, directly from the people involved, 
we knew the facts- the people weren't at liberty of course to expose themselves at that 
time- yet the answers we received in the Parliament, we knew the answers were 
clearly wrong. But to prove that from Opposition of course without documentary 
evidence was vezy, vezy difficult indeed. I repeat that in the pursuit of power it 
seemed the ends always justified the means. I think it is also wise to remind 
ourselves, because I want to comment again on this later, to give and gain favour 
appears to have been part of the game as a means of retaining power. 
The list of donations that were given at that time and in the words of the Royal 
Commission, 'their siZ£! (their words not mine) was quite extraordinazy. And 
again I think it serves well to remind us as to exactly what occurred at that time. 
Mr Anderson, $366,000; Mr Bond, $2,000,038; Mr Connell, $860,000; Mr Dempster, 
$512,000; Mr Goldberg, $425,000; I could go on. The Commissioner's said the size 
of the donations was quite extraordinazy particularly when compared with the size 
of donations made before Mr Burke became Premier. In many instances, there is an 
obvious connection in time between donations and events in which the donors were 
concerned with Government It is not surprising therefore that the circumstances 
should give rise to suspicion that improper practices might have occurred and that 
undue influence might have been exercised. 
To give you an idea of the comparison whilst I was not involved, and I repeat not 
involved and never had access to the information of who was donating money to the 
Liberal Party, I was informed that the largest single donation, the largest single 
donation that we received through that time was $80,000 - the largest It enabled the 
ALP of course prior to the 1989 election to out spend us by $3 or $4 or more to 1 in 
the advertising stakes. Leadership, I repeat, was clearly central to the problem. 
Were there other people other than the leaders? 
Of the Ministers who questioned, none stood up to be counted. We see when we look 
back at histozy that Arthur Tonkin resigned, but he resigned on the question of 
electoral reform. Barty Hodge we now know from the Royal Commission 
documents spoke out against some of the issues but didn't say anything publicly nor 
did he resign. Others it seems were content to accept, or not to question, and when 
questioned in the Royal Commission couldn't recall. Julian Grill of course, it must 
be acknowledged, did resign but still to this day has never admitted that he did 
anything wrong. The Ministers must share part of the blame and the back benchers 
also by and large were content to accept it As a back bench member of the 
Government, but an experienced member, an MLC when questioned in the 
Parliament said this:-
'I did not know where the money was coming from and I did not ask any questions'. 
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He went on further to say:-
'Ask no questions, and you are told no lies'. 
It would seem the only ones prepared to stand up and resign were Ian Alexander 
over the Swan Brewery affair and Frank Donovan over the Notre Dame issue. But 
with both due respect to those gentlemen who did at least have the principles to 
stand up on those issues, it was a little bit like shutting the gate after the horse had 
well and truly bolted. 
Some people would say well, doesn't the Opposition have to share part of the blame? 
It might sound surprising to some that I admit that, yes, I think we do have to share 
part of the blame. In two particular instances, we had a unique opportunity to win 
the 1989 election and failed to do so, we failed because we did not have the right 
cohesion at the time. The key factor was that we didn't have a coalition and that 
caused difficulties through the campaign and in fact right into the last week where 
the crucial decision, or the crucial issue, was a statement made by Bill Hassell that 
was blown up I believe out of proportion by the media, but nonetheless because we 
didn't have a coalition and a good communication with the National Party it gave 
the perception of disunity. 
That was a mistake and as a consequence we must share part of the blame, there was 
neither enough discipline within our own party to ensure that that Fremantle 
(Hassell) occurrence didn't occur, despite the fact that at that time we endeavoured 
to ensure that that didn't occur. After the 1989 election there is no doubt either- and 
I can speak with some feeling- that neither party was able to keep the pressure on as 
we might have otherwise been because of leadership pressures. I can assure you as a 
political leader with one eye over your back and one eye forward, it clearly isn't 
conducive to taking the fight as effectively to the government as you might want, and 
this of course was a crucial issue when we sought to block supply. Whatever you 
think about that issue, the key factor that ensured that we didn't in my opinion at the 
time was the question of leadership. 
And finally, I think also the media must accept some responsibility. They did not 
pursue the Government effectively until after the 1989 election and in my opinion the 
grossest mistake they made was over the petrochemical guarantee. It was known-
we knew we said so- everybody did prior to the 'ff) election- yet the media did not 
pursue the government In fact, I still remember the day that Peter Dowding made 
his policy speech out at Karrinyup, we released information that very day. 
Dowding refused to answer questions and the media refused to pursue him, I think 
they were derelict in their duty and in particular The West Australian, as the major 
media source in this town, supported the re-election of Peter Dowding. It is 
astounding to me that the Sydney Morning Herald on the 7 January, a month before 
the election, editorialised about an election in Western Australia and this is what 
they said:-
'Mr Burke and Mr Dowding were soft touches. Their actions could cost Western 
Australian taxpayers a fortune by the time the hidden subsidies to the non-economic 
petrochemical plant are added to the public money that has gone down with Rothwells. 
The appropriate political penalty is for the government to be thrown out of office.' 
The Sydney Morning Herald knew what the potential cost was at the end of the day, 
they knew what was wrong- it would seem that The West Australian at that time 
did not. That is not a bitter statement, I admit the mistakes that we made by us in 
giving them the opportunity of publicising our disunity in the last week of the 
campaign. But to not pursue that particular matter at the time (a mistake made not 
just by the West, but by the total media) was I think a grave mistake. 
So it was in large part, in my opinion, the people who failed the system- the 
Government and in particular its Leaders must bear the brunt of the blame. The 
Ministers because they knew, and if they didn't know, they must have had a real 
good idea because I spent every other hour of my days in Parliament telling them so! 
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Likewise its back benchers, the Opposition played a part and also the media. So you 
can see as we all pretty well knew, but need to be reminded as I have said again, the 
people were to blame by and large, but not the system. 
It may well of course be argued that the system we need not bother about, and I have 
heard this argument put forward if fact by many people on our side of the politics-
that you don't need to bother about the system, its the people, and no matter what 
you put in place, if their badly motivated, dishonest, they are just going to pursue the 
retention of power, it doesn't matter what you put in place, it is not going to work. 
They' re right in part, but only in part. I believe the system does have a role to play 
and can influence the decisions of the Executive and others on how they act and 
operate. 
What was it that worked? What was it that failed, and if so, why did it fail? My 
belief is that the Parliament, as an institution through the WA Inc. years, in large 
succeeded. It succeeded in maintaining pressure on the Government. We did it 
relentlessly, to the extent that I was cartooned and all the rest of it, lampooned for 
being so persistent. But without an Opposition that was as consistent and as 
persistent at using the protection of the Parliament and the forums from Rothwells 
right through PICL to the Royal Commission, the facts would not have come out and 
the Government would not have been under pressure. Without the Parliament, I 
argue very strongly the People for Fair and Open Government would not have 
succeeded by themselves, neither would have the public nor the media. It needed the 
Parliament to be able to take the battle up to the Government through the use of 
debate, questions, committees- and in the end of course it was effective although it 
took us much longer than it should have. I'd also remind people (because they seem 
to forget) that the straw that broke the camel's back emanated from Parliament, I 
refer to a letter that I wrote to the Ombudsman at the time over the Stirling City 
Council affair. The Ombudsman wrote back and I would remind you that the 
Ombudsman is an officer accountable to the Parliament, not to the Government, 
saying words to this effect, that none of this will be cleared up until such time as 
there is a Royal Commission. The Royal Commission was announced the next day. 
So it was in fact the Parliament by and large that maintained the pressure and I 
believe the Parliament in a large part did its job to the best of its capacity given the 
information it was given, and that's where it probably failed. Where it failed was 
through the lack of information made available to it and that limited its 
effectiveness and also, as r~ said earlier, when the Opposition was diverted by 
leadership issues (from the time of the supply debate and onwards) that also limited 
the ability of the Parliament as an institution to take the fight up to the Government. 
I would also remind you that at the time neither did we have the support of Freedom 
of Information, the Auditor General didn't have access to information that he 
should have had and the Ombudsman's parameters were limited (as they still are) 
and the donations information that is now public of course was not available to us. 
So the system worked in part, but where it failed in a large part it was due to the 
lack of access to information. 
Which brings me now to that formal question in light of all that, what should we 
do? I go back to the beginning, the quorum at the Royal Commission said the proper 
accountability of the Executive to the Parliament is a lynch pin in our system of 
responsible government. The means and measure of that accountability are the 
matters of real importance. If you believe as I do that the Executive will only be held 
accountable effectively through access to information, then we must strengthen the 
Parliament's access to information so that our accountability process can be 
improved, enhanced and strengthened. So in light of all that has happened, there are 
four things that I think should occur. 
Firstly, we should strengthen the role and position of the Auditor General. Secondly, 
we should broaden the scope of the Ombudsman's areas of purvey and view. 
Thirdly, the question of political donations must be addressed and finally, the role 
of the Legislative Council needs examination. I'm not saying these things are all that 
needs to be done, but if you believe as I do, that information is one of if not the key 
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question or factor in accountability and the ability of the Parliament as an 
institution to hold the Executive accountable, then it is these type of reforms that we 
must focus upon. 
The Auditor General 
The Auditor General's role in the system is absolutely crucial. The Office of the 
Auditor General provides a critical link in the accountability chain between the 
public sector and the parliament and the community. We saw it in today's paper, it 
alone subjects the practical conduct and operation of the public sector as a whole to 
regular independent investigation and review. This function must be fully 
guaranteed and its discharge facilitated. The Auditor General is the Parliament's 
principal informant on the performance of the administrative system. Its why when 
you look at the second report that fully 25 % of the recommendations of the 
Commissioners relate to the Auditor General. These recommendations go to such 
things as ensuring 
• the independence of the Auditor General, so that he is answerable to the 
Parliament and not the Government; 
• the Office budget is set by the Parliament and not by the Government; and that 
• the tenure and powers which attach to the Office are improved (eg so that he 
may call for - 'such Cabinet documents as may be necessary') ; 
There should be 'ro claim of legal professional privilege maintainable against the 
Auditor General by the Government'. I can assure you that during the whole of the 
WA Inc years, the Opposition had good communications with the Auditor General, 
as an officer who is accountable to the Parliament and not the Government. 
Auditors' General should not be party political, nor should they be feared by 
Government. 
The Ombudsman 
The second area that I commented on was the Ombudsman. You have seen in recent 
days reports that over 40 agencies of government are not covered. The Opposition 
have been critical, let me say the Opposition aren't any saints, I took that matter up 
in 1991 saying that his purvey should be broadened. The Opposition said basically 
what the current government said- 'well we are looking at it and we are drafting the 
legislation'. Well it is time the legislation wasn't looked at and wasn't drafted, but 
introduced into the Parliament! Again the Ombudsman is an officer accountable to 
the Parliament, not to the Government, his access to information can assist that 
accountability process. 
Political donations 
The third issue- that of political donations- is a very thorny and difficult one for 
politicians and an issue easier for me to look at now as a non-member of Parliament. 
But the facts, as we look back over the Royal Commission and as recounted, make 
still amazing reading, amazing reading. My belief is that if the facts about political 
donations had been known it would have made a material difference to the question 
of the government's accountability. This is a matter for the Commission on 
Government to examine, and whilst I am supportive of some form of disclosure 
legislation, it must be acknowledged by the people who examined the question that 
it will damage the coalition parties in government more than the Labor Party. The 
Coalition parties rely almost solely for their income source on business donations, 
the Labor Party have a basic source from the union movement topped up by business 
donations. Where private donors feel threatened by public disclosure and have been 
threatened at times when they have been so disclosed, then that question must be 
looked at very carefully. Something needs to be done, but it must be done in a form 
which is not only open to assure accountability, but equitable from the point of view 
of the political parties concerned. 
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The Legislative Council 
And finally to the question of the Legislative Council- one which caused me some 
sleepless nights when I was the Leader of the Opposition I can tell you! I find myself 
in agreement with the Royal Commission's recommendations eg Recommendation 
No.27:-
The Legislative Council be acknowledged as having the review and scrutiny of the 
management and operations of the public sector of the State as one of its primary 
responsibilities. 
If you are to have a Legislative Council (and I believe we should have a bi-camera! 
system) I have always believed that the Legislative Council's primary role should 
be one of review, not of legislation. Its reviewing role must be strengthened; the 
committee system should be given better funding and more status and stature; the 
roles of committees and of the council must be better identified and there should be 
more public involvement in these operations. The current Government in fact have 
had more Ministers appointed to the Legislative Council than the previous 
Government, and I believe that weakens its role as a house of review. I believe that 
this plays directly into the hands of people (and there are many) who are opponents 
of the Legislative Council. I am not saying that there shouldn't be any Ministers, but 
five is certainly too many-two or three at maximum in our Parliament. 
As for the issue of electoral systems, a politically thorny issue in the Legislative 
Council in this State, but an issue which I personally believe to be a red herring. We 
should focus more on the role of the Legislative Council, not its method of election-
when you look back historically at it and the Labor Party you see that they have 
always campaigned on the basis of winning control of the Assembly and never 
really have addressed as vigorously the matter of the Legislative Council. So Im 
not a believer in electoral reform for the Council (furthermore, lm a supporter of a 
weighted system of voting anyway to give people in the more distant regions equity 
in terms of their representation). What is more important is what the Legislative 
Council does and how he does it, not the method of its selection. I know that many 
people will disagree with that, but I think that their views are wrong. 
In summary, I'll return to the three questions that I put, namely:-
• Did the proper accountability of the executives to the Parliament work? 
• Secondly, was the Parliament informed during that time or uninformed? 
• Finally, was the Parliament effective or ineffective? 
In relation to the first the answer is no, because the people deliberately avoided that 
process in pursuit of the retention of power. The system didn't help ·because of some 
of the reasons I have outlined (eg it lacked the means of getting access to information 
to hold that executive properly accountable). 
Secondly was the Parliament informed or uninformed?. Information was hard to 
come by. It was only gained by persistent effort, sometimes through the operations 
of the system, sometimes not, and sometimes through the persistence of the media 
and others. Was the Parliament effective or ineffective? Given the information 
available to it, I believe largely it was effective, and when it failed it was due to 
internal party problems, the National Party /Liberal Party tensions or the Liberal 
Party leadership problem. No system can hope to overcome the problems that people 
will present because they are either dishonest or ambitious and want to avoid the 
system, but we can surely improve the system. 
My hope is that the Commission on Government will see the four areas that I have 
highlighted as having a priority- the strengthening of the role of the Auditor 
General, the broadening of the scope of the Ombudsman's area of purvey, political 
donations, the question of and the role of the Legislative Council. 
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The Royal Commission has highlighted, I believe, arguably the most infamous 
chapter in the public life of our state, or perhaps even our nation's history. If nothing 
changes other than the Government as a result of its findings, it will have been a 
failure and a major disappointment to me and the thousands of other Western 
Australians who fought so hard for its appointment. 
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IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Dr Geoff Gallop MLA 
Deputy Labor Leader 
The year is 1900 and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill is being 
debated in the House of Commons. Irish MP William Bedford supports the Bill as 
making a great advance in Australia's "national existence". He notes, however, that 
in the colony of Western Australia representation in the State's Parliament is, for the 
numerous residents of the Goldfields, "a mockery and a farce". Indeed he goes so far 
as to say: 
... I would make it a condition upon the entry of this small colony into the Government 
Federation that she should, by a proper measure of representation, do away with an 
undoubted scandal which exists at the present time, and give full and fair representation 
such as other colonies do to the whole of the people within her borders.[1] 
At the time of the 1897 election the four Legislative Assembly constituencies based 
on Coolgardie (4 out of a total of 44) contained 5,481 electors out of the State's total 
of 23,318 electors (ie. 23.5 per cent). The State's largest seat Coolgardie contained 
2,080 electors whilst the smallest - Ashburton - contained just 54. 
I regret to have to report that Ashburton is still the State's smallest electorate (with 
9,135 electors at the 1993 State election) and that the electoral system is still a 
"mockery and a farce". Thankfully, however, this state of affairs was recognised for 
what it is in the Second Report of the Royal Commission into Commercial Activities 
and other Matters. 
Accordingly the Royal Commissioners concluded that electoral review was 
"central" and of "vital importance" to their recommendations.[2] 
For over one hundred years conservatives in the State's Parliament have resisted 
moves to establish electoral equality. Not even three election victories for a Labor 
Party committed to one vote one value in 1983, 1986 and 1989 were enough to 
convince Liberals and Nationals in the Legislative Council that there was a mandate 
for change. Malapportionment remains as the last vestige of the deformed version of 
democracy which came to Western Australia with responsible Government 1890.[3] 
It is worth reminding ourselves of the extent and pace of change that has 
characterised the evolution of Western Australia's electoral institutions. In 1890 
neither women nor Aboriginals could vote and there were property-based 
restrictions on the right to vote, plural voting allowed some to vote more than once, 
politicians were themselves involved in the drawing of boundaries, and 
malapportionment was accepted as a necessary fact of Western Australian political 
life. 
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Much has changed since then. Women gained the right to vote in 1899 but not the 
right to become MPs until 1920. Aboriginals, on the other hand, did not gain the 
right to enrol and vote until 1962, although it was not until 1983 that enrolment and 
voting became compulsory. 
In 1904 plural voting for the Legislative Assembly came to an end but not for the 
Legislative Council until 1963 when the property qualification was itself abolished. 
Western Australia was the first State to introduce systematic malapportionment 
through zoning in 1922 when the Mitchell National Coalition Government 
appointed Commissioners to draw electoral boundaries but only within zones 
defined by Parliament and not including statutory seats in the North West of the 
State. 
The ability to manipulate outcomes by re-defining the zones or changing the 
boundaries of the seats in the North West remained a reality until 1987 when the 
metropolitan/non metropolitan boundary used in the Metropolitan Region Town 
Planning Scheme Act 1959 was incorporated into the State's electoral legislation 
and the statutory seats in the North abolished. 
Evidence is available that politicians involved themselves directly in boundary 
manipulation as late as the 1970s and early 1980s. Of the 1975 redistribution Ian 
Thompson {MLA from 1974 to 1993) has said: 
... one of the most unusual occurrences was just after the 1974 election when q Libera/-
Country Party Government had been elected. I was invited to join a couple of other 
people kneeling on the floor of the Liberal Party meeting room to make a suggestion on 
where the electoral boundaries should be, because there needed to be a redistribution.[4] 
The legislative change in the metropolitan boundary that followed converted 
Mundaring into a marginal Labor seat and consolidated Kalamunda as a Liberal 
seat. Labor MPs at the time called it a "Charliemander".[5] 
It happened again in 1981 when 6,000 electors (mostly Labor voters) from several 
mining towns in the Pilbara were shifted by Parliament into the Kimberley giving it 
a voting population of 12,000 and reducing that of the Pilbara to 9,000. The Liberal 
Member for the North Province left the Party over the issue. The metropolitan 
boundary was also altered to include Rockingham, Wanneroo and Ballajura but not 
some of the hills' suburbs to the east.[6] Such "jiggery-pokery", to use Ian Thompson's 
words, has no place in a modem democratic state. 
Nor, indeed, does malapportionment. The reasons are simple: 
The bedrock of our electoral system is the right of each citizen to cast one vote. Each 
vote represents the view of an elector about who should represent him or her in 
Parliament. The principle of one vote one value asserts that each elector is equally 
important and has an equal right to promote his or her freedom and interest. 
It does not make sense either logically or ethically to establish the right of a person 
to vote then diminish the value of that vote in relation to the votes cast by other. In an 
extreme case this would undermine the basis for community life itself by creating 
inequalities in the distribution of political power.[7] 
Once vote weighting is accepted as legitimate it becomes impossible to anchor the 
electoral system on anything approaching a principled basis. Political and party 
interest replace principle. That this was the experience within each of the states has 
been well illustrated in numerous academic studies. Writing in 1960 Rufus Davis 
described the electoral experience of the states a mixture of "adventure, heterodoxy 
and knavery". He observed that electoral devices were used "with a skill which even a 
fun-fair poker machine proprietor could admire".[8] 
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Over the last three decades electoral review and reform has arrived in each of the 
States and Territories except Western Australia where both Houses are elected from 
a malapportioned system and Tasmania, where the Legislative Council is s~verely 
malapportioned. An attempt to finalise the process by incorporating a clear and 
simple definition of one vote one value in the Commonwealth Constitution failed in 
the 1988 referendum.[9] 
The Labor Party sought unsuccessfully to reform the system by judicial review in 
1982 when it took a case to the State's Supreme Court based on Section 73(2) of the 
Constitution Act 1889. That section requires that a Bill providing for the Parliament 
to be composed other than of "members chosen directly by the people" must be passed 
by an absolute majority in each House and submitted to a referendum of all 
electors.[10] 
Since that time there have been significant development in judicial thinkip.g that have 
led the Labor Party to try again - this time to the High Court. I refer of course to the 
constitutional entrenchment of the doctrine of representative government and the 
implied rights which follow from it, the spreading of the net of implications to State 
as well as Commonwealth laws, and the growing importance of international 
conventions and standards in constitutional interpretation. The cases involved in 
these developments are well known to you all.[11] 
Three arguments are advanced in support of Labor's Contention that Western 
Australia's electoral laws are invalid: 
1. The first relates to the implied requirement arising from the principle of 
representative democracy inherent within the Commonwealth Constitution 
and/ or the State Constitution Act of 1889. 
2. The second relates to the implied requirement of equality before the law 
inherent within the Commonwealth Constitution. 
3. The third is based on Section 73(2) of the Constitution Act 1889 and was 
referred to earlier in relation to the 1982 case. 
In the short time available today I will summarise the first of these arguments, that 
is the implied constitutional requirements arising from the doctrine of 
representative democracy inherent in one or both of the constitutions. They are three: 
• numbers of voters in electorates should be as near as possible to equal, 
• variance between numbers of voters should not be excessive, 
• voters are entitled to equal and effective representation. 
Each of these represents a different way of formulating the test of democracy. It may 
be the case, for example, that the High Court will accept the implication that variance 
"should not be excessive" without endorsing the view that the numbers of voters "be 
as near as possible to equal" .[12] 
The High Court has ruled that freedom of speech is necessary to support the structure 
upon which our Constitution is based. As Justice Brennan put it: 
... it would be a parody of democracy to confer on the people a power to choose their 
parliament but to deny the freedom of public discussion from which the people derive 
their political judgements.[13] 
Would it not also be a "parody of democracy" if people are given the right to vote but 
some votes are accorded more weight than others? Put in a nutshell that is Labor's 
case. 
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In defending the claim that there is a link between electoral equality and 
representative democracy the following points can be made: 
1. Most modem representative democracies do accept the principle that the 
primary basis of representation ought to be population. Indeed many have 
established systems of proportional representation which embody the principle 
of equality of voting rights and the principle that equal numbers of votes should 
translate into equal numbers of seats.[14] 
2. Even when we consider the Commonwealth Constitution it is important to note 
that Section 24 allocates seats in the House of Representatives as between the 
states according to their respective populations. Originally the distribution of 
seats was left to State Legislatures on the understanding that they would 
refrain from any action that was "ineffective or improper". If a State failed to 
exercise its power the State would vote as one electorate or if a State misused its 
power the Commonwealth could intervene to remedy the situation. In the event 
dissatisfaction at the arrangements made by the States at the first election led 
the Commonwealth Parliament to pass its own Electoral Act in 1902. Electoral 
equality was established as a principle with a tolerance of 20 per cent from the 
quota accepted so that local circumstances could be taken into account.[15] 
3. Should the High Court reject or even dispute the claim that the principle of 
approximate numerical equality applied in 1900 they may still assert its 
relevance in 1994. In the Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Justice Deane 
quoted Inglis Clark's Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901) to the effect 
that the Constitution must be construed as a "living force" representing "the will 
and intentions of all contemporary Australians", both men and women, and not 
as a lifeless "declaration of the will and intentions of men long since dead". This 
would require them to adopt a contemporary understanding of representative 
democracy and its implications for the electoral system.[16] 
4. The United States Supreme Court has held the view since the 1960s that vote 
weighting runs counter not only to the idea of democratic government but also 
to the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by the People". For the 
American Court "equal representation for equal numbers of people" is the 
"fundamental goal". In 1963 they put it this way: 
How can one person be given twice or 10 times the voting power of another 
person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because 
he lives in the smallest rural county? 
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is 
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote -
whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever 
their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.[17] 
5. The Canadian High Court has been less fundamentalist in its interpretation of 
the "right to vote" enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but it 
has made it clear that any departure from equality needs to be carefully 
justified by factors such as geography, history and community interests. They 
certainly stated that the first condition of "effective representation" was "relative 
parity of voting power" .[18] 
It is very important to note that the majority in the McKinlay case before the 
High Court of Australia in 1975 ruled that while the Commonwealth 
Constitution did not require strict equality, a degree of vote weighting may 
offend the requirement of Section 24 of the Constitution that the House of 
Representatives be "directly chosen by the people". In other words it is all a 
question of degree. Thus while the Court rejected the argument of the plaintiffs 
that the Commonwealth electoral boundaries were unconstitutional (and it is 
worth noting that at that time demographic changes had created disparities 
between the largest and smallest electorates but none more than 2:1) they did 
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accept the point that inequality could become so extreme as to offend the 
requirement "directly chosen by the people".[19] 
6. For Labor's case to succeed it needs to establish that implications in either the 
Commonwealth or the State constitution extend to electoral equality. In the case 
of the former it will need to be further argued that the implication is more than 
simply a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power but that it also 
extends to the states. The Court has now established this extension in respect of 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of communication. As Chief Justice 
Mason put it "the concept of freedom to communicate with respect to public 
affairs and political discussion does not lend itself to subdivision". The analogy 
with electoral equality is easy to see.[20] 
In Western Australia today the Legislative Council has 34 members half of whom 
represent 26 per cent of the State's non-metropolitan population. The quotients 
required to elect members varies greatly such that the voting power in the Mining 
and Pastoral Region is 3.8 times that of the North Metropolitan Region. 
The Legislative Assembly has 57 members, 23 from the country and 34 from the city. 
The quota for city seats is nearly twice that for the country, the ratio being 1.88:1 
However, the largest city electorate Wanneroo varies significantly from the smallest 
country electorate (Ashburton) to the tune of 3.33:1. 
The arbitrary nature of the Metropolitan Zone is also illustrated by the contrast 
between Peel and Mandurah, with the former in and the latter out of the 
metropolitan zone. Peel has more than twice the electors of Mandurah (the ratio is 
2.38:1). By what logic, one might ask, are the electors of Mandurah given over twice 
the voting power of those in Peel ? 
We have had the extraordinary situation in Western Australia where the Liberal 
and National Parties have always enjoyed a majority in the Legislative Council in 
the hundred years of responsible Government since 1890. Malapportionment has 
also impacted upon the ability of minority interests besides the Nationals to gain 
representation, even though there is now a system of proportional representation. 
The Royal Commissioners put it this way: 
We acknowledge that proportional representation now provides one element in the 
electoral system for the Legislative Council. We consider, however, that the effect on 
it of the present regional division of the State strongly inhibits the possibility of 
significant minority interests obtaining representation in the House, representation 
which we believe should be promoted on democratic grounds.[21] 
Imagine how our State's politics would operate if the current balance of power in the 
Senate applied in Western Australia's Upper House. Put simply neither Liberal or 
Labor Governments based on the Assembly would find an easy ride for their 
measures in the Council. There would be a real and an enduring check on the 
Executive. (See Appendices One and Two on votes and seats in the Senate and the 
Legislative Council.) 
The fact that the State's electoral system has consistently skewed the political debate 
in the direction of conservative and rural interests has bred complacency within 
Coalition Governments and contempt within Labor Governments. It is difficult to 
assess what its broader impact has been on the State's economic and social 
development but that it has been significant, particularly in metropolitan Perth, is a 
conclusion that is hard to avoid.[22] 
The fact that electoral equality has not been accepted by our State Legislature or 
State Supreme Court as a fundamental principle of representative democracy has 
opened up our political processes to manipulation and chicanery. It is a sorry tale 
for which, it would seem, intervention by the High Court is the only solution.[23] 
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LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN WA 1989 AND 1993 
1989 1993 
Percentage MLC's Percentage MLC's 
Vote Elected Vote Elected 
Australian Labor 
Party 41.3 
Liberal Party 41.05 
National Party 5.00 
Democrats 3.3 
Greens 1.8 
Others 7.4 
APPENDIX2 
16 
15 
3 
36.8 
45.6 
3.8 
3.0 
5.2 
5.4 
SENATE ELECTIONS IN WA 1987, 1990 AND 1993 
1987 * 1990 
% Senators % Senators 
Vote Elected Vote Elected 
Australian 
Labor Party 42.8 5 33.5 2 
Liberal 
Party 39.1 5 43.3 3 
National 
Party 5.5 2.9 
Democrats 5.7 1 9.4 
Vallentine 
Peace 
Group 4.8 1 8.4 1 
Greens 
Others 1.9 2.4 
* Double Dissolution 
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INDEPENDENT VOICES : THE TWO PARTY SYSTEM, WA INC 
AND ELECTORAL REFORM 
Dr Ian Alexander, 
Department of Geography 
University of Western Australia 
(Dr Alexander was State Member for Perth from 1987 to 1993, 
and an Independent for the last two years of that period.) 
HISTORY AND POLITICS 
A cynic once said that the one thing we learn from history is that we DON'T learn 
from history! WA Inc is supposedly a period in our history from which we have 
learnt. These days even the ALP-under its new and supposedly squeaky-clean 
leadership- is saying that the approach was a mistake, and that it will never be 
repeated. And yet, perhaps the cynic was right, since apart from the ALP going into 
Opposition, and the Court Government occupying the Treasury benches, what has 
actually changed in the meantime to prevent a repeat of WA Inc? 
In my view, and I believe in the view of an increasing number in the community, the 
two party/ Cabinet government system, combined with WA's peculiar electoral 
system, must shoulder a large part of the blame for WA Inc and its precedents. The 
Parliament is supposed to be a collection of elected members responsible to their 
constituencies. In fact it more often operates as a collection of party hacks doing 
their party's bidding. Hence under normal circumstances individual politicians 
have little effective scrutiny over Government. 
In response to this type of criticism, Liberals are fond of telling tlie community that 
the conservative-dominated Legislative Council often acts as a check on 
'mischievous' Labor governments. There are two major flaws in this argument : 
1. Such a check, even if it were effective, only operates from one side of the 
party political fence ; are we really to believe that only ALP Governments 
need such scrutiny? 
2. In any event, as we saw during the WA-Inc years, Parliament can be 
effectively by-passed by Cabinet through a variety of non-statutory 
devices. 
EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE OVER PARLIAMENT 
And so, whether there is an ALP or.a conservative State Government, the dominance 
of the Executive over Parliament and the community remains despite a growing 
resistance from community groups and increasing challenge from Independents and 
so-called minor parties. As the Royal Commission said in 1992: 
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the causes of the decline in the effectiveness and reputation of the legislature are well 
understood. They lie chiefly in the dominance of the party machines in the work of 
elected representatives 
After all, the much vaunted Commission on Government has only just been 
established, and it is not yet clear if it will be able to deal with an issue seen by the 
Royal Commission as critical : Parliamentary and Electoral Reform. 
WA INC GIVES THE LIE TO THE ALP 
But before I expand on that issue, a little on a more personal note. I resigned from 
the ALP to became an Independent in the WA Parliament in 1991 (following a 
torrent of other ordinary disillusioned members I might add) partly in protest at the 
WA Inc goings-on, and the inability of backbenchers to have their constituencies 
heard and keep Government to Party policy and ethical practices. I would like to 
take a few minutes to reflect on the political and business culture within which WA 
Inc was played out. 
The scene is set neatly by the recent admission of Graham Richardson - key ALP 
Right figure with close links to the rich and powerful himself - that it is necessary to 
lie, and frequently if necessary, in order to maintain Party solidarity on the one 
hand and to achieve the next step in the power game, on the other. I seem to 
remember some remarkably similar admissions to the Royal Commission from 
former ALP Cabinet Ministers! Power and Government can only be maintained 
through a certain amount of secrecy in Government, and hence hiding of the truth, it 
is claimed. 
As I see it, this philosophy of 'justified' lies and secrecy is little more than an excuse 
for the power-hungry. As one originally from the left of the ALP, and what was 
seen by many in the Party as the "loony left', I actually believed that the ALP was in 
government to achieve reform not simply to stay in power. So in the early days of 
the now long gone Burke government, I was among the many party faithful in the 
ALP who hoped for great things in terms of social and economic reform. 
But as one who also had an interest in city planning matters, and was on the Perth 
City Council at the time, it fairly soon became obvious that Labor's reforms -if they 
were to occur at all- would only come in the context of the now notorious Curtin 
Foundation, most of the members of which are now disgraced, dead, bankrupt or 
facing court charges. And ironically, so are many of the players who set up the 
Foundation in the hope of providing the ALP with a permanent pipeline to corporate 
funds. 
As Paul Barry noted in his brilliant "Rise and Fall of Alan Bond" (page 141) 
"looking at the incredible mess that Burke, Bond and another big businessman Laurie 
Connell have bequeathed WA, it i~ hard to believe that WA Inc once had a philosophy 
that both press and public believed in." 
The public seemed to accept or were convinced by clever propaganda that a 
flirtation with business interests and the new entrepreneurs was necessary to oil the 
wheels of the economy. And the ALP membership, or the majority of it, were 
convinced that the relationship with business was necessary to keep the ALP 
Government in power. 
At the time, of course, few realised just what a sleazy section of business 
entrepreneurs - the so-called four on the floor brigade- the Government had become 
associated with, and just how unethical both their practices became. The culture of 
greed which characterised the entrepreneurs intersected all too well with the culture 
of power maintenance and greed which infected much of the Burke Cabinet. 
In the early and heady days of the Burke government few dissident voices were 
raised. But there was some dissent nonetheless and considerable grass-roots uneasE' 
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in the ALP over the new partnership between the power-broking sections of the labor 
movement and the sleazier fractions of capital. In the local ALP branches, if we 
dared to express doubt as to the integrity of the Curtin Foundation philosophy --and 
we did- we were either told by Party heavies that we were malcontents or if they 
were in a more charitable mood, we were told "don't worry, we will keep the 
members of the Foundation at arm's length!". It soon became obvious that this was a 
difficult if not impossible task. 
Indeed the Government seemed to set in place a corporate arrangement around the 
WADC which assured the arms were very short indeed -so short in fact that 
everyone in the Curtin Foundation club (the major financial donors) not only had 
access to the Premier, but to some of the best and most exclusive deals in town. 
Nowhere was this more obvious than in the city centre: tender processes were rorted 
for the Casino, for purchase of the former Perth Tech site and so on. And in each case 
the beneficiaries were part of the magic circle : Dempster, Bond, Connell, Horgan etc. 
So that wa~ the first lie, but somehow the Government retained its credibility in 
Brian Burke's days as Premier. Perhaps the ALP hierarchy of the day were as good 
at lying as was Richardson? 
There were many other lies and deceptions on the public to follow. And regrettably, 
the ALP Caucus of which I was a member for four years, allowed the process to 
continue. Partly through ignorance, partly through fear. 
HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL.. .. 
I will draw on just a couple on instances to illustrate the 'culture' which prevailed in 
Caucus at the time. (1987-89): 
1. Efforts to raise Caucus alarm at the growing problems of WA Inc following 
the Rothwells Rescue were greeted with scepticism : many members were 
worried but didn't know what to do .. they know the ALP Government 
seemed to be increasingly beholden to big business, but there was a certain 
blindness to the idea of trying to initiate change. When I or others on the 
dissident left raised concerns we were usually urged to leave well alone. At 
a Caucus seminar on one occasion in 1988, one senior Cabinet Minister, 
who must have known better, even tried to convince us that WA Inc was 
"socialism in action"! If you believed that, you would believe anything! 
2. Following the collapse of Rothwells and the setting up of the petro-chemical 
deal in the lead up to the 1989 election, the Caucus was simply told --as 
was a still-gullible public- that the government had swapped its potential 
debt to Rothwells for equity in the petro-chemical proposal. 
Most Caucus members seemed to believe this, or want to : for we were also told that 
we shouldn't know too much : ignorance is bliss as they say! There was plenty else 
we didn't know at the time too : Dowding had assured all in 1988 that WA Inc was 
dead, and yet it turned out from Royal Commission evidence that the donations 
from Curtin Foundation members were still coming in thick and fast throughout 
that year : nearly $1 million from the Bond Corporation alone. 
But regardless of such matters the Caucus was also told that the PICL deal was 
essential to Labor's survival at the 1989 election! In other words, the cover-up had 
already started, and it was essential to maintain it in order for Labor to get re-
elected. Since many members were in marginal seats, most chose to heed this advice 
and concentrate on re-election, rather than asking too many probing - and 
potentially electorally damaging -questions. Here then is the fear element. We were 
also told in no uncertain terms that if we spoke out too much, we would be pushed 
out of the SPLP in any case. 
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The fact that the petro-chemical plant was more of a fiction than fact, and that the 
main beneficiaries of the deal seemed to be the likes of Bond and Dempster, then was 
conveniently ignored by Caucus members in their anxiety to get the political benefits 
of the 'deal' i.e. re-election in 1989. 
Mind you, it should also be remembered that even if the Caucus had expressed more 
concern at the deal, the fact is it had already been done by the Cabinet -or a small 
clique within Cabinet- and there was little Caucus, or the Parliament could do to 
change that. As I suggested earlier, the WA Inc years turned by-passing of 
Parliament into something of an art form. 
Nonetheless, as I see it six years on, Caucus missed a golden opportunity to bring 
some pressure on the Government from WITJilN. For in our hearts, many knew 
something was rotten in the State of WA! 
A GREENER FUTURE? 
And so it proved. The rest is history, and I want now to turn to some possible 
remedies. This as an ex-Independent MP, now a member of the Greens (WA), a party 
dedicated to participatory democracy and social justice as well as to more well-
known environmental goals. 
1. Parliamentary Reform seems to be mandatory. It is clear that under present 
electoral and Parliamentary arrangements the Cabinet and Executive of the 
day can either dominate both Houses of Parliament (as under the current 
Government) or can bypass a potentially hostile Parliament (as did the 
Burke Dowding and even Lawrence governments). 
2. The Cabinet should therefore be far more accountable to Parliament. From 
my brief time as an Independent in the Legislative Assembly, I can observe 
that the Government was distinctly more nervous and careful about its 
legislative programme when it was faced with potential defeat on the floor. 
3. And yet, many decisions in Budgetary terms were -and still are- made 
outside of Parliamentary scrutiny (eg continuing deals made by the SSB, 
SGIC, controversial public works such as those often proposed by the MRD 
etc). It should not be possible to undertake major reorganisation of 
Government or semi-government finance, such as a Rothwells rescue or a 
petro-chemical deal involving Government and statutory corporation 
funds, without much closer Parliamentary scrutiny, including its prior 
approval. 
4. This means that the Constitution should be changed such that major 
financial decisions, including all major capital items allocated under the 
Budget AND by statutory and semi-government authorities are subject to 
Parliamentary debate and approval. 
5. In electoral terms, this means -as partially suggested by the Royal 
Commission- adoption of a system of proportional representation and 
multi-member electorates in both houses. This would lead to a Parliament 
more representative of the plurality of views in the community- instead of 
the present situation which sees the vast bulk of seats in the hands of the 
major parties, with only a few other voices present. 
Even with such reforms, the State Government of the day will still be subject to 
strong pressures by local and international capital to deliver the goods in terms of 
favourable deals. But if we are to go any way towards greater democratic control 
over our State affairs these steps must be taken urgently. It is time to put the Royal 
Commission agenda back in the urgent basket. 
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In my view this is the only way to give people a greater degree of confidence in their 
MP's, who currently rate in the community at the very bottom in the unpopularity 
stakes. Given the excesses of the 1980s, and the failure to date of the Court 
government to implement any genuine reforms, this is with good reason. 
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THE ELECTRONIC WHITE BOARD I: ELECTRONIC 
RECORDKEEPING PRACTICES IN W.A. PUBLIC SECTOR 
AGENCIES: 
Report on Work in Progress (as of December, 1994) 
Ms Vicky Wilson 
Department of Library and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
[During 1994, the Department of Library and Information Science at Edith Cowan 
University received a grant to investigate electronic recordkeeping practices in Western 
Australian public sector agencies. The Electronic Recordkeeping Research Group was 
established in July, 1994. The following is a report on progress to date.] 
The Electronic Recordkeeping Research Group started its investigations from the 
premise that there is a need to build in greater levels of accountability into electronic 
recordkeeping systems. The events of the 1980s in Western Australia and the 
conclusions of the Royal Commission into the Business Dealings of the WA 
Government and others have focussed attention on the importance of accurate and 
complete records to ensure responsible and accountable government. 
The Management Information Systems (MIS) that have been developed to meet the 
information management needs of the business community provide efficient support 
for business activity, but they do not address the evidentiary nature of records or the 
need for accountability, particularly in public sector agencies. To meet the needs of 
the organisation for efficient and timely information, MIS are specifically designed to 
provide data that is non-redundant, timely and reusable. Officers in the organisation 
need to be able to access and manipulate that data and create new records to support 
their business activities. 
In contrast, an electronic information system which has been specifically designed to 
preserve records for the purposes of evidence and accountability does exactly the 
opposite. In order to preserve evidence of past transactions, the records in such an 
evidentiary system need to be redundant and non-reusable. They must accurately 
reflect the business transactions of the organisation, the lines of responsibility and 
the continuity of events over time. By their very nature, they cannot be changed or 
manipulated, as this would immediately destroy their veracity as evidence. 
The dilemma for records managers is the marriage of these two disparate elements. 
Electronic information systems must continue to be constantly available and 
accessible to the organisation. The information within those systems must continue 
be to modifiable, manageable and retrievable at all times. At the same time, the 
same systems should create accurate, secure and responsible records of business 
transactions. This marriage must be achieved with the least possible disruption to 
55 
The Electronic Whiteboard 
the business of the organisation and in such a way that the burden of professional 
accountability for individual officers does not become too great. 
It was the opinion of the researchers that while the functional requirements for MIS 
are well established and the constant object of revision and discussion, little thought 
has been given to the functional requirements for accountability and recordkeeping. 
The development of such electronic 'recordkeeping systems' was technically quite 
feasible, but it was debatable whether the organisational culture of the WA public 
sector would support the necessary changes to policy and practice that would be 
required to implement such functionality. 
The research group therefore developed the following hypothesis to test against WA 
public sector agencies: 
Western Australian public sector agencies that address 
accsuntability issues related to electronic recordkeeping 
have appropriate policies, practices, processes and 
philosophies in place. 
In order to test these hypothesis, we needed to gather data from all WA public sector 
agencies likely to have significant electronic information systems in place. We were 
aware that agencies were in very different stages of development with regard to 
electronic information systems, so for the first phase of the project, a questionnaire 
was designed that would identify those agencies with complex and distributed 
information systems. The questionnaire is being distributed at the present time. It 
attempts to elicit information on the organisational structure, the IT budget, the 
hardware, software and networks in use, the information processing environment 
and any policies and procedures for the integrity and security of the electronically 
stored records. 
We are also asking some preliminary questions to ascertain the level of awareness 
within the organisation on matters of data management and accountability, through 
questions about their data management principles, backup policies, data exchange 
policies, retention and disposition policies. These responses will help us formulate 
the questions for the second phase of the study, where we will work with selected 
agencies to establish policies, procedures and practices to manage their electronic 
data, according to the following principles developed by Robert Smith-Roberts and 
the Australian Archives (Smith-Roberts, 1993): 
• Know your data 
• Share your data 
• Maintain your data's accuracy and 
• Preserve your valuable data. 
The third phase of the project is to work with one agency in a collaborative project to 
actually establish and integrate requirements for accountability into their existing 
systems, with the goal of establishing a set of policies and guidelines that can then be 
used by other agencies to implement similar cultural and technological changes 
within their own agencies. 
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If you would like further information about this project, please contact: 
Vicky Wilson 
Project Manager 
Electronic Recordkeeping Research Group 
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THE ELECTRONIC WHITE BOARD II: THE COMMISSION'S 
PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC RECORDKEEPING AND THE 
INFORMATION AGE 
Mark Brogan, 
Department of Library and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
The modern idea of public recordkeeping as the servant of the people, and not 
merely of the Crown, can be traced to the French Revolution of 1789. Before the 
revolution, the absolutist monarchies of Europe regarded themselves as answerable 
only to God, and hence the rights of citizens to access public records, or to use them 
for ensuring the accountability of government to society, were not recognized. 
The Revolution changed all that. In 1794, the Revolutionaries enacted legislation1 
which established 
• 
• 
an obligation on the part of the State to preserve the documentary heritage of the 
past contained in public records; 
the right of citizen access to public records by virtue of a legal prescription . 
For the first time since the period of medieval city states, the preservation of records 
was seen in the context of the relationship, rights and duties between citizens and 
states, in which states had to preserve records because of their destination for public 
use and because of the government's duty of accountability. Expressed in many 
more complex ways in the Westminster system since, the modern idea of 
accountability can be seen in Article 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen , the idea that-
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In the nineteenth century, interest in public recordkeeping declined. A variety of 
factors were at work here:-
• 
• 
• 
the nineteenth century involved an explicit renunciation of many of the 
revolutionary ideals; 
the influence of romanticism in society emphasised the heroic, as opposed to the 
pedestrian; and 
recordkeeping itself lost its mystique as a result of increasing literacy and 
improvements in office technology. 
Such interest as their was, reflected the perceived importance of non-current public 
records as historical source materials for the writing of histories- a purpose 
commensurate with the neo-classical revival and the influence of romanticism. 
For the first half of the twentieth century, social upheaval occasioned by war and the 
ideological divide between capitalism and communism, effectively placed the issue 
of government's relationship with citizens on the back burner. Citizens were 
obliged to trust their government, in the interests of unity before the common foe. 
This situation changed in the late 1960's, as the cold war receded in intensity, and 
attention focused on the 'democratic' character of the modem liberal democracy, 
something previously not questioned. Critical in this were:-
• the repressive response of the State to popular opposition to the Vietnam War; 
• awareness of the extent of deceit (something we popularly call 'dis-
information') practised by the modem state in the normal conduct of its 
business (revealed dramatically by the leaking of the Pentagon papers by Daniel 
Ellsberg in 1969; and 
• popular awareness of writers such as George Orwell and Chomsky, who 
exposed the character of the modem totalitarian state, and its power base in 
creation and access to information. 
The grass roots democratic movements which first came to prominence in the late 
1960's, had a number of discrete information policy goals:-
1. making government accountable to citizens for the management of private 
information it creates (a concern founded in the introduction of computer based 
information systems which increased the potential for privacy abuse), and 
2. the introduction of citizen rights of access to government information. 
The idea that government can and should be made accountable for the information 
that it keeps was dramatically demonstrated in 1974, when Richard Millhouse 
Nixon resigned the US Presidency, following discovery of White House tape 
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recordings which implicated him in the infamous Watergate break in during the 
1972 Presidential election campaign. 
The message from Watergate, that Executive power had the potential to undermine 
democracy, was at least temporarily, absorbed- In the United States and other 
liberal democracies, legislatures re-asserted their power. However, the medium of 
the message, public recordkeeping, was mostly ignored. The reform agenda in 
information policy continued to focus on information access and privacy issues. In 
effect, the issue of popular sovereignty over the information created by Government, 
as a consequence of the activity of public recordkeeping, was only partly addressed. 
The debate about sovereignty over public records did not begin with the Nixon 
affair, but is about as old as government itself. In political philosophy, we can 
conceptualise the two positions in terms of the two very different understandings of 
sovereignty derived by the philosophers' Locke and Rousseau. 
For Locke, sovereignty was transferred to rulers from the people as a result of a 
social contract. While it could be reclaimed by the people, government was 
empowered to go about its business unless it betrayed the trust on which the contract 
was based. For Rousseau however, who agreed with Locke's idea of a social 
contract, the idea of sovereignty being transferred to government was repugnant. 
For him, sovereignty not only originated with the people, but stayed with them, an 
idea linked to the obligation of government to carry out the common will. 
These two competing perspectives can be seen at play, when we ask ourselves the 
apparently trivial question, who owns government records? 
In Australia, privacy protection and citizen access to government information, have 
formed the subject of a grab bag of reforms collectively known as the new 
administrative law. In most States and Federally, Australian citizens now have an 
enforceable right of access (subject to exemption) to government information through 
Freedom of Information, and some degree of privacy protection through various 
Privacy Acts. 
The 1980's was a period of considerable activity in administrative law. The 
Commonwealth Government was the first to legislate for citizen right of access with 
its FOi Act (1982). Under Commonwealth law, complementary rights of access are 
provided to current, semi-current and non-current records. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, right of access (subject to exemption) is provided to current and 
semi-current records. Archival access (also subject to exemption) is available to 
non-current records more than 30 years old. The Archives Act (1983) is a 
comparatively little known and under-utilised information access resource which 
can be used to surprisingly good effect- e.g. has been used to secur~ access to the non-
current records of ASIO. The Western Australian Government enacted FOi 
legislation in 1992, and this legislation is about to have its first anniversary of 
operation. 
The first specific information privacy legislation in Australia, was Queensland's 
Invasion of Privacy Act (1971), later amended by the Invasion of Privacy Act 
Amendment Act (1976). These acts dealt with the licensing and control of credit 
reporting agents, detective agencies and regulation of the use of listening devices. 
The first Australian law to deal with the issue of data privacy, was the Privacy 
Committee Act, enacted by the New South Wales Government in 1975. In 1976, the 
Australian Government referred the matter of privacy protection in law to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission for report. In 1983, the Commission presented 
a two volume report on privacy in Australia, which recommended the enactment of 
privacy protection law covering the Federal public sector. The report was 
accompanied (Butler, 1992, p.17) by draft legislation incorporating data privacy 
principles based on the O.E.C.D.'s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transnational Flows of Personal Data (1980). 
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Since 1983, privacy protection in Australia has been the subject of a flurry of 
legislative activity, the most notable examples of which have been The Privacy 
Committee Act (1984)(Queensland), Privacy Act (1988)(Commonwealth), Privacy 
Bill (1990)(South Australia) and Privacy Act Amendment Act 
(1990)(Commonwealth). In 1984, the Australian Government moved to formally 
adopt the O.E.C.D. principles. 
However, in most Australian jurisdictions, these reforms effectively overlooked the 
life cycle management of public records from creation, through maintenance to final 
disposition. In Western Australia, regulation of public recordkeeping continued to 
be based on the anachronistic provisions of the Libraries Act- An Act created 
essentially for another purpose, and in which the public interest in public 
recordkeeping, was conceived in nineteenth century terms i.e. when they had ceased 
to be used for business purposes, public records might be used for historical 
research. 
Failures in the existing regulatory regime, coupled with cultural factors such as the 
new managerialism and entrepreneurial ethos, provide the causal explanation for 
many of the 'improper' document management practices identified with WA Inc. 
The Royal Commission described a picture of dysfunctional recordkeeping in which 
functional requirements for capturing, maintaining and accessing records with 
evidential value were not satisfied. It described practices at the highest level of 
Government aimed at manipulating the evidence contained in documents to escape 
accountability. The Commission hilited problems in:-
Capture 
Some decision making at the highest level of government, was not captured as 
recorded information. Consequently, government contractual obligations and the 
reasons for government decisions were often difficult to establish. The Royal 
Commission Part I Report detailed how in cases such as the Burswood Casino, 
purchase of the Fremantle Gas Co by SECW A, and K winana Petrochemical project, 
the failure to capture important decision making as recorded information placed the 
finances of the State in jeopardy. 
Shredding 
Multiple instances of shredding of files and documents, forming public records, 
apparently intended to obscure executive action and decision making. 
Corruption 
If public records are to have value as evidence of executive action, they must be 
authentic. If they are to be maintained as part of normal business practice, then the 
record of changes made to them must be auditable. Encompasses a variety of 
actions involving the replacing of original copy with edited or substitute, changed 
copy. 
Accessibility 
If public records are to have value as evidence of executive action, then they must be 
accessible, and arrangements for their custody must ensure their security. The 
Commission identified instances where records had been removed from Ministerial 
Offices and where the status of such records as public records had not been 
recognized. The misfiling of information can also be an effective way of obscuring 
the record of business transaction or decision making. The same effect can be 
achieved by destroying control records which identify the physical location of 
records. · 
In its assessment of the relationship between recordkeeping and responsible 
government, the Commission was influenced by a view of public records as 
evidence, meaning :-
• evidence in a legal sense, as proof of an event ... 
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• evidence of government action and decision making enabling citizens to make 
informed decisions about the performance of government 
The Commission concluded (RC Part II s.4.3.1) that where official papers are lost, 
deliberately destroyed or removed by officials, and where a record of decisions is 
not made 
Such practices strike at the roots of responsible government. Whether intended or not, 
the result is a false or incomplete account of the stewardship of the Government. Proper 
record keeping and effective record security are essential to good public administration. 
Proper recordkeeping serves two purposes. First, it is a prerequisite to effective 
accountability .. 
In its Part Two Report, the Commission made recommendations concerning public 
recordkeeping, which it believed were necessary to ensure evidence and hence 
accountability. 
It is a matter of history that these changes have to date not been acted upon. 
While the Commission was primarily concerned with discovery of evidence in 
paper (the 'paper trail'), the classic bureaucratic image of files and paper may be 
said to no longer accurately depict the reality of government information systems. 
What we recognize as paper, is increasingly a representation of data contained in a 
computer based information system at a particular time. 
A recent report commissioned by the US Congress2 concluded that by the year 2000, 
75% of all US Government business will originate in electronic form. As we make 
the transition to a digital society, an important question for society is whether 
digital technologies are likely to increase or diminish the accountability problem in 
government. Are digital technologies in communications and information systems 
accountability benign? 
Three characteristics in data management under score the advantages of computer 
based information systems for business applications, compared with paper based 
recordkeeping systems:-
Data in computer based information systems is intended to be 
1. non-redundant 
2. timely, and 
3. reusable 
The non-redundancy of data means that systems carry no overheads of obsolete 
data (paper based systems normally carry significant overheads of non-current 
information). The timely nature of data means that data accurately depicts the 
business situation at any instant. Information is by its very nature current (allowing 
for batch or on-line data update modes of operation). Information in paper based 
systems on the other hand, is often non-current and paper based systems often do not 
reflect the real time situation of business. The re-usability of data means that data 
currency can be efficiently maintained through editing and updating of existing 
data, an idea logically related to the previous two. 
However, an electronic (or any other) recordkeeping system is intended to preserve 
evidence i.e. information about the content, structure and context of a transaction. 
As such, the data management characteristics of a recordkeeping system are the very 
opposite of a computer based information system. Data is intended to be 
1. redundant 
2. time bound, and 
3. non reusable 
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This is not an invitation for us to throw up our hands in despair about the apparent 
incompatibility of new technologies with evidence, and hence accountability. David 
Bearman at the Universtiy of Pittsburgh3 has suggested that electronic information 
systems can fulfil the functional requirements of recordkeeping systems through the 
tactics of:-
• systems design 
• systems implementation 
• policy frameworks, and 
• standards frameworks. 
What is essential, is for government to adjust systems design, procurement and 
electronic records management policies and procedures to ensure evidence. 
However, to date, Government in common with other consumers of information 
technology, has shown little appreciation of the long run life cycle data management 
view of information systems, compared with the short run, business efficiency view. 
As a consequence, few systems meet the functional requirements for recordkeeping 
exposing society to accountability related risk. 
The Case of Armstrong v. Bush 
In 1987, the United States Congress and Senate conducted joint hearings into 
allegations that the United States Government had covertly and illegally sold arms 
to Iran and subsequently used funds derived from these sales to fund insurgency 
operations by Nicaraguan rebels (known as Contras) against the Nicaraguan 
Government. During the context of these hearings, it was revealed that Colonel 
Oliver North, the National Security Council officer who had engineered the so called 
Iran-Contra deals, had received electronic mail from National Security Advisor 
John Poindexter congratulating him on providing false testimony to the 
Congressional inquiry. This l!,nd other revelations focussed attention on the 
relevance to investigations of information contained in the White House PROFS, 
OASIS AND A-1 electronic communications systems. 
In 1989, the Public Citizen Litigation Group filed suit against the Executive Office of 
President alleging that electronic records contained in the above systems could only 
be disposed of and dealt with in accordance with the Presidential Records and 
Federal Records Act. This action had been prompte~ by a Bush Administration 
decision to destroy the back-up tapes at the heart of the controversy. In January 
1993, Judge Ritchie of the U.S. District Court of Columbia4, delivered a judgement in 
the case of Armstrong v. Bush with far reaching implications for all Governments in 
their treatment of electronic records issues. Ritchie ruled that the electronic records 
at the heart of the controversy comprised federal records within the meaning of the 
Federal Records Act, and should be extended statutory protection. On the 13 
August, 1993, this decision was upheld by a Federal Appeal Court Judge. 
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Significance 
Armstrong v. Bush demonstrated the extent to which systems design, regulatory 
and electronic records management issues have significant implications for 
Executive accountability. While the immediate impact of the case has been limited 
to the United States, it has demonstrated the need for all governments which make 
significant use of digital information and communications technologies and which 
profess a genuine, rather than just rhetorical interest in accountability, to adjust 
policy and procedure. Specifically, we can conclude that in the absence of initiatives 
aimed at ensuring evidence, the prognosis for government, including the 
Government of Western Australia, is for an increase in accountability related risk 
arising from increasing use of digital technologies. 
Conclusion 
The Royal Commission demonstrated the extent to which public sector records 
management has significant implications for government accountability. However, 
the Commission was only incidentally concerned with issues in accountability 
arising from public sector records management, and analysis of the likely impact of 
digital communications and information technologies, suggests that problems 
surrounding the record of government action and decision making are likely to 
grow. The reform agenda established by the Commission in its Part Two Report, 
does not in itself constitute a response to the problems of the 'electronic white board', 
but through the regulatory powers and new public records legislation envisaged in 
the Report, an appropriately constituted Public Records Office might play an 
important role in addressing this issue. 
However, since the Royal Commission, there has been no change in public records 
legislation. A Discussion Paper on New Public Records Legislation For Western 
Australia circulated by LISWA in 1994 recommends a number of worthwhile 
reforms, but entrusts scrutiny of public sector recordkeeping to a proposed Public 
Records Commission, which does not include information technology 
representation. Overall, progress is proceeding at a snail's pace, posing a dilemma 
for society as government recordkeeping becomes increasingly digital .. 
--ooOoo-
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TURNING ON THE SEARCHLIGHT: A RETROSPECTIVE ON 
THE FIRST YEAR OF OPERATION OF THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT 1992 
Karen Anderson 
Department of Library and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
The Freedom of Information Act 1992 clearly states two objectives. They are to: 
• 
• 
enable the public to participate more effectively in governing the State; and 
make the persons and bodies that are responsible for State and local 
government more accountable to the public. 
Given these objectives, the intent of the Act must be construed as facilitating openness 
in the process of decision-making and allowing scrutiny of decisions and actions by 
government agencies, except under the range of exemptions for particular agencies 
and particular types of records. 
The Introduction to the Act goes on to say that these objectives are to be achieved by: 
• 
• 
• 
creating a general right of access to State and local government documents; 
providing means to ensure that personal information held by State and 
local governments is accurate, complete, up to date and not misleading; and 
requiring that certain documents concerning State and local government 
operations be made public. 
A large proportion (75%) of requests under the Act have been for personal 
information and in a society which values freedom and democracy it is important 
that individuals should have access to information held about them and the ability 
to ensure that such information is accurate, giving the right to have records amended 
if they are incorrect. 
Non-personal requests 
However, the requests typified as "non-personal" in the Freedom of Information 
Annual Report 1993-1994 are of considerable interest when attempting to gauge the 
openness or otherwise of government decision-making, and the first and third of the 
Objects of the Act are probably the most relevant to these types of requests: 
• creating a general right of access to State and local government documents; 
and 
• requiring that certain documents concerning State and local government 
operations be made public. 
The Freedom of Information Annual Report 1993-1994 provides little comment on 
non-personal requests other than to offer a list of the 13 agencies receiving the highest 
65 
1111, 
Turning on the Searchlight 
numbers of this type of request The Police head the list with 161 requests. The Health 
Dept follows with 43, then the Department of Premier & Cabinet with 20. The 
remaining 10 agencies listed have between 9 & 12 requests each. 
Publication of information 
The remaining objective is also very important: 
• requiring that certain documents concerning State and Local Government 
operations be made public 
While this is probably the hardest objective to measure, its success if achieved, will 
do much to achieve real open government. That is, if government agencies establish a 
culture in which the public is more actively encouraged to participate in decision 
making and as much information as possible is freely published or provided for 
inspection upon demand without prejudicing privacy or the public interest, then 
much progress will have been made towards open government. 
In the early stages, it will be possible to measure progress toward publication by 
agencies of the information statements and internal manuals required by the Act. 
But measurement of the step beyond this, the willingness to release information not 
actually required to be released by the Act, is difficult. Much informative material, 
of course, is already published. However, quantity of publications is not a 
significant measurement tool: quality of information made available becomes an 
issue. The length of lists of publications can be misleading. Governments can easily 
pad publication lists with trivia and advertising material which seek to present 
decisions in the best possible light without soliciting participation in or comment on 
the decision-making process. Counting the number of publications won't tell us much 
about the openness of a government. 
Whether or not it can be accurately measured, it is a willingness to share the 
decision-making process and to freely provide information to all, rather than 
leaving it to interested individuals to winkle it out through use of FOI legislation, 
which will indicate real openness of government. 
Yet the most important step which can be taken to support the Freedom of 
Information legislation is yet to be recognised by the Government and that is support 
for records management programmes in government agencies. 
Information for the people 
To gain a different perspective on the general right of access to State and local 
government documents I approached The West Australian for an overview of their 
experience in using the Freedom Of Information Act for access to information which 
they believed to be" in the public interest". I am very grateful to the Editor, Mr Paul 
Murray for permission to look at their experience, and to Liz Tickner in particular 
for her generous help. 
In outlining The West Australian's experience I do not intend to imply that it or any 
other news publication is an arbiter of the public interest. The newspaper was chosen 
as an example of a frequent user of the Act for non-personal information. Indeed, 
Commissioner Keighly-Gerardy in her Decision 0194 makes the following 
statement on the concept of "the public interest". 
The Public Interest - Clause 8 
55. The public interest is not defined in the WA Act, nor in any other similar 
legislation. It is allied to the concept of public interest immunity or crown 
privilege, considered by courts in determining whether official documents of 
government could be produced in court. In Freedom of Information 
legislation, the public interest test is used to balance competing interests. 
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Whilst the public has an interest in access to information, the public also has 
an interest in the proper functioning of government agencies and in protecting 
the privacy of individuals and the commercial interests of business 
organizations. 
56. In applying the public interest test, the difference between matters of general 
interest and those of private concern only, must be recognized. The public 
interest is an interest that extends beyond what the public may be interested 
in today or tomorrow depending on what is newsworthy. 
The experience of The West Australian 
The West Australian lodged a number of Freedom Of Information requests on 1st 
November, 1993: the first day that the Act came into operation. These requests all 
concerned topics for which they had previously been unable to gain access to the 
information they sought 
Although no statistical record has been kept, very few have been completely 
successful. The newspaper has adopted a policy of reporting the Information 
Commissioner's decisions on all requests which have gone to external review, as 
well as reporting the success or failure of their own FOI requests. They believe that 
on the whole they have obtained more information through documents which have 
been leaked to them after reporting that FOI access on a particular topic has been 
denied, than through the process of FOL These information windfalls have resulted 
in a number of major stories for The West Australian and perhaps most importantly 
reveal that there is a strong desire for information to be available to the community. 
It also points to a very real need for protection for "whistleblowers" which the 
Royal Commission recommended. 
"Unsuccessful" FOi requests 
The earliest of these stories concerned the Potato Marketing Board. The West 
Australian lodged a request for access to copies of Board meeting minutes; 
consultants reports on the management of the authority; details surrounding the 
resignations or termination of employment of four staff members; information 
concerning black marketing activities and pecuniary interests. Access to very little 
was granted, but the documents that had been sought were subsequently leaked 
within 48 hours of the newspaper reporting their lack of success. This resulted in 
major stories published on 17th and 18th January, 1994. 
A notable failure for another organisation was a request lodged by the Opposition 
with the Department of Premier and Cabinet for the working papers and 
consultant's reports to the McCarrey Commission. The West Australian had also 
considered lodging a request for this information, but chose to wait for the result of 
the Opposition's request 
Of 79 documents requested, 77 were refused. In an 85 page response, the Ministry of 
Premier and Cabinet effectively said 'no' to the Opposition's request - and charged 
$90 for dealing with the application! Mr Ian Taylor's media release pointed out 
that although the McCarrey Commission had cost taxpayers $500,000 its workings 
were denied to them and kept secret. 
Another event which was the subject of considerable ll;lterest in the community was 
the Sinatra's affair. Constable Salt's trial was told he had been drinking at Sinatra's 
Tavern for at least four hours before before an accident in a police vehicle but he 
could not be breath-tested after the accident because he and three other detectives left 
the scene. He was subsequently acquitted on a drink-driving charge because of lack 
of evidence. 
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The following is quoted from the article of 16th July illustrated below: 
"The West Australian submitted questions to the Police under the 
Freedom of Information Act but the force has failed to meet the 45-
day statutory deadline imposed by the Act. The deadline was May 
2. Under the Act, the failure of the police to meet the deadline 
constitutes a legal refusal to release the information." 
The article also reported: 
"Told on Friday that The West Australian intended reporting the 
failure to comply with FOI laws, police offered partial access to 
some of the documents and to make a decision on access to the rest 
today. Police maintained yesterday that there was nothing sinister 
about withholding the files. They put it down to a lack of resources 
in the force's legal services unit. 
The West Australian's use of the Act to investigate the force has exposed 
an escalating crisis in the legal services unit The unit has become so 
bogged down with FOi requests that Information Commissioner 
Bronwyn Keighley-Gerardy met police over the failure to comply with 
the Act's deadlines. 
The force has also forgone hundreds, possibly thousands of dollars in 
revenue by waiving charges in cases where documents have been given 
out after the expiry of deadlines. 
The West Australian has now exercised its right under the Act and 
applied for an internal review of the deemed refusal. Police spokesman 
Jim King said: "There is no hidden agenda. We gave it our best shot but 
we simply weren't able to meet the time limit. We haven't got the 
resources to cope with the demand from FOi. This is new territory and 
we're feeling our way. The officers concerned are giving it their best shot 
and I don't think you can ask for more than that." 
Ms Keighley-Gerardy acknowledged that the police were experiencing 
problems but said some other departments 
and agencies were also having difficulties. But there was no excuse for 
not keeping the applicant adequately informed- as had been the case in 
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Balanced against those examples are the newspaper's successful FOI requests. Most 
notable was a request to the Health Department for information about the incidence 
of sexually transmitted diseases among Kimberley Aborigines. Although this was a 
particularly difficult request to handle on a topic which is a very large problem for 
the Department, their response was exemplary. 
More than 140 pages of documents were released by the WA Health Department to 
The West Australian in response to their Freedom of Information request The West 
Australian requested access to documents on sexually transmitted diseases amongst 
Kimberley Aborigines from January 1992. 
The extent of the problem can be clearly seen from the sheer volume of documents on 
the subject held by the department-in one case, a sexually transmitted diseases 
register contained 17,000 pages of information. In another case, there were 2000 
laboratory forms. Access to these and many other documents were of course refused 
because they contained confidential patient information. The released documents 
say Aboriginal health problems have been under-funded compared to other 
strategies, and have often suffered by being based on non-Aboriginal priorities. 
The West Australian ran front page stories followed by a series of double page 
spreads entitled "Outback Health" raising public awareness of a serious health 
problem. The article below was published on Thursday, 3rd February, 1994. 
In another series of reports which commenced on 9th June, 1993 Liz Tickner reported 
in a page 3 story that the Rural Adjustment and Finance Corporation had come 
under pressure to provide assistance to three farmers in serious financial trouble. In 
response to an investigation by The West Australian, RAFCOR chairman John Groves 
said that Mr House's request amounted to the corporation being asked to "act above 
and beyond the call of duty." 
On 16th June it was reported that Mr Groves had apologised to Mr House, and on 
the following day that Mr Groves had resigned his position as joint chairman and 
chief executive. The report noted that attention would now focus on changes Mr 
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House could make to the corporation, including splitting the roles of chairman and 
chief executive, in line with coalition policy statements made prior to the State 
election. 
On 26th January, 1994 a NEWS EXTRA reported that The West Australian had 
obtained documents through Freedom of Information which justified Mr Groves' 
comments reported on 9th June. 
Raising standards of records management 
At present agencies are given no extra resources to deal with their responsibilities 
under the Freedom Of Information Act, or with the number of information requests, 
which will grow as the public becomes more aware of their rights under the Act. 
Many requests have caused agencies a great deal of very time-consuming work 
which simply has to be added on to existing workloads. After a number of years of 
action in the Public Service aimed at reducing staff and increasing productivity it 
must be realised that new functions of such significance as the provision of Freedom 
of Information cannot and should not be dealt with simply by tacking it on to the 
end of someone's job description. The failure of the Police to respond in time to the 
Sinatra's affair request is indicative of these difficulties, although it is also an 
illustration of a culture of secrecy which must be overcome both in pockets of the 
public service and among elected members of Parliament. David Parker's reported 
comment that governments operate on a principle of concealment offers an 
indication that this culture exists at executive level. 
The problems encountered can only be addressed by paying more attention to 
records management in government agencies. The corporate memory is the most 
valuable asset any agency holds, yet few acknowledge this in their management 
practices. A number of agencies have had to cast their search net over various offices 
and branches, as they are not certain where records relevant to a particular request 
may be held. Urgent action is also required to ensure that agencies understand the 
management implications of records held in electronic format and have in place the 
policies and resources to deal with them. 
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Support for greater access to information requires: 
• resources to improve records management in government agencies which 
will in tum 
• support agencies' ability to respond to FOI requests. 
This can be achieved by: 
• employing professional records managers in government agencies; and 
• increasing the resources of the Records Management Office of the State 
Archives, enabling the Office to increase its work towards raising the 
standard of records management in government agencies through advisory 
services and training programmes. 
Professional standards of recordkeeping and accountability go hand in hand and 
the employment of professionally educated records managers is essential if agencies 
are to emerge from the paperchase (or the even more nightmarish electronic record 
chase) that many are currently experiencing. 
A professional records manager will: 
• have a professional understanding of the legal, ethical and social 
obligations of the organisation and a broad understanding of the 
constraints of the social environment; 
• develop policies and devise systems which ensure that the standards of 
recordkeeping within the organisation are capable of meeting those 
obligations. This will include advising on the design of electronic 
recordkeeping systems to capture 'complete accurate reliable and useable 
records'. (McKemmish, 1994) 
• develop policies standards and strategies in conjunction with other 
information professionals in the organisation to deliver services in the most 
efficient and cost-effective manner; 
• provide custodial services such as indexing and scheduling of corporate 
records regardless of their physical location or format. (Wilson, 1994); 
• provide advice, assistance and training to action officers and support staff 
in the organisation to ensure that standards are met. (Wilson, 1994) 
Furthermore, a staff of only two in the Records Management Office of the State 
Archives cannot hope to provide or even coordinate all of the extensive training and 
advice on records management currently needed across Western Australian 
government agencies, although excellent efforts are being made by that Office. 
The emphasis placed on education and mediation between requestors and agencies 
by the Office of the Information Commissioner when reviews are requested, and its 
concern for education and awareness concerning rights and obligations under the 
Act is an exemplary start to its activities. However, if the Freedom of Information 
Act is to operate to its full potential in contributing to openness of government in 
Western Australia much more attention must be paid to raising the standards of 
records management in government agencies. 
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Introduction 
This paper summarises international and Australian reforms in the public sector 
over the last twenty years to set a baseline from which the recommendations and 
findings of the Royal Commission can be studied. The summary is followed by a 
review of the recommendations that bear on the public sector. A comparison with 
other reforms is made and several conclusions are reached about political and 
administrative behaviour which might assist an analysis of the state of progress in 
implementing the recommendations. 
International and Australian public sector reforms 
Reforms in selected OECD countries were placed in eight categories in a paper 
delivered by Pertti Ahonen at the annual conference of the International Association 
of Schools and Institutes of Administration in Hong Kong in July this year. Ahonen 
followed an OECD categorisation and listed reforms as follows: 
• human resources 
• financial management 
• public services 
• public management procedures 
• reorganisation 
• deregulation 
• privatisation 
• organisation for reform 
The attached table shows a summary of these reforms between 1980 and 1994. The 
greatest effort was applied to general improvement and reform, manager 
improvement, reform and training, financial management and budget reform, 
retrenchment, increasing agency autonomy and de-concentration, the simplification 
of laws and deregulation. Privatisation, decentralisation in national, regional, state 
or local governments, reform of information systems policy, auditing reforms, 
quality programs, improved supply and procurement policies and improved 
industrial relations had made relatively less progress. 
The table also shows that the rate at which the reforms were taken up varied; these 
variations are probably due to political, economic and geographic factors. Some 
reforms have been continued over time, such as those. in financial management and 
manager improvement; others were attempted fitfully or started then stopped. 
Australian reforms, that is those undertaken by the Commonwealth government, are 
shown as strongest in general improvement and reform, manager improvement, 
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financial management and budgets, general public services reform and acquisition 
or procurement reform. The Commonwealth government published in 1992 its ''The 
Australian Public Service Reformed" (Australia 1992) and the table attached, 
provides a summary of the progress of nominated reforms in agencies where they 
occurred "to a great extent." 
Australian reforms 
Ahonen was exploring issues relevant to his native Finland and had not seen earlier 
Australian work which documented and analysed public sector change and reform 
over a longer period and which included the states as well as the Commonwealth. 
Smith and Weller (1978) write of inquiries in South Australia (1974), Victoria 
{1974), the Commonwealth (1976) and New South Wales (1974). There was later an 
inquiry in Tasmania and another in New South Wales. The scope of these inquiries, 
their terms of reference and the method of meeting them varied; some had sole 
Commissioners while others such as the Commonwealth Coombs inquiry had five 
and abundant resources to support them. 
Several inquiries were expected to provide advice and recommendations on matters 
other than the apparent mechanics of running the apparatus of government. Coombs 
was directed to give "particular attention to the relationship between the Australian 
Public Service and statutory corporations and other authorities with the Parliament, 
Ministers and the community." It was also to report on parliamentary scrutiny and 
control of administration and the responsibility and accountability of public 
servants and their participation in forming policy and making decisions. 
(Commonwealth 1976). Similarly, the Reid inquiry (Commonwealth 1983) made 
recommendations on Ministerial responsibility. 
There were also significant reforms in administrative law which were stimulated 
by the Kerr Committee Report and resulted in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
and contributed to the appointment of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the 
review and rejection of Ministerial and public service decisions. 
The inquiry in South Australia especially positioned that state for a steady and 
regular program of reform which continues to the present day. The states which 
undertook no public review of their administration or the relationships between it, 
Ministers, the Parliament and the community were Western Australia and 
Queensland. The former is the focus of this paper. Was there no change taking place 
here when change was under way east of the border? 
There was change locally. The former Public Service Board studied the reviews 
conducted interstate and assessed their application to Western Australia. The Public 
Service Act 1978 was the product of this work and includea, for example, a 
provision allowing the appointment of leaders on contract. Representatives of the 
government also approached a leading academic before the 1980 state election and 
discussed public sector reform. The Parliament debated the formation of a system of 
parliamentary committees (Wood and Hollier 1991, 369-374) and established the 
Public Accounts Committee in 1970. In 1974, it set up the country's first 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations (the Ombudsman). 
The Legislative Council formed the Standing Committee on Government Agencies in 
1982 to investigate, evaluate and monitor the performance of government agencies. 
Its jurisdiction was to include all agencies set up by statute and through improved 
annual reports, it would facilitate the evaluation of agency performance. 
By the date of the election of the ALP government in March 1983, the public sector 
was administered through a major statute, the Public Service Act, which covered 
about one-fifth of government employees. The remainder were subject to the 
requirements of agency-specific statutes and accountability was routed through 
Ministers, the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and two important Parliamentary 
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committees. Elections were administered through the Electoral Department whose 
head was responsible to a Minister. 
The development of policy and its implementation were carried out with the 
authority of statutes, the Minister or Cabinet. Unlike other states, there had been little 
coordinating capacity realised in the Premier's Department and little support and 
analysis given to Cabinet itself by the sort of unit envisaged by the Haldane 
Committee in England in 1918. 
The ALP government updated the role and work of the Premier's Department and 
added in far greater numbers Ministerial advisers to the offices of Ministers (Beggs 
1983). During its term, it either initiated or responded to demands for change to the 
Audit Act 1904 (now the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985), the 
Electoral Department (now the Electoral Commission with an independent 
Commissioner reporting to the Parliament) and the Official Corruption Commission 
(1990) with powers that were disputed and reviewed in 1991-2. The Public Service 
Commissioner issued guidelines for the behaviour of public servants in 1988 and 
though they applied only to staff employed under the Public Service Act, the 
Commissioner hoped they would be taken into account across the public sector. It 
also passed the Freedom of Information Act in 1992, first promised by the ALP 
during the 1983 election campaign. 
Other changes bearing on the public sector were initiated by the former Public 
Service Board in 1985 and 1986 and senior officials from the Public Service 
Commission, Treasury and the Department of Cabinet proposed reforms in 
publications issued in 1992. The Public Service Commissioner also made proposals 
for a new legislative framework in 1991 and 1992. 
The Royal Commission 
What did the Royal Commissioners make of the system for the operation, 
accountability and review of government? 
Cabinet 
The Report reviews the role of Cabinet, collective and individual Ministerial 
responsibility and the "malleability of ... conventions" which sustain cabinet 
government and which make "categorical statements about them both difficult and 
potentially misleading". (Report, 4.2.1) The Report notes that "Cabinet became a 
diminished institution", that there "was a disturbing trend towards the denial of any 
collective consideration on an informed basis of some major decisions" and that 
"there was a clear disregard of the formal cabinet procedures to which both the 
Burke and Dowding Governments were ostensibly committed .... in some crucial 
meetings of Cabinet in late 1987 and 1988 ... no record ever appears to have come into 
existence, no agenda, no submissions, no recorded decisions." (Report, 4.2.7) 
There is praise for guidelines issued by the Department of Premier and Cabinet to 
assist Ministers with Cabinet conventions and procedures: 
" ... the guidelines themselves reflect a proper understanding both of the purposes of 
Cabinet and the procedures which should be adhered to so as to ensure not only the 
efficiency and effectiveness but also the integrity of cabinet operations. " 
There is a substantial gap between the guidelines and the behaviour of Cabinet and 
the Report rightly asserts that the Premier should bear ultimate responsibility for the 
"effective operation of the system." (Report, 4.2.10) 
In order to stress the importance of record keeping to accountability, the Report 
· recommended that the Auditor General be given access as of right to cabinet records 
for functions of his office and that the proposed state archives authority monitor 
compliance with standards set for record creation, maintenance and retention. 
(Report 4.2.11). 
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Independent agencies 
The Report considered that the agencies responsible directly to the Parliament have 
their powers expanded (Auditor-General, Public Service Commissioner or the 
Standards Commissioner) or be replaced by a new agency (Commissioner for the 
Investigation of Corrupt and Improper Conduct to replace the Official Corruption 
Commission). These, along with the Ombudsman and the Electoral Commissioner 
were to be designated independent parliamentary agencies in the legislation 
establishing them. The independent agencies would then cover, in summary: 
• the use of financial resources (Auditor-General) 
• the management of the machinery of government and the use of human resources 
(Public Service Commissioner or Standards Commissioner) 
• the electoral process (Electoral Commissioner) 
• the behaviour of politicians and officials (CICIC) and 
• decision making and use of power by officials (the Ombudsman) 
The five agencies were no more in number than those already reporting to the 
Parliament but in some circles, the recommendations were portrayed as adding 
more to an already overloaded system. Together with reform to the processes of 
administrative law (Report 3.4 and 3.5), the Legislative Council acting as a house of 
review (Report 3.9 and 5.3.7), the financial independence of Parliament being 
achieved and the Commission on Government inquiring into the "means best suited 
to be adopted by the Parliament to bring the entire public sector under its scrutiny 
and review" including the use of parliamentary committees (Report 5.4.4), the Royal 
Commissioners provided the community with a coherent vision to reduce the risk of 
aberrant political and administrative behaviour and for securing change in the 
public domain and in its accountability to the electorate. 
The Report occupies ground not taken by the public sector reforms which have swept 
the selected OECD countries shown in attachment one; it believes that the 
foundations of the system of government should be laid for the construction of a 
democratic parliament capable of exercising scrutiny and itself open to scrutiny 
through agencies reporting to itself. 
Changing the public service 
The implied principle of scrutiny and the formation of a service of integrity was to 
be applied to the public service by the passage of a new Public Sector Management 
Act, the extension of the powers of the Public Service Commissioner to the whole 
public sector or the same functions being carried out by a Public Sector Standards 
Commissioner, a review by government into managerial, industrial and other 
matters involving the service, and preventing the Department of Cabinet from 
providing party political services (Report, 6). 
The Report states (6.1.2): 
11 
... with regard to the state of the administrative system itself; a complete review of its 
structure and organisation is required ... much of which has passed for reform has been 
designed more to further the managerial objectives of government than to give 
organisational integrity to the system itself " 
It also called for legislation which would bring "greater integration, 
standardisation and community of purpose to the public sector" (Report 6.2.1). Most 
significantly, the report swam against the tide of public sector reform in other states 
when it sought unequivocally for the formation of an independent body "responsible 
for the general oversight and supervision of the administrative system" (Report 
6.2.2). The Commissioners sought an organisation which would be the protector and 
the custodian of the values "which should inform the conduct and operations of the 
76 
Wood 
whole of the State's public sector" and they noted that other states had diminished 
the significance of such agencies. 
The Report recommended (6.2.4) that an office of Commissioner of Public Sector 
Standards be created in a statute which included the principles to be adhered to in 
public administration and which charged the Commissioner with keeping the 
overall organisation, management and operations of the public sector under scrutiny 
and review. The office was to establish standards for agencies, to ensure compliance 
with those standards and to report to the committee of the parliament responsible 
for the organisation and operations of the public sector. 
The Report also sought: 
• observation of the merit principle for appointment at all levels 
• clarification of the roles of chief executives and their relationship for 
management of their organisations with the Public Service Commissioner 
• balance between the interests of Ministers in the appointments of chief executives 
with the need to safeguard public service interests 
• prevention of intrusion by parliamentarians into any and all appointments to 
the public service 
• separate legislation covering employment arrangements for ministerial staff 
• prevent the corrosive effect of ministerial staff dealing with public service staff 
in departments 
• agreement between the minister and the chief executive officer on how 
communications should be made between ministerial staff and the staff of a 
department if not through the leader 
• whistle blowing legislation 
• standards of conduct for officials 
Assessing the Commission's view 
The Commission's view of public sector change was that the fundamentals should be 
set right. Other Australian and overseas reviews and changes have aimed at the 
introduction of specific programs to improve efficiency, reduce the size of the public 
sector or meet the ideological position of elected governments. In getting the 
fundamentals right, the Commission correctly pointed to the need for a legislative 
framework to direct the behaviour of participants in the public sector and so was 
clear about the central contents of legislation for public sector management. 
There will continue to be debate about the Commission's views on the electoral 
system though the logic of having the Legislative Council as a house of review ought 
to be accepted. Similarly, having independent officers responsible to the Parliament 
and for a statutory framework governing the whole public sector and the need for 
adherence to standards through codes of conduct or registers of interest are 
recommendations little in dispute. 
There is a long list of specified matters derived from the Report contained in 
Schedule 1 of the Commission on Government Act 1994 which will provide more 
opportunities for government to get fundamentals right. However, there is still an 
unfinished agenda which can build on the fundamentals and whose investigation 
should give the Parliament confidence that the public sector is structured, resourced 
and delivering services well and efficiently. Three important areas stand out for 
consideration. 
Cabinet's role as the link between the legislative and executive arm, as a 
coordinating institution, is being altered by the increasing prominence of the office of 
the Premier, the public service agencies supporting that office and the electioneering 
methods followed by political parties. The interdependence between government 
agencies and functions also makes it very difficult for individual Ministerial 
responsibility to have any meaning and the practice of delegating authority, a 
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necessary step, tempts politicians to push down to others blame for errors. The 
prominence of the Premier diminishes the likelihood of individual Ministerial 
responsibility as well and the prospects for the practice ever matching the ideal in 
the Westminster system are further reduced. There are questions for Ministers about 
their roles and work and the extent to which they need preparation for office through 
a Parliamentary professional development system. 
The legal and financial relationship between the Commonwealth, the states and 
local government, quite apart from the political dimensions of those relationships, 
requires the best possible coordination for the most effective delivery of services to 
Australians. This implies that the procedures for evaluation and review need to be 
sound and easily understood and that the structure of the machinery needs review, 
as the Commissioners stated. 
Finally, the political rights and obligations of public servants need to be debated 
and agreed on as far as possible. The Commission on Government might be satisfied 
with the provisions of the existing code of conduct, this is not the same as taking 
politicians and the public through a consideration of the factors which brought 
about the code. 
Conclusion 
There is no shortage of material from which further public sector improvements can 
be drawn. Indeed, much of it is contained in work already undertaken by the 
Standing Committee on Government Agencies, the former Public Service 
Commission or the Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia. It is to be 
hoped that the Commission on Government will interpret its powers so as to include 
the matters raised and do so in a way which involves the public. 
Part of the price for not having a public review of the machinery of government and 
the exercise of power by all the members of the public sector when the less isolated 
parts of Australia did in the 1970's was that a generation of politicians, public 
servants, journalists and the community missed the opportunity to develop their 
concepts about the public sector. Public reviews are not panaceas for the ills of public 
life but they have a role to play which was missed in this state. 
The Report of the Royal Commission stands out in the international arena as a 
document aimed at getting the fundamentals right It is remarkable for its focus on 
the essentials and for its coherence in assembling them in the interests of promoting 
accountability. It had to leave the hard work of influencing political behaviour to 
those who themselves were instrumental in having the Commission established or 
who are able to contribute now because of the offices they hold. 
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THE EMPLOYEE? 
Associate Professor Alan Peachment 
Curtin University of Technology 
The question I pose in the title of my paper would seem to have a self-evident 
answer. 
WA Inc was obviously a failure of both the system and a crime of the employee. The 
question remains however, which part of the system failed and which employees 
committed the crime. 
In addition to wanting to re-affirm your recollection of what the Royal Commission 
said in regard to that question, I also wish to raise further questions based on my 
own research. 
Thus, I shall argue first, that so far as the public sector is concerned WA Inc was a -
'crime' of select public servants, politicians /ministers and advisers 
due mainly to a 'meltdown' of public sector ethics and a serious 
compromise of the ministerial advisory system; 
and second, that WA Inc was also a failure of the political system or, 
more specifically, the Westminster-Whitehall model as practiced in 
Western Australia (bi-cameralism, parliamentary accountability and 
a responsive public service etc) 
I will also suggest that WA Inc was in part attributable to shortcomings in the wider 
socio-political system, including federal-state financial relations and the 
oversighting role played by the media in relation to government. WA Inc also points 
to the critical role played by industrial development policy in determining the state 
political agenda. 
I shall conclude by arguing that while I agree with many of the calls for post-WA Inc 
reform, reform can be taken too far and may shackle government action as well as 
pose a threat to our liberty. Our system of representative and parliamentary 
government will always contain the potential for corruption, however, we should 
view this potential as a positive sign and dampen any over-high expectations for the 
total elimination of corruption. 
I will also suggest that there is danger in blaming prominent individuals alone for 
what happened. Nor should we rely on a new ethical awareness to solve our 
problems 
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WA Inc: Crime of the Employee: 
Politicians (Ministers) 
The WA Inc Royal Commission produced a damning indictment of our public sector 
leaders. It wrote of former Premier Brian Burke that he 
'acted improperly, his conduct being discreditable and amounting to a substantial breach 
of the standard of rectitude to be expected of a person holding the office of Premier". 
Of former Deputy Premier David Parker it wrote he was 
'evasive and quite lacking in conviction', that he was 'grossly negligent', and that 'ty 
any normal measure of the conduct of a minister of the Crown, his behaviour was grossly 
incompetent, if not absurd'. 
Of former Premier Peter Dowding the commission found that his evidence was 
'designed to evade the obvious conclusion', that he had 'not been frank and that he was 
unconvincing'. The behaviour of other former ministers, from both major parties, 
was found wanting. 
Senior Public Servants 
The commission found that four senior public servants had behaved improperly and 
these were charged under the Public Service Act. The case of former Registrar of Co-
operative and Financial Institutions, John Metaxas, raised important questions as to 
the appropriate role of the public servant when fulfilling an advisory role. 
Ministerial Advisers 
During the eighties it was often difficult to establish whether particular individuals 
were public servants or ministerial advisers as many of the latter became the former 
with little or no change in role. I shall regard Len Brush, and superbureaucrats 
Kevin Edwards and Tony Lloyd as ministerial advisers for the whole of their 
public service career. All three individuals were parachuted into senior executive 
positions; in the case of Brush and Lloyd, positions in retrospect beyond their 
capacity. 
The commissioners regarded Brush's conduct as most definitely improper, his 
appointment they wrote would undermine P?blic confidence in appointments to 
senior public service positions. Edwards was found to have acted improperly in 
translating the desire of Burke into specific requests of government 
instrumentalities. Lloyd was found to have failed to discharge his duties as a 
managing director and to have engaged in quite extraordinary conduct. 
Reflecting upon the commissioners' comments, and placing the widest meaning on 
the term 'crime, clearly WA Inc may be selectively regarded as a crime of the 
employee - that is, ministers, senior public servants and ministerial advisers. In 
fairness, it should be said that some of these individuals have defended their actions 
on grounds of 'situational ethics' as did Oliver North and John Poindexter in the 
United States and as others have done in Britain. This defence has something going 
· for it - at least in some cases. 
These Royal Commission findings do not tell the whole story unfortunately as they 
rely on the evidence of a relatively few key individuals. In some ways the Royal 
Commission carried out its investigations like a drunk searching for dropped keys 
under a streetlamp. There is no reason to suppose he dropped them there, but it is the 
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only light around. Of course, some keys did lie near the streetlamp but in order to 
reveal other keys a bright torch was needed to probe the dark comers of the public 
sector. At a minimum a survey of the mountain of first hand experience of the WA
Inc years known to the senior echelons of the public service was required. Such a 
survey would have placed the more dramatic events in context and would have 
added significant authority to the commission's findings as well as providing a 
benchmark against which to measure future progress. 
Thanks to former Premier Carmen Lawrence, a survey of 351 senior executive 
service (SES) personnel was in fact undertaken by Curtin academics in late 1991. 
This revealed a huge amount of as yet unpublished information related to ethical 
practices in the service. 
The survey revealed that the typical SES executive had worked in the public sector 
for twenty one years and in that period had worked for 3.5 agencies. Sixty one per 
cent had worked in the private sector for an average of eight years. The great 
majority are highly qualified and together they represented a vast resource of 
untapped knowledge. 
Amongst other things most SES respondents believed that the ethical standards of 
the service are higher than those of either the private sector or the wider community. 
Most also believed that ethical standards had fallen in recent years and that the 
strongest influences on their own ethical behaviour was peer behaviour together 
with the ethical climate of their agency. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority 
believed that there was no agency pressure for them to compromise their personal 
ethics or, if there was, the pressure was weak. Thirty per cent had never experienced 
conflict between their personal ethics and the ethics of the agency while almost forty 
per cent experienced such conflict between two and five times over a five year 
period. The great majority asserted that if a ministerial directive was contrary to 
the Code of Conduct, they would point out to a minister that this was in fact the case. 
Of more relevance to this paper however, are the responses of those senior managers 
who believed that ethical standards had fallen and that the decline was linked to 
ministerial advisers in one way or another. 
The repetitive terms used to express this view included - political jobs for the boys, 
political appointees, appointment of Labor 'friends', politicisation of the public 
sector, parachuting of political appointees, appointment of cowboys and a 
government promoted public service culture where looking after your 'mates ' at 
public expence became acceptable behaviour. 
Many of these respondents elaborated their views saying that, noblesse oblige was 
rubbished as old fashioned, that there was a lowered ability to accept the validity of 
contrary views, and this in an economic and environmental climate which increased 
the perceived cost of not having one's views prevail. 
Another wrote that one had to be more devious to achieve anything against the tide 
of political corruption and interference. A number noted that the new breed of 
advisers did not have the tradition or culture of public service, for example, duties, 
obligations, loyalties, standards and probity, and had been selectively recruited, 
poorly inducted and trained. It was asserted that these people had short term 
agendas and were subservient to ministers wishes, not the public's well being. In a 
similar vein another respondent noted that changes at senior levels has resulted in 
the appointment of people who did not even know how to behave in a legal or moral 
sense let alone an ethical one. 
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Others pointed to the negative role of outside influences stating that some 
entrepreneurs and government leaders and politicians were corrupt and that this 
would flow down the line; another respondent blamed the move away from 
'Westminster standards and a poor understanding of public administration. A 
number noted the arrogant behaviour and attitude as well as the lack of leadership 
from politicians and business leaders. Business people without traditional public 
sector ethical values, it was claimed, had taken up senior positions in government 
and there was an 'impression' that promotion was dependent at high levels on not 
rocking the boat. 
Associated with this was the apparent belief of some people that they transcended 
the law and accepted procedures. Selfishness, greed, and bribe takers were terms 
used by some. One blamed the decline in good ethics on political interference and 
decision making by officers without relevant qualifications and training, of 
executive decisions made by managers who did not understand technical, scientific 
and professional problems and issues. 
In a related vein another wrote of the rapid expansion of the SES over the past five to 
seven years and how this had produced younger, politically motivated and less 
experienced staff. These managers, it was claimed, were more often aligned with the 
ALP than the Liberals and found it more comfortable to support ALP government 
beyond their usual ethical boundaries. 
Another wrote that the trend was to provide advice which senior officers and 
ministers wanted to hear, whereas previous ministers relied on departments for 
advice. It was also alleged that there was an unwillingness on the part of 
bureaucrats to speak their mind. This attitude produced a blurring of the previous 
distinction between the bureaucracy and the politicians. 
When asked what impact the presence of ministerial advisers had on the ethical 
standards of public servants the responses were devastatingly negative as the 
following figure depicts. 
FIGURE 1 
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Before leaving the insights provided by survey material, I should point out that an 
almost identical survey was held of mid-level managers (levels 4-8) only a matter of 
months ago. In broad terms the results of this second survey endorsed the results of 
the first. However, one additional question was asked: 'In the time since the 1993 
State election to what extent has the standard of ethics changed in your department or 
agency?' The response indicated that far from improving, or even staying the same, 
the average response on a five point scale indicated that ethical standards were 
perceived to have declined! 
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When all of this qualitative evidence is weighed alongside the judgements of the 
Royal Commission the conclusion that WA Inc was a crime of select senior 
'employees' is given major endorsement. Survey evidence also suggests that in terms 
of practice the same unethical odour continues to hang over important areas of 
govenunent activity. 
FIGURE 2 
ETHICAL STANDARDS SINCE ELECTION 
Number of Responses 
::o�t----- -----!-. _.._L...J, ----...- --
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Average Score 2.90 
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WA Inc: Failure of the System 
I regard the system that failed as a vast interlocking directorate which includes 
parliament, public bureaucracies, the media, high flying entrepreneurs, consultants, 
select academics and public servants. It must also include relationships between 
political parties, their leaders and their elected nominees in parliament, especially 
ministers; between ministers and their key advisers and between key advisers 
themselves. 
Attempts to draw linkages and connections between the various players in this 
directorate tend to look more like the wiring diagram of an ICBM missile than 
anything else. However, that this system failed is not seriously in doubt. 
For example, the system failed when party leaders and others refused to 
conditionally waive parliamentary privilege in order to assist the investigations of 
the Royal Commission. Indeed, by making certain statements unexaminable, this 
action may have crippled the commission's investigations at a stroke. 
The most successful attempt to explain this complexity has been that of Elizabeth 
Harman (Murdoch University). Nominating accountability as one of the main 
problems, Harman argues that WA Inc can only be understood in the context of the 
historical political struggle for power between the Executive and Parliament or, 
more accurately between the Executive (especially a Labor one) and the Legislative 
Council. 
Harman's second argument is that WA Inc was not a single phenomenon but several 
quite distinct phases in the relationship between govenunent and business. Thus the 
motives, key actors, actions and outcomes differ in each phase. 
Harman's six phases are not mutually exclusive and are only roughly chronological. 
Phase one is the Burke govenunent's creation of new business- govenunent 
enterprises (GBE's) between 1983-84 so as to take the Labor govenunent strongly 
into commercial activities following its election win. 
The second phase was the 'realignment' of the old GBE's which included the 
Govenunent Employees Superannuation Board and the government insurance arms 
which later became the SGIC, the Rural and Industries Bank and the State Energy 
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Commission. Harman's term 'realignment' here is, I suggest, a euphemism for 
something much more sinister. 
However, her further comment that these changes went largely unnoticed at the time 
and that the media focussed on the wrong targets, throws a powerful light on 
important developments. 
Harman's third phase, The Partisan Element, was concerned with the establishment 
of overt links between big business and the ALP, and in particular with the 
establishment of the John Curtin fund raising foundation. 
The fourth phase was the Rights and Property Deals which concerned the 
involvement of government with prominent entrepreneurs in a range of deals 
relating to older public sector sites. The fifth was the rescue from financial collapse 
of local financial institutions from 1987 onwards, including the first of three 
Rothwells rescues. 
Harman's final and most complicated and expensive phase occurred in 1988 and 
involved the government purchase of a share in Petroleum Industries Corporation 
Limited (PICL) and the second and third attempted rescues of Rothwells. Harman 
argues that the second rescue was a scam to allow corporate players to recover 
funds, not, as we now all know, to assist in Rothwells liquidity crisis. Realising the 
highly adverse publicity that would result from a third Rothwells rescue the 
government, with the connivance of private interests, dressed it up as an investment 
which was attractive to long term state industrial development. The legislation to 
allow the deal was defeated by the Legislative Council and it collapsed. Several of 
the major variables interacted here. 
Harman's six phases help clarify this complex situation however, her categorisation 
scheme would benefit from the addition of three further factors which should be 
regarded as contextual to the main plot. 
Managing the Media 
For example, it is arguable that both running through and affecting each of 
Harman's six phases is first, the media. In the modern world the media is a potent 
component of accountability in government - a concept that is a major focus of 
Harman's scheme. 
Journalist Peter Kennedy has written much on how some members of the press in 
particular were seduced by Brian Burke and how this, in effect, helped Burke 
'manage' the news. Burke was extraordinarily accessible to the media and enjoyed 
strong rapport with both journalists and media executives. As a result critical 
reporting suffered as the media reported the parliamentary circus and not political 
process. 
We now know that those elements of the media that attempted to be critical of the 
government took the risk of being served with a writ. The media that was not able to 
be managed was gagged. Had the High Court made its recent 'free speech' 
interpretation ten years ago WA Inc would never have matured. 
Ministerial Advisers 
Much the same can be said for the already discussed impact of ministerial advisers. 
Primary evidence from surveys now reveals that the major infusion of ministerial 
advisers, that occurred from day one of the Burke regime, did major political 
damage far beyond their relatively slight numbers. 
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Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VF/) 
Finally, there is the factor of federal-state financial relations and what is termed 
vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) that is the revenue incomings and outgoings of the 
two levels of government. This factor has long been of serious concern for all state 
governments as it hobbles their freedom to pursue preferred policy options. Former 
Premier Burke acknowledged this as a serious problem as early as 1983. 
By comparison with other mature federations such as Canada, Germany and the 
United States of America, VFI is severe in Australia. In 1991-92 Australia's 
Commonwealth government is estimated to have collected about 73% of the total 
own source revenue generated by all levels of government but to have spent only 
52% of total own purpose expenditures. Most of the remainder is transferred 
conditionally to the states severely constraining the development of new or 
alternative policy options by the various state governments. In WA involvement 
with the private sector was seen as a way of supplementing the state's revenue base 
in a way that denied Commonwealth intrusion. 
These three factors, the management of media criticism, the more extensive role of 
ministerial advisers on the conventional advisory mechanisms, and the desire to 
reduce the negative impact of federal-state financial relations on state policy 
initiatives would each have had some impact on all six of Harman's categories. As 
contextual factors they either shielded government from the wider implications of 
accountability, distorted rather than enhanced ministerial-adviser relationships, or 
offered a strong incentive for government to search for and utilise innovative and 
perhaps risky revenue raising initiatives. 
What We Should be Doing 
In posing the question: what should be done, I suggest that the central dilemma 
concerning unethical behaviour and political corruption is not whether it is personal 
or systemic in nature. The answer surely lies somewhere between the two and we 
should be dealing with the individual and the system together. Let me expand 
briefly on this theme. 
Deal With the Individual and the System Together 
The perspective that the individual is the source of corruption assumes that its basic 
cause is the inclination of specific individuals to abandon themselves and their 
duties to proffered temptations and violate the system's norms. This view may be 
satisfying for two reasons. 
First, it reinforces the comfortable notion that corruption is fundamentally a deviant 
position - that turning out the occasionally ill-mannered scoundrel is all that is 
needed to keep the body politic healthy, if not immune. 
Second, it endorses the view that it is the apparent aberrant individual who 
commits the corrupt act. It follows that it is the isolated individual not the system 
that should be punished and should suffer. Therefore the solution should be tailored 
to the person. The demon once exorcised does not impugn the sanctity of the system, 
much to everyone's relief. 
These personnel oriented solutions, while necessary in the operation against 
corruption, fall short of any durable correction to the on-going malady because they 
ignore systemic roots. History reveals that corrupt acts have occurred and will 
continue to occur in spite of social condemnations, severe penalties, appeals to 
disbarments, tighter regulations and auditors' general. Indeed, measures concerned 
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with individual temptations such as additional red tape, tighter codes and less 
bureaucratic discretion might actually increase the motivations and opportunities 
for corruption and could exacerbate the condition by making it even more difficult 
for government to respond. 
With increased oversight the vulnerable official would have greater control over the 
now more restricted bottleneck and therefore be able to extort a higher market price. 
As a result we would be left with a legacy of control that in the name of honesty 
makes it harder for government to work efficiently. Clearly, acts against the 
individual do not rid the system of the opportunities for ill-gotten gains, a condition 
that others will willingly exploit. The system and the individual should be dealt 
with together. It follows that the second report of the Royal Commission should be 
taken seriously. 
Don't Put the Blame on Individuals 
Every academic welcomes the opportunity to insert the name of a well known 
philosopher into a conference paper. My chosen philosopher is Friedrich Nietzsche. 
I select Nietzsche not for his philosophy but for the fact that he was held to be 
directly responsible for the both the outbreak and conduct of World War I and in 
particular its brutality. In other words he was credited with the remarkable 
achievement of shaping the principles, policies and prejudices of a whole nation. 
Attributing blame to an identifiable individual like this was a deliberate British 
strategy for justifying the war in moral terms and it had the effect of catapulting 
Nietzsche out of obscurity and making him a household name. This was fairly 
astonishing as Nietzsche had died in 1900! 
A second effect of this strategy was to reduce Nietzsche to the level of a 
melodramatic villain. This tactic provided intellectual support for a British assault 
on the moral and cultural high ground and reinforced the claim that not only was 
Germany responsible for the conflict but that it was part of Germany's nature to 
provoke and prosecute war. Ipso facto, through Nietzsche, the entire German nation 
had become the enemy and had become demonised. 
It would obviously be stupid to draw any parallels between Nietzsche and jailed 
Labor leaders' responsibility for the WA Inc debacle, but I believe that there are 
lessons to be learned from the Nietzsche experience for the post-WA Inc period. 
For example, the manner in which former senior ministers, when jailed, are cast as 
the lone villains gives the impression that they were solely responsible for the mess. 
Of course they bear much blame .. In addition, the further tactic of blaming the entire 
ALP cabinet for the WA Inc disaster places a meaning on collective cabinet 
responsibility and confidentiality which belongs in the world of Dicey and is shown 
not to exist on almost a daily basis in Australian government. 
The real intention of course is to claim the moral high ground and demonise the 
ALP. This is a legitimate political tactic, but it takes the attention away from 
additional sources of explanation about the wider causes of WA Inc. 
Don't Rely on Good Ethics Alone 
The second response to WA Inc on which I would like to comment is the tendency to 
attempt to tighten standards of ethical behaviour by implementing new codes of 
conduct and the like for public sector employees. The new Public Sector Management 
Act (1994) for example gives extensive mention of ethics and, in its description of the 
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new office of Commissioner for PS Standards, the main emphasis is on the 
promotion of good ethics. This response alone is not one from which we should 
expect a great deal. 
In the first place the codes apply to the public sector alone, that is, public 
bureaucracies, and while there are some pointed questions that could be posed about 
public sector behaviour in the eighties, the evidence we have points strongly to the 
fact that public sector ethical standards were not a major part of the problem. The 
problem in the public sector, as I have already suggested, lay more with the imposed 
advisory system and its questionable ethical standards. 
In addition to being aimed at the wrong part of the problem, research makes clear 
that codes of conduct have little effect on the behaviour of individuals. Over 70% of 
WA Senior Executive Service respondents believed there to be a low awareness of the 
existing Code of Conduct among public servants and a much larger percentage 
believed that the Code was either neutral or (highly) ineffective. Furthermore, codes 
may bring about a negative effect by producing a false sense of reassurance among 
senior management. 
Good ethics begin at the top, by that I mean within the ministry itself, and should be 
given more attention. May I illustrate what is required by quoting the words of 
Lord Hartington, 8th Duke of Devonshire and then Chief Secretary for Ireland who, 
in 1874, wrote to a colleague -
I have been looking at my Secret Service account to see what is 
available in case money is wanted for elections. I find I could spend 
about £4,000 ... would you ask (the Permanent Secretary) to find out 
what oaths I took as Chief Secretary and whether there is anything in 
them as to the disposal of Secret Service money, which would prevent 
my using it for electoral purposes ... 
While Hartington was writing at a time of widespread electoral bribery his ethical 
standards compared with those of David Parker will not have escaped you. 
Accountability 
The third response to WA Inc on which I would like to comment is that of 
accountability. I have been as outspoken as most people in calling for greater 
accountability to be exercised in the political and bureaucratic systems. However, 
accountability should not be seen as an end in itself regardless of either cost or of its 
wider political implications. · 
When the demands of accountability begin to affect adversely the behaviour of 
managers whose prime responsibility is to deliver a service to the community, then 
it can become an impediment to good government. Managers today must manage 
effectively and efficiently. They have to satisfy the customer, account to the Auditor-
General, submit to examination by a wide range of parliamentary committees and 
respond to the Ombudsman and the new Commissioner for Public Sector Standards 
to ensure that all relevant guidelines, statutes and regulations are adhered to. They 
can be roundly criticised with the knowledge of hindsight by a wide range of 
review agencies and are regularly taken to task by morning talkback, 40 second 
soundbite media. 
The incentive for public sector managers to perform well is lessening and there is 
good cause for expressing surprise that, in government, anything happens at all. In 
NSW for example, accountability processes represent 10% of the state budget ($2b). 
In our concern for probity and proper process those of us who call for improved 
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accountability should not forget the main game - to deliver a service to the 
community. You have to come down to trust that people are managing properly. 
The new Public Sector Management Act adds a further weighty layer of oversight 
to an already overburdened system. Perhaps we should consider Edward 
Gibbon's nineteenth century warning that -
Corruption is the most infallible symptom of constitutional 
liberty 
and be prepared to accept some minimum measure of it. 
Gibbon's view envisions a police state so invasively thorough in terms of 
accountability that it could eradicate any and all signs of unsanctioned activity, 
although to date even the former Soviet Union did not come close. In the words of 
one writer "a prosecutorial class with no sympathy for human frailties can be a 
much greater danger to a democracy than the simple peddling of influence". I 
suggest that most West Australians would agree that it would be preferable to 
accept a limited amount of corruption in line with democracy's other permissive 
means inherent in loosely structured, representative government than to risk the 
consequences of a society based on authoritarian controls. 
It is important to ask how many layers of oversight and legal penalties we can 
realistically have to limit corruption and still fall well short of repression and 
authoritarian rule. 
At one extreme my point is illustrated by Lord Grenville who, in 1806, shocked a 
fairly worldly British political establishment by retaining the sinecure of Auditor 
of the Exchequer while at the same time holding the office of Prime Minister, thus 
technically auditing his own accounts. This no doubt cheapens the cost of 
accountability to the point of doing away with it. On the other hand however, it is 
also possible to have too many safeguards on the spending and other actions of 
government, safeguards which may make accountability prohibitively expensive 
or which make it a threat to individual liberty. 
What we need is to re-design accountability and change it from being the 
equivalent of the chunky Vickers Vimy aircraft that recently flew from Britain to 
Australia, to being the equivalent of a sleek F18 fighter. 
Dampen Expectations of Perfection 
The American experience demonstrates that corruption continues despite the glare of 
Watergate, Irangate and all the other gates. The Japanese experience, from which the 
abbreviation Inc was first take~ holds similar lessons. 
Commenting recently on the Savings and Loans and Iran-Contra scandals in the US 
The New Yorker magazine wrote -
the idea that the system itself has problems ... has few champions 
among the people who are in a position to do something about it ... It is 
much more convenient to reduce our political crises to the evil deeds 
of a few isolated figureheads (eg Oliver North with his shredder and 
delete button) and to confine reform to the task of putting away the 
latest crop of villains - a never ending task that merely punctuates our 
scandals rather than resolves them." 
In Australia we have the same systemic conditions and incentive structures that 
incubate and inculcate corruption and improper behaviour. Medicare fraud, social 
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services fraud and excessive private sector regulators, the costly and often 
irresponsible advice of the big eight accounting and legal firms, are proof of the 
weakness of the greater government intervention argument. Can we afford, and do 
we want yet another layer of oversight? 
The criticisms of The New Yorker could be applied here in WA where the coalition 
parties have moved at a snail's pace, if at all, in implementing the Royal 
Commission's recommendations- especially those concerned with reforming the 
political system. This lethargy merely brings the parliament and political parties 
into further disrepute. The good news is that there are policies that can be executed 
to reduce the incidence of political corruption. The bad news is that the easy 
remedies (usually ascribed to individuals) are not effective and the hard ones 
(dealing with systemic issues) are difficult to implement. 
Nowhere is that lesson more evident than here in Western Australia. 
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Jim McGinty MLA 
State Labor Leader 
When Geoff Gallop and I took over the leadership of the State Opposition just three 
weeks ago we embarked on a journey of renewal and reinvigoration. 
On the day we were elected to the leadership I apologised to the people of Western 
Australia, on behalf of the Australian Labor Party, for what has become known as 
WA Inc. 
I knew the feelings of hurt and betrayal felt by most Western Australians and 
particularly by Labor voters. 
I said I appreciated the strong feeling in the community that justice must be done and 
that every citizen must be equal before the law. 
I also appreciated that, beyond the relatively narrow issue of pursuing people who 
broke the law, there were many lessons to be learned from the $30 million Royal 
Commission, particularly in the area of better government. 
It was for that reason that I gave an assurance that the Labor Party in Western 
Australia embraced, without exception or qualification, all of the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission in its new accountability package. 
Those recommendations will each significantly enhance our democratic system of 
government. 
What was WA Inc? 
WA Inc is not about everything that happened during the decade of Labor 
Government in WA from 1983 to 1993. Much of what occurred during that decade 
can properly be described as solid achievements ..... achievements of which the ALP 
can be proud, that deserve recognition. 
Some of the outstanding achievements of Labor in Government include: 
• reopening the Perth-Fremantle railway line and building one of the world's 
finest passenger electric railway systems, 
• major initiatives in public housing, with an end to the creation of ghettoes for 
low income earners, 
• above-average economic growth, 
• legislation to enhance and safeguard the egalitarian nature of our society, 
backed up with administrative action to improve the status of women in 
particular as well as other disadvantaged or marginalised groups, 
• family, cultural and community facilities, 
• recognising the enormous contribution of senior citizens and providing special 
services for them, 
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• modern and fair occupational health and safety laws which made workplaces
both safer and more productive,
• the establishment of a tripartite industrial relations system with an emphasis on
dispute resolution through consensus rather than conflict.
These are some of the tangible achievements. Other achievements, which are just as 
significant, include: 
• establishment of new levels of financial accountability for government bodies
through the Financial Administration and Audit Act,
• The Disclosure of Pecuniary Interests legislation,
• Creation of the Director of Public Prosecutions,
• The Freedom of Information Act 1992 and the Declaration of Political
Donations legislation (which the Government still refuses to proclaim),
• The Burt Commission on Accountability,
• The independent WA Electoral Commission,
• The McCusker Inquiry into Rothwells and, despite claims it came too late, the
Royal Commission into WA Inc itself.
These are all achievements of lasting benefit to Western Australians. WA Inc is not 
about this, the good side of Labor Government in the 1980s. It is about the failures of 
the State Labor Governments and business. Understanding these failures requires 
an appreciation of the broader failure of the corporate culture of that tumultuous 
decade. 
Floating the Australian dollar, reducing tariffs and relaxing lending restrictions 
allowed Australia's corporate sector to test the limits of expansion and growth. The 
atmosphere of the 1980s was dominated by the "bold riders" .... entrepreneurs who 
were later revealed to be corporate cowboys. Financial institutions reduced 
prudential requirements, approving vast loans with little or no security and few 
safeguards. Banks and other formerly conservative lending establishments financed 
opportunistic takeovers on an unprecedented scale. The corporate cowboys were 
able to amass huge corporate empires based on tiny equity and massive debt. 
This could only happen because of a general failure of the mechanisms of 
accountability in our financial sector. 
Outside directors should have restrained headstrong chief executives. Accountants 
should have questioned dubious book-keeping. Auditors should have drawn 
attention to misrepresentations in company accounts. Commercial lawyers should 
not have approved arrangements designed to circumvent statutory regulation, and 
stockbrokers should not have pushed the shares of shady corporate citizens. 
All of these checks and balances failed to function as they should have. All of the 
traditional safeguards were swept away by a tidal wave of greed. Western 
Australia was at the centre of the financial dealings of the 1980s. Many of the "bold 
riders" came from WA, and they achieved national and even international 
dominance of key industries, including brewing and television. The series of 
disastrous investment collapses which followed the stock market crash in 1987 
rocked Western Australia to its foundations. 
Billions of dollars were lost overnight as the total value of listed companies 
worldwide fell by over 25 per cent in one trading day. Many investors and 
companies were wiped out. Banking institutions also lost heavily, and several banks 
and building societies collapsed. It was within this environment that the rescue of 
Roth wells and the series of events which we have come to know as WA Inc occurred. 
I say this not by way of justification of the events of WA Inc, but merely to put them 
into context. 
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Although the scope of WA Inc style dealings was more extensive, the heart of WA Inc 
itself can be identified as the process of government involvement in the Rothwells 
rescue package of 1987, and events leading through to the Kwinana Petrochemical 
project of 1988. 
These events raised serious questions about: 
• Firstly, the relationship between the ALP and major donors, and 
• Secondly, the failure of proper processes of public administration, particularly 
in the governments' dealing with its majority statutory authorities. 
The "greed is good" decade saw a volatile mix of ruthless entrepreneurs and 
ambitious politicians.... an involvement that had serious consequences for the 
government and for the state. Substantial financial losses were recorded by 
government instrumentalities. The consequences were not just financial. 
Perhaps the most distressing legacy of the WA Inc years has been the undermining of 
the public's trust in their elected officials, and in the institutions of government. It is 
important that this confidence be restored. 
It is for that reason that the Labor Party, under my leadership, has strongly pursued 
honesty, integrity and accountability in government. A strong Opposition will 
ensure better government. This will hopefully lead to an increase in public 
confidence in both elected officials and institutions of government. Of fundamental 
importance to the operation of any democracy is an independent and critical media. 
Three weeks ago, in the landmark cases Stephens v The West Australian and 
Theophanous Vs Herald & Weekly Times, the High Court provided a timely reminder 
of the crucial role that freedom of speech plays in Australia's democratic 
development. 
Due in part to restrictive defamation laws and a lack of independent and critical 
public comment, Western Australians were largely unaware of what was occurring 
during the early part of the 1980s. I consequently welcome today's headline that the 
States and the Commonwealth have agreed to pursue uniform defamation laws in 
the wake of the High Court decision. 
In the 1980s, glib assurances from company directors, bankers and elected officials 
were generally taken at face value by journalists struggling to come to grips with a 
changing financial market and corporate ethos. As the Editor in Chief of The West 
Australian has pointed out, a case can be made that between 1983 and 1987, the 
media in general failed to grasp the early warning signs of WA Inc and to that extent 
failed as one of our accountability watchdogs. 
Recognising the importance of (reedom of speech to the proper functioning of a 
representative democracy, the High Court significantly liberalised the defamation 
laws in relation to politicians and public officers. This will allow and encourage 
investigative journalism and robust political comment. Also of fundamental 
importance to the operation of a democracy is that you have a democracy to start 
with. 
This cannot be said of Western Australia. 
When Labor wins in WA it is never in power. It simply wins a majority of seats in 
the Lower House and requires consent of the conservative parties to the passage of its 
legislative program. It is a veto which the conservatives frequently exercise when 
they are not in government. However, when the conservatives win government they 
also win power. They have a majority in both Houses and the necessary checks and 
balances are swept aside. 
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I make this point not merely to complain about its essential unfairness to Labor but 
because of the effect that the malapportionment, particularly in the Upper House, has 
on the operation of our systems of government and to put in context the Royal 
Commissioners' call for electoral reform. 
Vote weighting skews the political debate in WA away from its natural equilibrium 
in favour of conservative and rural issues. With a vote weighting of almost 2:1 in 
favour of rural areas in the Legislative Assembly and about 3:1 in the Legislative 
Council, each party must pitch its vote-winning appeal not to the general public, but 
to privileged conservative voters. 
Secondly, I have no doubt that this unfair system, which has guaranteed a 
conservative majority in the Legislative Council continuously since the first election 
in the 1890s, regardless of the popular vote, encouraged governments in the 1980s to 
bypass Parliament. 
The attraction of Executive government in these circumstances is obvious. As the 
State Parliament won't reform itself, and introduce a system for each House of 
Parliament based on the concept of each citizen having an equal say in the election of 
the government which exercises power on their behalf, the High Court has been 
requested to intervene and impose democracy on us. 
Ideally, the Parliament should be the source of democratic changes to our system of 
government. But while corrupt self-interest prevails, we must look to other 
institutions as the source of those rights. 
The Royal Commission Report: 
The Royal Commission focused attention on the mechanisms of our government in a 
way that has never happened before. It raised issues concerning our government 
institutions, the relations between them, and their accountability to the people in a 
comprehensive way. It examined these issues in the context of the very real problems 
in our system of government during the 1980s. In a sense, it was like a Constitutional 
Convention, with some of the most eminent jurists in the State turning their attention 
to the mechanisms of State Government. Clearly, it found these mechanisms to be 
wanting. 
Allow me to read a relevant passage from the Royal Commissioners' second report 
"Individually, the matters upon which we have reported reveal serious weaknesses and 
deficiencies in our system of government. Together, they disclose fundamental 
weaknesses in the present capacity of our institutions of government, including the 
Parliament, to exact that degree of openness, accountability and integrity necessary to 
ensure that the Executive fulfils its basic responsibility to serve the public interest." 
These conclusions are disturbing. But out of this process has arisen what is at once a 
unique opportunity, and a unique obligation. The recommendations contained in the 
second report of the Royal Commission represent an opportunity to transform the 
system of government in this State greatly for the better. An opportunity to make our 
state government truly open and accountable to all Western Australians. 
They represent an obligation, because unless such reforms are implemented, the 
events of WA Inc, and the style of government which characterised the WA Inc years, 
may be repeated. 
Premier Court made plain his view of what went wrong in the 1980's when he said: 
"The fact is, there is little inherently wrong with the system of government in Western 
Australia." 
He believes there was nothing wrong with the ship of state, merely that the wrong 
people were at the helm. 
94 
McGinty 
There has, to date, been little effective reform of the system of government since the 
change of government in February, 1993. Any accountability reforms were 
implemented by Labor prior to the election. One agency of change, the Commission 
on Government, was delayed for two years in its establishment despite the Royal 
Commissioners' recommendation it be established without delay. 
Many of the Royal Commission's recommendations were meant to be implemented 
immediately and this hasn't happened. The Government then ignored the 
recommendations of the Legislative Council's Standing Committee on this matter. 
Further, the Court Government neutered the Commission on Government by 
restructuring its terms of reference to examining only matters "relevant to the 
prevention of corrupt, illegal or improper conduct". Finally, the Government 
appointees were criticised, as was their method of appointment. 
To be blunt, the Opposition is concerned that the Court Government's hostility or 
indifference to the Royal Commission recommendations is reflected in their 
approach to COG and that what is a golden opportunity to implement a model 
system of democratic government will be wasted. 
However, back to the Royal Commission Report. Four observations need to be made 
by the Labor Party in response to the report. 
1. The Second Report of the Royal Commission should be viewed as an agenda for 
action and not a topic for discussion. 
Delays in establishing COG, outright rejection of some recommendations, 
indifference to others and persistent reference to the political behaviour of the 1980s 
to justify today's non-accountable actions, demonstrate a disinterest in reformist 
action. 
2. Accountability is now a mainstream political issue. Previously only a small 
number of academics and civic minded people were interested in the general 
procedures of government as distinct from particular policies and decisions of 
government. 
The Royal Commission has changed that. I predict that the political party that turns 
its back on the accountability package of the Royal Commission will do so at great 
political cost. 
3. The Royal Commission Second Report should be applauded as a blueprint for 
government of the future. 
The undermining of the Royal Commissioners and their report by members of the 
Coalition Government reveals a strong disinclination to embrace the report. 
4. The first, and so far only, commitment that I have given with the express intention 
of binding an incoming Labor Government in Western Australia to the 
implementation of the Royal Commission recommendations. 
The New Accountability Package 
We ought in no way underestimate the boldness of the vision of the Royal 
Commissioners in recommending the way WA shoul_d be governed. They went to 
the very heart of our system of responsible and representative government and 
subjected it to intense examination. Never before has our system been subject to such 
investigation and assessment. The results represent a major contribution and a 
decisive break from what had essentially been political thought and practice 
dominated by the Executive arm of government. 
Indeed the Commissioners shifted the political debate in Western Australia from 
results to processes, from Executive to Parliament and from Government to people. 
Reinventing Government: the Opposition's View 
We are left with an excellent statement as to how our democratic system should 
work if that much used concept "accountability" is to have any real meaning. I will 
examine this contribution under their headings: 
• invigorating the process of politics, 
• the establishment of Parliament as the central agent of accountability, and 
• the development of new mechanisms. 
Invigorating the Process of Politics 
Much has been made in commentaries on the Royal Commission about the emphasis 
placed on legal/ administrative reform. 
The fact is, however, that the Commissioners proposed a much more active political 
process as a means of ensuring accountability. 
"It is", as the Commissioners state, "for the people of the State to determine by whom 
they are to be represented and governed". (Part 2, 1-9) 
Consider, for example, the significance for citizenship and political activity in these 
recommendations of the Royal Commission: 
• electoral reform, 
• disclosure of political donations, 
• the need to eliminate taxpayer-funded propaganda, 
• the need for freedom of information. 
It follows that, if representative democracy is to work properly, that information 
must be available, electoral processes must be fair, and public participation 
encouraged . 
The Commissioners also observed that our system of government rests upon two 
principles - the democratic principle and the trust principle~ 
They said: "The first affirms the people's right to determine their representatives and 
hence their government. The second establishes the public interest as the touchstone of 
public power. A fundamental premise of each is the public's capacity to make informed 
choices and to reach considered judgements. " 
Parliament as the Central Agent of Accountability 
For the Royal Commissioners, their proposals relating to Parliamenl were central in 
that the Parliament "is the public's representative forum and it derives its ultimate 
legitimacy from the public on whose behalf it acts". (Part 2, 5.1.1) 
The chapter dealing with Parliament is argued with great clarity and wisdom. The 
distinction is drawn between the Legislative Assembly (the House of Government 
and Opposition) and the Legislative Council (the House of Review). 
It is then proposed that the Council be given a central role in reviewing and 
scrutinising the management and operations of the public sector. To this end it must 
gain the authority and legitimacy that can only come from electoral reform and the 
proper realisation of the principle of proportional representation. It is not enough 
that Parliament have the authority and legitimacy that comes from a fair electoral 
system. It is also important that it be structured to carry out its accountability duties 
effectively by way of: 
• parliamentary committees, 
• question time, 
• Executive scrutiny generally. 
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It is my view that the status of Parliament in our community needs to be improved, 
as does the accountability of the Parliament to our community. To that end my 
Shadow Leader of the House has developed a package of reforms for the Legislative 
Assembly which will be placed before the majority party for consideration: 
• Equal numbers of Government and non-Government members on key 
Legislative Assembly committees, 
• The establishment of the right of reply to brief Ministerial statements, 
• The restoration of Private Members' time to at least four and half hours per 
week, 
• The extension of question time to 45 minutes, 
• Televising of Parliament- in particular question time, and 
• More parliamentary sitting days and less late night sittings. 
Development of New Mechanisms of Accountability 
With respect to Executive scrutiny, the Opposition is pleased to see the 
recommendations for greater independence for, and powers of, the independent 
agencies of Parliament including the: 
• Auditor General 
• Ombudsman 
• Electoral Commission 
• Commissioner for Public Sector Standards 
• Commission for Investigating Corruption and Improper Conduct (OCIC). I 
support the establishment of CICIC. 
Local councils such as Wanneroo, Stirling, Canning and Boddington have been 
subject to a range of controversial and, in some cases, incomplete, examinations. 
Indeed. Wanneroo Inc and the Wayde Smith Affair should have been dealt with by 
an independent aac. 
It is absurd that Mr Smith's dubious financial affairs have been examined by a firm 
of accountants which has provided a secret report to the Premier. 
The independence and integrity of the five agencies I have earlier listed must be 
guaranteed. The appropriate body to provide the guarantee is the Parliament itself, 
rather than the Executive, which is, after all, the subject of their attention. 
And let it not be forgotten, that the Royal Commission saw more to accountability 
than the agencies that were exercising scrutiny and supervisory functions - it was 
also a question of how the Government related to its departments and statutory 
authorities, some of which operated in largely commercial terms. 
Their report outlines in clear terms the conflict of interest that may occur, the terms 
and conditions of Ministerial involvement, and the responsibilities and liabilities of 
the various players. Little has been heard from the Government of the day about 
these matters. 
I would advocate not only that we ought to embrace the Second Report of the Royal 
Commission but also that we ought to entrench its conclusions in our State 
Constitution and therefore in our political practices and institutions generally. 
In 1992, in two landmark decisions, the High Court of Australia held that freedom 
of speech as to political matters was an implied right in the Commonwealth 
Constitution. Those decisions have been recently built on to significantly amend the 
law of defamation at least in relation to public figures. 
Reinventing Government: the Opposition's View 
In June of next year the High Court will be called upon to determine whether a 
measure of equality of voting power is a necessary incident of the form of 
representative government provided in the Commonwealth or State Constitutions. 
The scope for extending our constitutionally-implied rights is quite significant: 
Equality before the law, universal franchise, electoral equality, freedom of 
association and other rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights readily come to mind. 
But each of these go to the rights of citizens to participate in the democratic process. 
The other dimension of representative government is the corresponding duties cast 
upon the elected representatives in their role as trustees for the people. 
The Royal Commissioners' accountability package was very much about the duties 
of elected representatives as a necessary incident of representative democracy. 
To give efficacy to representative government, both the rights of citizens and the 
duties of the elected representatives should be enshrined in the State's Constitution. 
The failure of the Parliament to legislate to protect the essential features of our 
constitutionally created representative democracy is to be regretted. 
However, the High Court has placed the Parliament effectively on notice that it will 
move to fill the void left by the inactivity of the Parliament on this important issue. 
A responsible Parliament should respond to the Royal Commission report and the 
growing activism of the High Court by asserting itself as the defender of the civil 
rights of its citizens, rather than abrogating this function to the courts. 
The Labor Party does not see WA Inc and the Royal Commission recommendations 
as a passing fad in Western Australian politics. It is an opportunity to be seized in 
order to provide an excellent democracy for future generations. This is best achieved 
by entrenching these rights of citizens and duties of representatives in the State 
Constitution. 
In this way we will ensure that the lessons of the Royal Commission are absorbed 
into the very heart of our system of government. 
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(MINISTER FOR HEAL TH, WESTERN AUSTRALIA) 
The Premier apologises that he is unable for personal reasons to be with you today to 
participate in this forum. As a person who was on the other side of WA Inc for 10 
years, the matters under discussion are ones about which he feels very strongly. He 
has asked me to stand in for him and speak on behalf of the Government. 
I hope that I will be accepted as a suitable substitute because I entered Parliament at 
about the time that we were most in despair at the capacity of the system to deal 
with what we saw as its outright abuse and remained with it as the Parliament and 
the system started to strike back and expose the lies and deception that had gone on 
for years. 
I participated in the Upper House moves to make the need for a Royal Commission 
undeniable and spoke frequently in that House about the principles of the 
Parliamentary system. 
As a lawyer, I probably knew the theoretical side of the Constitution fairly well but 
membership of the House has given me the opportunity to see how the reality of it 
operates. I am eternally grateful for the opportunity to see how the unwritten parts 
of the Constitution operate - the natural balances and restraints. 
For the first few years there were so many interesting constitutional happenings I 
almost felt as if it had been put on as an intellectual feast for me. It is this practical 
experience that I believe is essential for an understanding of the processes because 
our Constitution was invented and refined over centuries by its participants. 
My intellectual and professional interest in Constitutional law was a useful 
preparation but about as real as a computer simulation is to actually flying a fighter 
plane. I have come out of the experience with a respect for its designers. I certainly 
believe that a wholesale reinventing is not justified but we should always be 
prepared in the light of immediate experience to continue the process of accretion 
that we make. 
I will start my talk by referring to the extract from the Royal Commission report 
quoted on the registration brochure for this conference. It says in part: 
'the present institutional arrangements for the conduct "of Government cannot be relied 
upon either to ensure that Government will be conducted for the public's benefit or to 
provide reassurance to the public that it is being so conducted" 
I will respond to this statement in four ways. 
First, I point out again, as I have done in Parliament, that no administrative systems 
of Government can ever guarantee against improper conduct by public officials, in 
99 
Reinventing government: The view from Government 
which term I include ministers. If you want an honest Government, you have to elect 
one. 
My second point is this: systems of government, to remain healthy, ought to be 
subject to continuous assessment, renewal and reaffirmation. 
Thirdly, that the Constitutional guarantees are not confined to written laws but are 
most powerfully guaranteed by the unwritten rules of conduct that people see 
themselves to be bound by and there is no reason that these constitutional rules 
should be confined to the formal Parliamentary structures. I go further and say that 
they must be developed for and extend to the informal structures that are influential 
in today's Government - the parties. 
Fourthly, it is important that there be a clear view as to the role of Government if you 
are to be able to judge whether what it is doing is for the public benefit. 
It is the People not the System! 
It is ludicrous to think that you can change the moral character of a person by the 
checks and balances that you put in the system. If a person is dishonest in their 
private and business dealings then it is hard to believe that they can suddenly 
change their character when dealing in matters of government. 
Whilst not saying that it is beyond possibility it is certainly highly improbable. We 
have judges and juries that have told us that a former Premier and Deputy Premier 
were dishonest and those two people are now in jail. 
In each case the offences of which they have been convicted were associated with 
their role in politics. That being the case it is not surprising to have a Royal 
Commission finding in part 2 as follows: 
II Some Ministers elevated personal or party advantage over their constitutional 
obligation to act in the public interest. The decision to lend Government support to the 
rescue of Rothwells in October 1987 was principally that of Mr Burke as premier. Mr 
Burke's motives in supporting the rescue were not related solely to  proper governmental 
concerns. They derived in part from his well-established relationship with Mr Connell, 
the chairman and major shareholder of Rothwells, and from his desire to preserve the 
standing of the Australian Labor Party in the eyes of those sections of the business 
community from which it had secured much financial support. Subsequently, Mr 
Dowding, as Premier, presided over a disastrous series of decisions designed to support 
Rothwells when it was or should have been clear to him and to those ministers closely 
involved that Rothwells was no longer a viable financial institution. This culminated in 
the decision to involve the Government, through WAGH, in the Kwintma petrochemical 
project as a means of removing the Government's contingent liability for certain of the 
debts of Rothwells. Electoral advantage was preferred to the public interest. 11 
To a large extent the institutions of government have been used as an excuse for WA 
Inc, rather than the human frailties of the culprits who were assisted either 
knowingly or unwittingly by the Labor Party. 
The community should stop making excuses for the WA Inc players by blaming the 
system. It is rather like blaming the Criminal Code law of theft if a person steals. It
is like suggesting that we need a new law of theft If a person steals it is because of 
their moral bankruptcy not because the police were not standing by all ready to 
enforce the law immediately. 
Probably the most interesting result of the Royal Commission was that although the 
Labor Government tried to smear the former Coalition Governments, the Royal 
Commission investigated the North West Shelf Project - carried out under exactly the 
same Constitution and which was the largest single resource project ever carried out 
in the State- and it came out with a clean bill of health. In fact it was seen as a model 
as to how things should be done. 
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That the Opposition have never accepted their responsibility and the responsibility 
of individuals is made plain because they continue top attack this Project despite the 
clean bill of health and yet Mr McGinty has on his front bench a man who was found 
by the Royal Commission to have acted improperly. It is quite clear that Labor has 
learned nothing and forgotten everything. No system of law is perfect. Nor is it 
likely ever to attain perfection. 
If we did attain perfect constitutional protection . I doubt we would have a 
Government that could work. Many times in Opposition we were tempted to amend 
legislation to try to overcome problems and abuses that we saw coming from the 
Labor Government, but we usually refrained because we were of the view that you 
should generally write legislation on the assumption that the right thing will be 
done rather than the wrong. You are unlikely to hamper a dishonest Government but 
you will tie an honest one. It is like the saying "Locked doors only keep out honest 
men". 
The whole point of Government is you put trust in a number of people to do a 
particular job. To be able to carry out that job they must have a degree of 
independence and freedom of action and capacity to act. 
You rely upon their integrity to make certain that they don't abuse that trust. As I 
have said before if you want an honest Government you have to elect one. If public 
officials are determined to be corrupt they will find ways, regardless of legislative 
or administrative systems. All that such systems can do is make it harder for them 
to succeed and easier to catch. 
Parliament is undoubtedly the primary safeguard for our systems of government. 
However, the probity of individual ministers and public sector employees is also of 
major importance. 
I do not accept that the WA Inc disaster, which led to the Royal Commission, and is 
the underlying reason why we are all here at this conference today, had much to do 
with systems of government. It certainly was not caused by any particular weakness 
in our systems. Focussing attention on systems of government is dodging the issue. It 
was not weaknesses in our "institutional arrangements" which cost this state some 
$1.5-2.0 billion dollars in wasted money - it was weakness in people. 
I have heard it said that the political leaders of the 1980s did not realise what they 
were doing. They were too busy to pay attention to trivial matters such as expense 
accounts. Our systems of government, it is said, were deficient because they allowed 
the excesses of the 1980s, and the failure of probity on the part of key individuals to 
occur. Somehow, the "system" should have prevented all these personal failings and 
errors of judgement. 
Sorry, but I don't buy this argument. What happened to our Government in the 1980s 
stemmed simply from an inability or unwillingness on the part of key individuals to 
judge right from wrong. It is profoundly disturbing to realise that political leaders 
and their senior advisers, through dishonesty, incompetence or indifference led us 
down the road to ruin. We all want to look up to our leaders. In a real sense, they 
represent the state as a whole, and hence all of us. We expect them to set high 
standards of personal behaviour, probity and public accountability. 
These events have nothing to do with "institutional arrarzgements"! 
It is not comfortable to talk about such events. It is more soothing and less 
disconcerting to talk about "institutional arrangements". It wasn't our political and 
business leaders who failed us - it was our system of government". I don't agree. It is 
a cop-out. It is intellectually dishonest. 
These elements of our past are not a suitable prologue to anything. They are a sorry 
chapter, best ended but not forgotten. The lessons are simple. They have been 
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expressed in the ten commandments for quite some time. Some of those who ignored 
them are now convicted thieves, in gaol. 
Government ministers in the 1980s also lied to Parliament. How can Parliament 
safeguard a system of government if its members tell lies to it? 
If these remarks sound overly moralising, I apologise. My intention is not to preach. 
It is to correct what I see as a growing trend in our community to rationalise what 
happened in the 1980s. 
I want to draw a sharp line between the role of individuals in these events from the 
function, capacity, intent and proper role of administrative systems of government. 
By placing too much emphasis on correcting real or perceived failings in our systems 
of government and denying the role played by individuals when placed in positions 
of power, we are risking a re-run of the very events we wish most passionately to 
avoid. 
If the past is any sort of prologue to the future, it is this - we have seen the results of 
personal failures in standards. The key to future probity and accountability remains, 
as it has always, in the power of one. 
Only daily adherence to high moral principle and attention to detail by public 
officials in their professional conduct can deliver good government all the time. 
Renewal and re-affirmation of government 
I'm not convinced that we should be focussing on "reinventing government". I am 
suspicious that the real agenda is reinventing history. The term "reinventing 
government" has a ring of anarchy about it. It suggests that our present systems of 
government are hopeless; that we need to tear them down and start again. I don't 
believe this is true. 
I think our system of government in Western Australia is basically sound. After all, 
it dealt effectively with WA Inc in the end. 
Two things really struck me about the WA Inc years: the first before I entered 
Parliament, the second after. 
For a number of years the WA Inc deals were exposed in Parliament however, 
members of the Labor Party chose to ignore or not to believe these revelations. The 
media almost to the very end did little to publicise them. The reason I entered 
Parliament was, because, in common with most other people up and down the 
Terrace, you could see that the touted successes of the Labor Government were 
nonsense. Anybody with an ounce of financial sense was able to see that the figures 
didn't add up. 
Snippets of information that became available put the lie to what the Government 
were saying. As lawyers we used to sit around saying "why doesn't somebody do 
something about it". We used to read the Eastern States newspapers which 
highlighted what was happening here. We could not see the same thing on the front 
pages of our newspaper. 
We sat there aghast while The West Australian sent Brian Burke off to Ireland with a 
resounding editorial character reference and thoroughly endorsed Peter Dowding in 
the 1989 election. 
As the result of saying "Why doesn't somebody do something about it" somebody came 
to me and asked me to enter Parliament and "do something about it". 
Entering Parliament the thing that most struck me was the total lack of knowledge of 
the constitutional background of what we are doing amongst the members of 
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Government, I confess to having given a number of speeches that were essentially 
lessons on constitutional law prompted by remarks that indicated to me quite 
clearly that the Labor Members of Parliament considered their sole role was the role 
of the 'Ruler of the Queen's Navee' always to vote at their party's call. 
We used to give speeches outlining the facts of WA Inc - the facts that were later 
confirmed by the Royal Commission - that were certainly delivered squarely to the 
members of the then Government. Apparently few of them ever questioned it in the 
party room. They objected to us querying anything that they did on the basis that the 
legislation they were putting through was the Government's legislation. Our role 
was merely to go along with them and endorse it. They refused to be accountable in 
regard to how they spent their money. 
They objected when as was traditional for any Parliament we asked the Government 
to account for the last lot of money before we gave them any more. They had no idea 
why we had annual appropriations. Their sole interest was numbers. That is why I 
say that we have to continually renew and reaffirm our constitution. 
In each case it became obvious to me that each citizen and each Member of 
Parliament has a role in ensuring the enforcement of our Constitution. For this they 
need to know what it is and to understand it. 
When the system operates smoothly for a long period of time you often forget the 
reasons behind what you are doing. When you pass through a torrid period you 
understand and have the experience stencilled on your mind. Ask any person who 
went through the Depression what they think about borrowing heavily. Ask any 
person who went through the Polio epidemic why we have polio vaccine. 
Obviously there have to be better ways to renew and revitalise our Constitutional 
watchfulness than having a WA Inc but it is something we need to do. We need some 
form of "booster shot" to our immunity to Constitutional corruption. 
Our Constitution has grown up over a long period of time. It does make sense, but 
only makes sense, if you understand the historical context and don't treat what is 
being done in Parliament as being merely a ritual without meaning and purpose. We 
need to know and understand not only the written part of our constitution, but also 
the unwritten parts which are in some ways more powerful than those which are 
written down. This really takes me to my third point- unwritten rules and their 
extensions to all aspect of government including the informal ones 
It is quite clear that the unwritten rules of the constitution can be more powerful than 
the written ones. The Upper House has the power to reject Supply, but by rules 
imposed upon itself it has never done so in this State. The subtle interaction of what 
you are legally allowed to do and what the written constitution allows you to do is 
extremely powerful. 
I believe one of the other faults of WA inc. was the disregarding by the Burke 
Dowding and Lawrence Governments of these unwritten rules of the constitution. It
is for this reason that my Government believes in and has firmly reinstated the 
collective responsibility of Cabinet. 
This is probably the most important unwritten rule .. Our premier has emphasised 
that we are collectively responsible and we do noi: leave the cabinet room until 
everybody has fully discussed, understood and accepted a decision. We don't 
believe it is unreasonable to impose collective responsibility. As a partner in a legal 
firm I had collective responsibility with my partners and all my employees scattered 
across Australia and the world, - anyone of who could cause me to lose my house 
and my wealth by their negligent act. 
I do not query the fact that I was responsible for their actions but I can tell you it had 
a salutary effect on care that we took. 
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We took great interest, in how they carried on their business and it was very 
important to me that the proper principles were in place. I believe that the people can 
reasonably look to Cabinet to take a similar interest in the propriety of their 
colleague's actions rather than do a Pontius Pilate job as the Labor Cabinets certainly 
did. 
Another way in which the Cabinet process was subverted was that the responsibility 
of Ministers was taken away completely by the central Premier and Cabinet office. 
This was even used to by pass ministers. 
The Burke Government with the influence of Kevin Edwards was legendary. He 
even claimed that he was the real premier of Western Australia and the Lawrence 
Government, with Marcelle Anderson had a similar arrangement. How can you 
have a responsible Government when you bypass the processes in this way? 
Another way in which the Parliament was subverted was the Labor Party was 
dominated by a small inner clique of Cabinet. It's vote determined the vote of 
Cabinet. Cabinet then voted as one in the caucus room and dominated that. The 
caucus then voted as one in the Parliament. A small number of people was able to 
dominate the entire proceedings. 
This is in marked contrast with how it is done under a Liberal National party 
Coalition Government. It is accepted that having made our decision in the cabinet 
room we will speak and vote the same way as one. For that reason, in the Party 
room only the Minister in charge of a piece of business and the Premier are able to 
speak in the party room. Then when it comes to the vote, only the backbench can vote. 
This ensures that he Cabinet has to be able to persuade at least half of the remainder 
of the backbench to agree with them. 
It is said that the party system has subverted democracy. In fact the democratic 
systems have their effect in the party room for it is their that the members respond to 
their electorate. 
It is certainly true that the Executive can dominate Parliament, but acknowledging 
that to be the case it is all the more important that we extend the Constitutional 
processes to the informal processes. I believe that we have done this in our party, but 
the ALP not only has not but also has strict disciplinary rules that prevent any 
independence in Parliament. We allow a conscience vote on any matter where you 
believe that your electorate or conscience do not allow you follow the party line. 
Of course, theoretically you may lose your endorsement later, but experience has 
shown that the selection committees allow their immediate heat to cool and by the 
time you come up for preselection they have forgiven you. Unless you really go 
overboard they won't hold your conscience vote against you. I say that with some 
personal experience. 
People if they are to be brave they need to have structures to be brave. In the current 
world it is outside the floor of the House that you need those structures. That is not 
to say that these structures outside Parliament should only be informal. That is why 
we moved at once to enact the Public Sector Management Act This act strengthens 
the role of chief executive officers of agencies and codifies their relationship with 
ministers. 
This relationship is crucial. It must be clear that the minister is ultimately 
responsible to the Parliament and people for the conduct of his or her portfolio, but it 
is equally necessary to make clear the responsibilities of chief executives. Much more 
rests on the shoulders of both ministers and their CEOs in modern Government. The 
stakes are higher and the pace is faster. This means the collateral damage can be 
greater if standards of performance, probity and accountability are not maintained. 
The custom that the political background of a civil servant is to be ignored had in the 
past preserved the independence of the Public Service. Under Labor this changed 
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markedly. I can remember at my first opening of Parliament in 1989, I was talking to 
an old friend who happened to be a CEO. After a short time he said "I hope you don't 
mind, I can't be seen talking to you - the Government will think that I am passing you 
secrets". 
That shows you the paranoia that existed under the political persecution that 
happened under Labor. I believe that we have effectively changed that by a different 
attitude and that CEOs feel free to talk to the now Opposition - I have certainly 
encouraged this. In addition, in the Public Sector Management Act we have 
recognised that modem politics needs some political advice and we have given them 
an acknowledged place so that they are distinguished from the permanent public 
servants. I believe this formal change will support the informal processes. 
Defining the role of Government 
This brings me to my final point The Royal Commission extract I quoted at the 
beginning implies more than just probity and improper behaviour. Conducting 
government for the public's benefit also means delivering the services people want 
from the public sector, efficiently and effectively. I said the services people want. Is 
there any limitation on this? I believe that there is. WA Inc troubles came mainly 
from the Government getting involved in activities where it is hard to see why 
Government ought to have been involved at all. It is not only that they did this 
improperly - it was fraught with the possibility of going wrong from the beginning. 
This is especially so where it put the Government in an arena where it has an 
obligation to regulate. I believe we have to ask: "What is the core business of 
government"? What things should the Government be doing and what areas should 
it stay out of? 
Government has the responsibility to deliver services of a public character, which 
would either not be delivered at all by the free market or which the market would 
supply inadequately to meet social standards expected by the community. While the 
Government has the responsibility to deliver such services, this does not mean it has 
to do the job itself with its own staff. It has to ensure that people have access to the 
services they need. It can purchase services on behalf of recipients from a variety of 
providers. 
Again, the Government moved quickly to address these fundamental issues. We set 
up the Independent Commission to Review Public Sector Finances, the so-called 
McCarrey Commission. It identified a host of long-overdue reforms in most public 
sector agencies. We followed up on this immediately by establishing a special sub-
committee of cabinet to work with ministers and their chief executives to sheet home 
the reforms, try to do even better than McCarrey recommended and capture the 
financial and efficiency benefits from the reforms. I think this process, and its 
outcomes, ought to be a major part of what the Royal Commissioners meant when 
they talked about "conducting government for the public's benefit". 
It has been said that state Governments were forced to dabble in entrepreneurial 
activities during the 1980s because the Commonwealth Government was squeezing 
their finances and their tax bases were diminishing. Both were, and are, true but this 
did not mean that we had to invest in a PICL project. A better approach would have 
been to confront the real problem - that is the unacceptable fiscal imbalance which 
besets all state Governments in Australia and the Government in Canberra which 
perpetuates it. That is where the problem and solution lie, not in blundering around 
in projects of dubious worth, which should have been left to the private sector, if 
anyone. 
It has also been said that, in a certain sense, we are all responsible for WA Inc. It was 
said to be part of the excesses of the 1980s, which we all either shared in or 
condoned. 
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I reject this argument. Most businesses, big and small, and most ordinary 
hardworking Western Australians, simply stuck to their guns and got on with the 
job. They were not diverted by get-rich-quick schemes and insider deals with 
Governments. 
The WA Inc excesses grew from greed and a thirst for power by politicians who saw 
nothing wrong with deploying the whole machinery of Government for their own 
ends. They used the Government to intervene in markets instead of confining it to its 
proper roles of facilitator and regulator. In doing so, they undermined the one great 
force which has powered the economic and social progress we have seen in the free 
world. I speak, of course, of competition. 
By favouring mates and trying to pick winners they distorted the beneficial role that 
markets play in our state development. Certainly we all have a role to play in 
keeping the institutional arrangements working - but you cannot hold people 
responsible for the wrongs any more than you can hold policemen, rather than 
thieves responsible for theft. As I said earlier, "institutional arrangements" will not 
protect the people against such behaviour. 
We have been criticised by the opposition and the media for watering down the 
terms of reference for the commission on Government and for delaying its creation. 
As to the first point, we do not resile from placing the emphasis right where it 
belongs - on preventing corrupt, illegal and improper conduct. The Royal 
Commission was about detecting it, the Commission on Government is about 
preventing it. 
In saying this I accept that the Commission on Government has, and ought to have, a 
much wider brief than preventing corruption. I do not accept that the Commission's 
ambit is restricted. The commission has complete freedom and scope to address its 
terms of reference in full and the issues which were the underlying reason for its 
creation. 
On the second point - the matter of delay - I will say this. The Government was 
elected on a set of promises. We told the electorate what our priorities were and 
what we would do in office. Well, we are in office and we are doing what we said 
we would. More importantly, we have in place the principal informal arrangements 
that are necessary to overcome the excesses of the 80s and we are honest. 
The Premier made it clear in his second reading speech for the Commission bill that 
the Government would not wait for the Commission's report before taking action. 
We have, and will make administrative changes, introduce efficiency measures, 
withdraw from activities which are not the business of govefRinent and enact 
legislation for essential reforms. 
Let us put things in perspective. During the latter half of Labor's term in office the 
business of government was stalled. There was a hung Parliament and it was 
frequently prorogued early. We came into office facing a considerable backlog of 
reforms and suggestions for legislative improvements. Frustrated departments and 
agencies had been sitting on some of these for years. This backlog was the result of a 
Government unwilling, and later unable, to act. We are dealing with the backlog 
with due diligence and vigour. 
We cannot and should not stand still. The state has to move on. The reforms which 
the Commission will recommend should be seen as a part, indeed an important part, 
of a continuing process of change, reform and improvement. The Commission is part 
of a process of evolution. 
With the end of the cold war, we are moving rapidly into an era of a one-world 
economy, perhaps distorted to some extent by trading blocs. To survive and 
prosper, Western Australia must become competitive in our key international 
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markets. This means both our private and public sectors must achieve efficiency 
standards comparable with the best international bench marks. 
If the mistakes of the past spur us to achieve this objective for the public sector we 
may yet gain something lasting and positive out of the ashes of WA inc. 
I 
COMMISION EXCLUSIVE: THE MEDIA, POPULAR CULTURE AND 
THE ROYAL COMMISION 
ALAN CARPENTER 
(Edited Transcript) 
I did spend a great deal of time at the Royal Commission, far too much time for my 
liking. I didn't particularly like it, it was very interesting, but it wasn't particularly 
enjoyable. Professionally, it was an experience that I will never forget. I had a 
unique perspective of it in many ways, as I wasn't inclined to rush back to work and 
type up stories. I was there as a critic and I could take my time and take things in. I 
was in a position to analyse things, not only said about the politicians, but also the 
businessmen in the witness box. 
It irritates me more than a little bit to be in a position two years after the Royal 
Commission reports have come down - without wanting to take a political side­
where we don't even have disclosure legislation. To me it is mind boggling that I 
could have gone right through the Royal Commission hearing all about political 
donations and the influence that they apparently applied to political thinking and 
yet we are still in a position where we have people arguing that political disclosure 
is not necessary. Four or five years ago, I would have argued the same thing. I was 
forced to change my mind and I find it hard to believe that other people haven't. 
I also listened with great interest to what Peter Foss had to say about electing honest 
politicians. The problem is we need a system which allows us to detect who is 
honest and who isn't, and if you have a system which does not allow this then you 
have the kinds of problems exemplified by the findings of the Royal Commission 
and the hearings of the Royal Commission. You cannot simply rely, as we have 
learnt, on the word of a politician that he is acting not only honestly, but also in the 
best interests of the state - he even might think that he is. But we need a system, to 
which what ever extent possible, guarantees that the actions and the words of the 
politicians who represent us are honest. 
Anyway, for those of you who have been here for a long time today, all day, you 
would start to get an idea of what it was like to sit at the Royal Commission. Only 
this is much more interesting - sorry Michael. Even Michael would admit that it got 
a bit tedious and when I was reluctantly casting my mind back to those unfortunate 
days that I spent there on the 13th floor listening to the evidence of the Royal 
Commission, I flipped through a magazine - the Weekend Australian magazine. 
Coincidently, a couple of weeks ago, there was an article about people who make 
their living from public speaking. According to the article, U.S. research showed 
that at any one time in a given speech only 12% of the audience is listening- I don't 
know which 12% is listening now- 20% of the audience is thinking about sex­
although I went through Peter Foss' entire speech without thinking about sex once 
until I got to the end and then I thought to myself I haven't been thinking about sex 
for more than half an hour - something's wrong, 20% were reminiscing about days 
of old - I do a bit of that when people are speaking, other people were thinking about 
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children at home and problems they have got and so on. But only 12% at any one 
time are listening. 
Given your experience here today, can you imagine how many people were really 
taking it in at the Royal Commission after about six months? It was a very long and 
very difficult process to go through and being asked to make a political remark 
about the way it was reported is a very dangerous thing for a journalist to have to 
do. Because I know from first hand experience, journalists (and lm not too sure 
about the other professions) hate criticism with a passion and hate being criticised. 
They love other people being criticised and love criticising other people and they 
especially love it when other journalists are criticised. 1hat's why people will sit 
and watch Stuart Littlemore, that pious git, vehemently criticising every other 
journalist in Australia. But as soon as he turns the light onto them as he did to me, 
his face changes. Journalists don't like criticism and they are not particularly prone 
to self criticism either, or self analysis in general, however there are exceptions. 
But in all truth, and I mean the way in which the Royal Commission was conducted 
and reported, there were a lot of areas where journalistically coverage fell short of 
the desired mark. I was guilty of it as much as anyone else. The ABC was guilty of 
it, although we tried not to be. Generally, I think the ABC and The West Australian -
(now that they have left I can tell the truth about them) were fairly rigorous, fairly 
honest in their assessment of what was going on, and fairly comprehensive in their 
research. I can't say the same for everyone else, which is unfortunate. 
But to understand why this situation arose, its necessary to understand the time in 
which the Royal Commission was held, just as it would have been perhaps more 
desirable if there had been more of an effort by the Royal Commission to understand 
the context in which some of the events they were investigating had taken place. I 
am not offering any excuses, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. 
When I look back now on the journalistic coverage of the Royal Commission, I can 
see that there were major faults which I saw at the time, but which I understand 
better now. For a start there was an underlying anger in the community, which is 
still there, a residual anger about the events of the 1980's. There was a 
bewilderment and there was a confusion about what had been happening. 
Journalists felt that to some extent as well. Many journalists felt as has been 
expressed today, and has in the past by various outlets, that they had been less than 
rigorous in their scrutiny of government in the 1980's. They were also aware that 
there was a perception in the population that journalists had failed in the 1980' s and 
to whatever extent this was true, journalists felt a sort of a pressure on them. When 
they got to the Royal Commission, they were determined to get it right. So there 
were these two background levels of activity, background crackle to the Royal 
Commission. One was the community anger aJ,out what had happened and some 
anger towards journalists about the way they had let the community down, and also 
there was the journalistic perception that they had somehow been deficient and were 
determined to make up for it. 
Now the Royal Commission itself when it started was completely different to what 
everybody had been expecting. People had been expecting a boring tedious 
exploration of detail going on ad infinitum without much news value. But instead, 
what we got from day one on the address on the Fremantle Gas and Coke deal was 
an explosion with Brian Martin - I don't know how many of you recall him or know 
him, but he is a very compelling figure with a great sense of court room drama, 
which I am sure he has honed in his career as prosecutor in South Australia. It was 
said of him at the time that the softest thing about Martin was his teeth, and he 
wasn't a very soft fellow, he was very thorough and he was very effective. So all of a 
sudden we had this compelling figure telling us that a puppet theatre in Fremantle 
had been the recipient of a $125,000 donation, contemporaneously with the sealing 
of the Fremantle Gas and Coke deal between Goldberg, Connell and Parker. People 
were amazed that such a thing had happened. Almost immediately after that we 
heard about $200,000 being handed over, $300,000 being handed over, large 
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amounts of cash being trolleyed up the terrace in suitcases- it was a mind blowing 
way to start the Royal Commission for journalists. 
All of a sudden, media outlets threw all there resources at it, including the ABC. The 
Royal Commission, as far as stories go, was the only thing going and people who 
were in government at the time would know that government became a total 
irrelevance as far as trying to get some space in the media - no one was much 
interested in anything else. People were talking about it all over Perth, it was pretty 
rare for an event like that, especially a political event to capture the imagination, but 
it did. The unfolding story of the Royal Commission developed a bit like a soap 
opera, and this is where to some extent the ABC shares some blame- because we 
started re-enacting events. What else could we do? There was obviously an almost 
frenzied level of interest in what was going on. The Royal Commissioners in their 
wisdom had determined that actual footage of people under cross examination 
could not be used as it could be used unfairly. I think I understand the logic of this, 
but in this case the logic was flawed. If the idea was to give witnesses a better 
chance of getting fair treatment at the end, it was a fate accompli to my way of 
thinking. 
We ended up with I think mainly amateur actors acting out parts which were given 
to them after someone had sprinted down St George's Terrace and thrust a piece of 
paper in their hand and there was a "Yes, Mr Burke". There was no lasting harm 
done, but then again it probably wasn't fair on some of the participants. Dallas 
Dempster's lawyer collared me in the lobby of the Royal Commission once and 
complained that we had been playi,ng Dallas Dempster wearing ghastly ties, which 
Dallas Dempster wouldn't be seen dead in. It might be creating an unfair 
impression of him in public. 
Now if you remember I used to do these comments on these re-enactments like some 
football critic with Liam Bartlett. He and I would be sitting there and we would 
play the re-enactment and then make some comment about what had been said, this 
was our attempt at analysis. We did our best. Anyway, one particular day, 
Multiplex boss John Roberts turned up at the Royal Commission for the first time, so 
we decided to re-enact Mr Robert's evidence. We went through Actors Equity. They 
provided us with a 'Roberts'. Bartlett and I were in the make-up room getting made 
up, watching the monitor as the re-enactment was being done (because we taped it). 
He looks alright, I thought and Bartlett, Yeh he looks good, until he began to speak. 
"Well I did, ye know what I did was, I thought to meself, what, rn give em money 
what". 
We had to tape it, our comment piece, six times before Liam could stop laughing. 
swear to God it happened. 
Then there was the Royal Commission itself, which some of you would be more 
familiar with. The Royal Commission hearings were on the 13th floor of the 
National Mutual building. The hearing rooms, there were three of them, were quite 
small and a bit like the Barbican Theatre complex in London, there was always 
more than one entertainment for people to look at, and it was entertaining. I have 
never seen an event comparable to the Royal Commission where people have come to 
follow politics like they did, everybody it seemed wanted to have a look at what 
was going on. I attribute this, and I think that this is a good thing, to the power of 
television, especially commercial television which I am a product of and which I am 
critical of as well. 
In this case, commercial television brought to people's lounge rooms, every night, a 
whole list of politicians, businessmen and generally undesirable types that people 
had felt uncomfortable with. Suddenly, somehow these people were being brought 
to book in a public way. I think people felt good about that and a lot of people 
wanted to go and watch and a lot of people did go and watch. If you had sold 
tickets, you would have made a fortune. The Royal Commission might have paid for 
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itself by selling tickets for the public to watch. If you are prepared to pay, you can go, 
a way if you like, of paying for our freedom of information. 
There were many more people than could ever fit into the hearing rooms. You would 
get up to the 13th floor lift and get out, but you could hardly walk because there was 
so many people. They could not fit into the hearing rooms, they were all standing 
out in the lobby, hoping to catch a glimpse of Brian Burke under pressure, or 
someone like that. So the Royal Commission set up a television monitor with public 
seating on the 13th floor, that was not enough, so they set up another monitor 
downstairs on the 12th floor for more public, and still there was an overflow on the 
12th floor. The Commission gendarmes ferreted people around from one level to 
another. As vacancies became available upstairs - they would shuffle a group up. 
You would have pension groups there, people with name tags, boy scouts in uniform, 
John Samuel. There was a lady who used to sit there knitting, and my French history 
isn't too good, but I think it was Madame Lafarge. 
I took note of the woman knitting and to me it actually represented something 
important, because the people who used to go to watch the executions at the Royal 
Commission went for a reason I think, and they went there because they wanted to 
see their grievance or their unhappiness being addressed by public execution. It is 
not the same sort of mentality that applied to most people who went along to the 
Royal Commission, I do not want to belittle them because I knew a lot of them. But 
people wanted to see for their own eyes that politicians and businessmen were being 
forced to answer questions. As I said people went to politics and much of the credit 
for that, if credit is due, I think goes to some extent to The West Australian 
newspaper. But it is largely from television that people get their immediate 
perception of what is going on. They see it and think, Christ, what has happened, 
and are prepared to go and have a look. I think that is a good thing. 
Journalists were provided with a workroom at the Royal Commission which was 
on the 12th floor, one floor below where all the action was. To facilitate the 
working arrangements for the journalists, the Royal Commissioners' very kindly 
provided a television monitor in that room so that, in theory, whilst journalists were 
there busy on the phone and typing their stories they would not miss anything. The 
reality was most journalists ended up sitting in the room all day watching what 
was happening on the monitor some of the time. The monitor would be droning 
away in the background, journalists would be in there talking and chatting, making 
coffee, asking if John Samuel was still outside, so in case he was, they would stay in. 
In the end I think it had a rather unfortunate consequence. Those of you who are 
familiar with the radio Triple J would know about Roy and HG and how they call 
the football. They do not go to the football, it is much more fun to sit and watch it on 
television and that is what they do, sit and watch it on the television and keep a 
running commentary going. That is exactly what happened at the Royal 
Commission, there was a running commentary. 
What this led to I believe, was what I unfortunately would term 'manufactured 
consent', and I think it is the term that Noam Chomsky uses when he denigrates the 
way media works in the United States, but he talks about vertical consent, from the 
top down. Here you had the bottom strata of media life coming to consent about 
what they were seeing on the Commission video. It does not mean that everybody at 
the Royal Commission, or the journalists at the Royal Commission were doing 
nothing, there were the genuine hard working ones and I am not including myself in 
any of this because I was there just as an observer. I didn't work in the work room, I 
did most of the work upstairs and then went back to work and just spieled off the 
top of my head. But working in the 12th floor workroom you had journalists from 
ABC Radio with their computer screens in front of them busy listening with 
headphones to what was happening and typing up their stories, journalists from The 
West Australian newspaper were there with computer screens, typing up their stories 
and a lot of other journalists looking over their shoulders seeing what was being 
written. 
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A situation which should have allowed for up to twenty independent viewpoints or 
analyses of what was happening in the end registered one. There was hardly any 
dissent from what the group thought of the events of the day. At the time I was very 
angry about that and I thought that it was a terrible breach of journalistic 
responsibility. I am not angry about it any more and in a way I understand why it 
happens, its normal. You people would be doing it, if you were watching me 
downstairs on a monitor, you would not be sitting here like this, you would be 
talking and every now and again you would be making remarks about what I had 
said, you would come to some sort of understanding with each other about what 
you thought, that is what happened. Some journalists are worse than others, 
anybody who is any journalist would tell you about a colleague who regularly went 
shopping for much of the day and would ask when she came back 'Wht's 
happened?' People would tell her, she would do her story and that was it. 
One journalist got what he thought was a scoop because he shared a lift with Brian 
Burke and Burke had passed on some trivial but interesting bit of information which 
nobody else had, so he went back to his computer which had a printer on it and 
typed it up. He typed it up and sat there thinking about what he had written, half an 
hour later he decided it was time to record his voice, went over to the voice studio 
and there was someone in there with exactly the same piece of information. Doug 
had to wait outside until this fellow came out and asked- "Haw did you get that? I 
was the only one in the lift with him." He said "Mate, I read it on your script as it 
popped off the printer." This particular guy covered the Royal Commission by 
learning how to read upside down. 
I will just speak briefly about hearsay evidence, which I think was a very 
unfortunate, but I understand a necessary part of the Royal Commission. Hearsay 
evidence was particularly damaging to David Parker I thought, with hindsight now 
nobody would care probably. But there was one particular case quite early on in the 
proceedings where a fellow from Rothwell' s called David Hurly was being cross-
examined by Brian Martin and Hurly passed on information that he had heard 
somewhere that Parker had received a $50,000 bribe. There was never any 
substantiation to it and it was going to be some time before Parker himself appeared 
to defend himself. I don't know if you remember it or not but the story of the night 
and the story in the paper the next day was "Parker in $50,000 bribe claim", I mean 
what chance did he have after that? The next day brought evidence that he had 
walked into the Real Estate Agents in Fremantle and paid a $13,000 cash deposit on 
his house- you put two and two together and come up with Parker's in trouble. This 
is one of the unfortunate aspects of the Royal Commission, however I understand 
that it must happen, but nonetheless it can be very damaging. Who is to blame 
ultimately? 
Most journalists certainly made no attempt to put any of that sort of evidence into 
context. Now at the beginning of the Royal Commission, there were people who were 
prepared to be critical. I sought them out because I thought the whole situation 
needed some balancing. Richard Utting was one, he was always good for a bit of 
criticism. But I think that there was a requirement at that stage to balance up 
proceedings because the Royal Commission was charging through people like a mad 
bull and journalists were being swept along with it. There was a sense of having 
failed, there was a sense of what the community expected and there were all these 
people at the Commission themselves and that creates an impact too. If you all 
believe fervently in one point of view, I would find it very difficult to stand up here 
and argue against it. These sort of things do not happen conscientiously, but 
subconsciously, you get swept along in certain directions and that is what happened 
at the Royal Commission in the beginning. 
So I found a couple of people, I got someone from the Law Society, but I can't 
remember the name because they change their faces every year. Someone I can 
remember is Utting who made criticisms, and tried to put things into perspective, 
which nobody in the journalism trade in WA was doing. Unfortunately even our 
effort was token. There was a critical lack of journalistic analysis in Western 
Australia, not only at the time of the Royal Commission but all the time, it was one of 
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the fundamental weaknesses of journalism in this State and we all suffer from it. If 
you read the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age regularly and then you look at 
The West Australian, you see that it provides good simple coverage of events but it 
doesn't go into a great deal of depth and I think that the media coverage of the Royal 
Commission exemplified this weakness. There was nobody putting anything into 
perspective. It may well have been and probably was the fact that the community 
didn't want it anyway. What the community wanted was what the journalists 
wanted, good stories and to see people up there answering questions, and if they 
weren't going to answer questions they were in trouble. I think that is what the 
community wanted, sometimes you have to provide things that people don't 
necessarily want. 
Sir Ronald Wilson was at a lunch one day and I managed to stand up and ask him a 
question about whether or not the Royal Commission was being fair. Wilson is a 
very wise person and as you get older I suppose you accumulate experience and he 
has probably seen a couple of Royal Commissions come and go (or similar 
proceedings). He said that the thing you have to bear in mind as the overwhelming 
imperative is the community's right to know what happened. I was still not 
necessarily totally supportive, but now I see that he was completely right. The 
community has got a right to know, that is what the second Royal Commission 
Report is all about. 
The Royal Commission - Part I and the events of the Royal Commission taught us a 
valuable lesson that the community must know. The politicians who suffered most 
at the hands of the Royal Commission- and there was some who suffered a great 
deal and have suffered greatly since- probably have only got themselves to blame. 
Some people were unfairly dealt with on the way through, but they should not blame 
the Royal Commission and they should not blame the media, they should blame the 
people who got them into the pickle in the first place. 
The other thing that needs to be borne in mind now, is that the manufacture of 
consent which I did think happened and I was very critical of at the time, I now see 
as probably having been not only an inevitable outcome, but a good one. The Royal 
Commission and the reportage of the Royal Commission provided people with the 
knowledge that they were crying out for. There may be a time when more analysis 
will be done and slightly different viewpoints come to fore about the events that the 
Royal Commission investigated, but I think that the Royal Commission succeeded in 
its primary aim, and so did the media even though it failed at various points along 
the way, the outcome was I think good. People were satisfied and a very valuable 
function had been performed. I don't believe any grave injustice had been done, there 
had been some minor injustices to people and some of them still feel hurt about it. 
They will get over it, or perhaps they won't. 
Beyond the more immediate gratification that the Royal Commission proceedings 
and the reportage of it provided to the community of Western Australia, something 
far more important emerged I think, something which should be of enduring value to 
the community. This was the second report of the Royal Commission, which could 
not have been borne without the first Report and which would not exist without the 
activities that the Commission investigated. It was like a breath of fresh air when I 
picked up the second report after dealing for so long with everything that had been 
wrong, to finally see okay there is a way maybe through it that we can put in place to 
prevent it or alleviate the likelihood of it happening again. 
1hat's the value of the second Royal Commission report, everyone else has spoken 
about this so you don't want to hear it from me. In terms of the media, I believe great 
credit should be given to The West Australian newspaper for pursuing this point, the 
importance of the Royal Commission's second report. The West Australian, for all 
its faults, has been relentless in trying to point out to the people of this State the 
opportunity provided by the second report and why the current government must 
pursue it. I believe that the newspaper should be supported and I congratulate it. It 
should be supported by the rest of the media in this State and by the community, 
particularly the community which took such an interest in the Royal Commission. 
113 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
REPORT OF THE 
ROYAL COMMISSION INTO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
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Commission terms of reference 
(EXTRACT) 
On 19 November 1990, the Premier, Hon Carmen Lawrence MLA, 
announced the intention of her Government to appoint a Royal 
Commission to inquire into certain matters. On 8 January 1991 His 
Excellency the Governor approved the issue of the following Commission: 
To: 
The Honourable Mr Justice Geoffrey Alexander Kennedy; 
The Honourable Sir Ronald Darling Wilson Ac Kbe Cmg Qc; And 
The Honourable Peter Frederick Brinsden Qc: 
By this Commission issued with the advice and consent of the Executive 
Council, I, the Governor -
(1) Appoint you to be a Royal Commission to inquire and report as follows:
1. To inquire whether there has been-
(a) corruption;
(b) illegal conduct; or
(c) improper conduct,
by any person or corporation in the affairs, investment decisions and 
business dealings of the Government of Western Australia or its agencies, 
instrumentalities and corporations in respect of the matters referred to in 
Schedule 1, and to report whether-
(d) any matter should be referred to an appropriate authority with a view
to the institution of criminal proceedings; or
(e) changes in the law of the State, or in administrative or decision making
procedures, are necessary or desirable in the public interest.
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Schedule 1 
1.1 The matters referred to under the headings 'WA State Government 
Funding of Rothwells following October 1987 Stock Market crash', 'Share 
Trading by the SGIC and the GESB in Rothwells and Paragon shares' and 
'SGIC trading in Bell Group shares' in the annexures to Chapter 11 of Part I 
of the 'Report of Inspector on a Special Investigation into Rothwells Ltd' by 
M J Mccusker QC. 
1.2 The purchase by the State Government Insurance Commission of shares 
in the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited from interests associated 
with the late Robert Holmes a Court. 
1.3 The Kwinana petrochemical project. 
1.4 Central City property transactions entered into from 1984 onwards by 
the Western Australian Development Corporation, the Government 
Employees Superannuation Board (formerly the Superannuation Board) and 
the State Government Insurance Commission (formerly the State 
Government Insurance Office). 
1.5 Government Employees Superannuation Board (formerly the 
Superannuation Board) involvement in the Fremantle Anchorage and Halls 
Head developments. 
1.6 The acquisition of Northern Mining Corporation NL in 1983. 
1.7 The purchase of the Fremantle Gas and Coke Company by the State 
Energy Commission of Western Australia in 1986. 
1.8 The sale of the Midland Abattoir site in 1986. 
1.9 Financial assistance by Government to Bunbury Foods Limited. 
1.10 The natural gas sales agreements entered into by the State Energy 
Commission of Western Australia for the purchase of natural gas from the 
North West Shelf Joint Venturers and the contracts relating to the Dampier 
to Perth natural gas pipeline project. 
1.11 The Burswood Island Casino. 
1.12 The Teachers Credit Society and the Swan Building Society. 
2. To inquire whether there has been-
(a) corruption; 
(b) illegal conduct; or 
(c) improper conduct, 
by any person or corporation in respect of the matters referred to in 
Schedule 2 which in your view warrant further investigation after present 
police inquiries are completed, and 
To report whether-
(d) any matter should be referred to an appropriate authority with a view 
to the institution of criminal proceedings; or 
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(e) changes in the law of the State, or in administrative or decision making
procedures, are necessary or desirable in the public interest.
Schedule 2 
2.1 Allegations of bribery with respect to planning decisions of the City of 
Stirling for Observation City. 
2.2 Other allegations arising from the trial of Robert Mark Smith and 
Robert Paul Martin held in The District Court of Western Australia 
before His Honour Judge Keall and a jury in October 1990, including 
those with respect to surveillance activities. 
2.3 The adequacy of the police investigation of the matters referred to in 
items 2.1 and 2.2 of this Schedule; 
(2) Declare that without limiting the powers otherwise available to you -
(a) in conducting the inquiry you are to seek to avoid prejudice to pending
or prospective criminal or civil proceedings and to the interests of the State
in pending or prospective civil proceedings in such manner as you think fit
and, in particular, by taking evidence or otherwise proceeding in private,
precluding the publication of evidence, or deferring the taking of evidence,
where you consider any such course to be appropriate;
(b) you may, during the course of the inquiry, refer any matter to the
Solicitor General or another appropriate authority with a view to the
institution of criminal proceedings, where you consider that delaying such
action to the completion of your report would be undesirable;
(3) Declare that you are to report within 12 months of the issue of this
commission and that you may publish interim reports;
(4) Declare that, by virtue of this commission, you may in the execution of
this commission do all the acts, matters and things and exercise all the
powers that a Royal Commission may lawfully do and exercise, whether
under the Royal Commissions Act 1968 or otherwise;
(5) Declare, without derogating from the powers which you otherwise have,
that you may, whether simultaneously or at different times, act separately
to take evidence or otherwise conduct the inquiry
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A list of the recommendations made by the Commission in this part of its 
report, appears below. The recommendations should be read in the context 
of the sections of the report in which they appear. 
Chapter 2 Open Government 
Recommendation 1 
Freedom of Information legislation be enacted in this State as a matter of 
priority. (Paragraph 2. 2. 3) 
Recommendation 2 
The Freedom of Information Bill be amended, so that: 
(a) persons may require the correction of their personal records held by
agencies;
(b) when an agency is not itself in possession of a document but either
knows another agency holds the document or has reasonable grounds to
believe it holds the document, the agency is obliged to transfer the request
and to inform the applicant;
(c) where an agency is in possession of the only copy of a document which
is not a document of the agency, it is obliged to transfer the FOI request in
accordance with clause 15(2) of the Bill, together with a copy of the
document and to inform the applicant; and
( d) the Information Commissioner is obliged to publish reasons for decision
in an appropriate form so that the public is adequately informed of the
basis of all decisions made under the legislation by the Information
Commissioner. (Paragraph 2.2.5)
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Recommendation 3 
An Administrative Decisions (Reasons) Act be enacted as a matter of 
urgency in accordance with the 1986 Report of the Law Reform Commission 
of Western Australia in Project No 26 Part II. (Paragraph 2.2.10) 
Recommendation 4 
The Commission on Government review the secrecy laws of this State, both 
statutory and common law, as they apply to information possessed by 
government, its officials and agencies. (Paragraph 2.3.9) 
Recommendation 5 
Section 58C of the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985 be 
amended so that 
(a) the minister is obliged to notify both the Parliament and the Auditor
General in writing of any action that has been taken or obligation incurred
to which section 58C is relevant, and the reasons why it is reasonable and
appropriate that the provision of information to Parliament is to be
prevented or inhibited to the extent that this is the case; and
(b) notwithstanding any secrecy undertaking or claim, the Auditor General
is entitled, as of right, to access to that information to the extent that, in the
opinion of the Auditor General, it is or could be relevant to the discharge of
his or her audit responsibilities. (Paragraph 2. 5. 20)
Recommendation 6 
(a) The recommendations of the Auditor General contained in the 1991
Report on the Management of Guarantees, Indemnities and Sureties be
given urgent attention by the Government.
(b) Steps be taken to ensure that Treasury is informed by all agencies of
government of the giving of any guarantees and indemnities pursuant to
legislative powers as soon as possible after they have been given.
(c) The Treasurer should be responsible for the giving of all guarantees,
indemnities and "sureties" responsibility for which, by law, is not vested in
another public official.
(d) Guarantees, indemnities and "sureties" in respect of matters of
significance should require Cabinet approval.
(e) The Treasurer or other minister or public official responsible for the
giving of any guarantee or indemnity, and the Treasurer in the case of a
"surety", should notify Parliament and the Auditor General of its nature,
full extent and purpose as soon as practicable following its being given.
(Paragraph 2. 6. 8)
Recommendation 7 
The Commission on Government inquire into the organisation, role and 
functions of press secretaries and of the Government Media Office. 
(Paragraph 2. 7. 6) 
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Chapter 3 Accountability 
Recommendation 8 
The recommendations contained in the Reports of the Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia in Project No 26, Part I and Part II, be 
implemented forthwith, subject to the observations in paragraph 3.5.2 of 
chapter 3 concerning the establishment of an Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal. (Paragraph 3. 4. 8) 
Recommendation 9 
All public sector bodies, programmes and activities involving any use of 
public resources, be the subject of audit by the Auditor General. 
(Paragraph 3.10. 7) 
Recommendation 1 O 
(a) The office of the Auditor General be constituted by a separate Audit Act.
(b) The Auditor General be appointed for a period of up to 10 years, rather
than to the age of 65 as the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985
currently provides.
(c) The Auditor General report directly to Parliament.
(d) A Joint Parliamentary Committee be responsible for the overseeing of 
the Auditor General.
(e) The Parliament exercise a direct role in the selection of the person to be
the Auditor General.
(f) The Parliament, with the advice of the Joint Parliamentary Committee,
be responsible for recommending to the Treasurer the appropriate budget
for the office. (Paragraph 3.10.12)
Recommendation 11 
The legislation governing the functions of the Auditor General provide the 
office with the power to call for such cabinet documents as may be 
necessary for the purpose of the exercise of the functions of the office of 
Auditor General. (Paragraph �.10.15) 
Recommendation 12 
{a) The legislation governing the functions of the Auditor General provide 
the office with all necessary powers to call for information and the 
production of documents, and to compel the appearance of persons, as may 
be necessary for the purpose of exercising all such functions. (Paragraph 3. 
10.17) 
(b) A public servant should not be appointed to the board of a statutory
authority or State-owned company while retaining a position in the Public
Service in a department within any portfolio of the minister responsible for
that body. (Paragraph 3.14.13)
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Recommendation 17 
Legislation provide that: 
(a) members of all boards of authorities and State-owned companies be 
required to conform to the same standards of probity and integrity as 
expected of persons occupying positions of trust; and 
(b) members of all boards of authorities and State-owned companies 
responsible for any business activity be required to exercise reasonable 
care and diligence in the exercise of their powers. (Paragraph 3.14.17) 
Recommendation 18 
All existing and future State-owned or controlled bodies be subject both to 
the audit of the Auditor General and to the provisions of the Financial 
Administration and Audit Act 1985. (Paragraph 3.14.19) 
Recommendation 19 
A State-owned Companies Act be enacted which will apply to all 
companies currently owned, or subsequently created or acquired, by the 
government or a statutory authority except when, in the case of a particular 
company, specific legislation is enacted governing the conduct of its affairs 
and its accountability. (Paragraph 3.14.22) 
Chapter 4 Integrity in Government 
Recommendation 20 
(a) A separate and independent archives authority be established, acting 
under its own legislation. 
(b) The Commission on Government inquire into the terms of the 
legislation. (Paragraph 4.3. 6) 
Recommendation 21 
The Government review the criminal law for the purpose of assessing its 
adequacy in proscribing conduct in public office for which criminal 
sanctions should be available. (Paragraph 4.5.5) 
Recommendation 28 
The Commission on Government review the electoral system for 
representation in the Legislative Council. (Paragraph 5. 3. 11) 
Recommendation 29 
The Commission on Government review the electoral system for 
representation in the Legislative Assembly. (Paragraph 5. 3. 16) 
Recommendation 30 
The Commission on Government inquire into the means best suited to be 
adopted by the Parliament to bring the entire public sector under its 
scrutiny and review. In this, particular regard should be had-
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(i) the disclosure of electoral expenditure; and
(ii) such other measures relating to political finance as may enhance the
integrity of the system of representative government. (Paragraph 5. 9. 14)
Recommendation 35 
All government instrumentalities, agencies and corporations, as part of 
their annual reports, be required to disclose all expenditure on -
(a) advertising agencies;
(b) market research organisations;
(c) polling organisations;
(d) direct mail organisations;
(e) direct postal or other direct communications to electors or to
householders;
(f) public relations organisations; and
(g) media advertising organisations,
and the persons or organisations to whom these amounts were paid 
Disclosure should not be required if the aggregate expenditure of any 
relevant body does not exceed $1,000. The Auditor General should monitor 
compliance with this requirement. (Paragraph 5. 9. 17) 
Recommendation 36 
The Commission on Government inquire into -
(a) the desirability of regulating government advertising during an election
period; and
(b) the desirability of regulating travel by persons in or connected with the
government during an election period. (Paragraph 5.9.22)
Chapter 6 The Administrative System 
Recommendation 37 
(a) The Government give consideration to the introduction of a Public Sector
Management Act.
(b) A Commissioner for Public Sector Standards be established whose
jurisdiction extends to all the departments and agencies of government.
(Paragraph 6.2.8)
Recommendation 38 
The Government review the Public Service Act 1978, whether as part of the 
Government's consideration of the enactment of a Public Sector 
Management Act, or, if that course is not to be pursued, on its own account. 
(Paragraph 6.3.11) 
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Recommendation 39 
(a) The financial provision made for ministerial staff be the subject of 
separate parliamentary appropriation. 
(b) The employment arrangements for ministerial staff be the subject of 
special legislation and monitored by the Commissioner for Public Sector 
Standards (or the Public Service Commissioner, if the former office is not 
created). 
(c) The manner in which ministerial staff are to deal with the officers of 
departments and agencies, other than with the chief executive officer, be 
made the subject of clear and explicit procedures. (Paragraph 6.4.11) 
Chapter 7 Con:-mission on Government 
Recommendation 40 
A Commission on Government be established in accordance with the 
requirements set out in paragraph 7. 3. 1 of chapter 7. (Paragraph 7. 3. 2) 
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